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# EVALUATION

OF THE UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO  
**MINE ACTION**

**COUNTRY CASE STUDY:**  
Mozambique

Independent Evaluation Office

United Nations Development Programme





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The overall evaluation team was led by Alan Fox and included Charles Downs as Principal Consultant. Jo Durham contributed to the development of a Theory of Change for UNDP mine action. Dilnoor Panjwani developed the global portfolio analysis and provided research support. Sonam Choetsho, Concepcion Cole, Flora Jimenez, Antana Locs and Michelle Sy provided logistical and administrative support. Sasha Jahic managed the production of the report.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This country case report is a component of the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) evaluation of the impact of UNDP support in mine action, contained in the 2014–2015 IEO workplan. The evaluation seeks to assess the impact of UNDP capacity development and other support on mine-affected communities and people, including in particular landmine survivors and their families.

The Mozambique Mine Action Programme has been in existence for over 20 years. It began in 1993 as part of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ). It is expected to achieve compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) — the resolution of all known or suspected minefields — before the end of 2015. UNDP has provided support throughout the entire process, from the peacekeeping mission until today.

In order to gather information relevant to the evaluation from national and international stakeholders and community members, a two-person consultant team visited Mozambique for three weeks in May–June 2015. This report is based on their review of over 20 years of the Mozambique Mine Action Programme and a small sample of community case studies to better understand the impact of landmines and their removal on affected communities and residents.

This report examines the impact of mine action on communities and considers the contribution that UNDP support has made to that impact.

It involved consideration of (a) the stages and results of UNDP support to mine action in Mozambique, particularly through development of national mine action management capacity, and (b) the impact of landmine contamination and mine action at the community level. The authors also sought to determine whether the results of UNDP support contributed to the impacts at the community level. The consultants met with stakeholders and community members in Mozambique who explained their own experiences and their interactions with the National Demining Institute (IND) and UNDP (see Annex 2 for a list of people met).

This report is not a comprehensive evaluation of mine action in Mozambique, nor of UNDP support to mine action in the country. It is not in any way an evaluation of the international and national operators who have conducted demining over the past 20 years. Nor is it an evaluation of all the impacts of mine action in Mozambique.<sup>1</sup>

During the two-plus decades of mine action, demining operations were conducted by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These included Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), HALO Trust, Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), Handicap International (HI), Menschen gegen Morte (MgM) and Apopo. Also involved were the armed forces and commercial firms. For the first half of the programme, mine action operations were carried out under three largely autonomous programmes, run by HALO Trust in the north, NPA in the centre and ADP in the south. UNDP supported

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1 The consultants are aware of many other significant impacts that mine action has had in Mozambique that are outside the scope of the current assignment. These include opening of roads for refugee return and provision of humanitarian assistance; reconstruction of infrastructure essential for the national economy (electricity generation and distribution, railroads, roads); clearance of land to permit development of mineral resources (coal, gas) and commercial agriculture (Buzi sugarcane fields); and mine action as a prerequisite for other development projects (on education, health, expansion of mobile communications network) and tourism (Limpopo Transborder Natural Park).

ADP with advisers and resources. All three entities resisted the coordination efforts of the national authorities — the National Demining Commission (CND) and IND.

Information regarding the national landmine problem was unreliable. The Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey, which took place in 1999-2001, was flawed, yet the three main demining operators were expected to use it in their work. Efforts by IND to develop a national strategy based on the survey were somewhat discredited as a result. Nonetheless the key target of that strategy — clearance of all high- and medium-impact sites by 2006 — was largely accomplished. The clearance effort was hit hard in 2004/2006 by a corruption scandal involving senior staff of IND, NPA and a UNDP programme officer; the collapse of ADP; and withdrawal by most bilateral donors with only low-impact sites remaining. The result was a loss of donor confidence, a drastic reduction in funding and the abrupt loss of over half the country's demining capacity.

This crisis came as Mozambique was preparing to develop a new mine action strategy and a request for extension of its Article 5 deadline. IND asked HALO Trust to conduct a baseline assessment (2007/2008) of the tasks remaining in the six provinces of the centre and south. After some review, the data from the assessment were accepted as reliable and replaced the previous IND database. With a more credible basis for further planning, IND worked with the operators and agreed that the national landmine problem could be resolved by 2014. IND also agreed to assign operators to specific districts that were to be entirely concluded before demining teams were moved to other districts. Agreement was made easier by the fact that ADP and NPA — which had been responsible for the south and centre of the country — were no longer operational.

Based on the community visits conducted during this evaluation, the clearance of landmines had a consistent and dramatic impact by eliminating

people's fear and freeing them to move around freely to undertake their daily activities. This important human security and human development impact affected all community members and should not be underestimated. However, the areas released were, in most cases, relatively small, and their use provided marginal benefits to those who cultivated or grazed their animals on them. The communities visited relied on subsistence agriculture. The improved access to resources due to the clearance of land has generally improved their quality of life and livelihoods, although use of the cleared land has produced little if any increase in their agricultural production.

During the first 10 years, UNDP provided technical advisers to ADP, CND and IND; channelled funding to each organization (most heavily to ADP); and took the leading role in coordinating donor support. During the final 10 years, UNDP's central contribution was its role in strengthening credibility of the national programme after the crisis of 2004-2006, which increased donor support. Another important UNDP contribution was the continuing presence of a chief technical adviser (CTA). The CTA provided advice to the IND national director and staff, helped mediate the relationship with other stakeholders and helped coordinate support from external partners. These included the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Survey Action Centre (SAC) and Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP).

In 2008 IND developed the Article 5 extension request and the corresponding National Mine Action Strategy 2008-2014. This demonstrated that it was largely able to manage the mine action programme cooperatively with other key stakeholders. This followed more than 10 years of UNDP technical advisory support, and a crisis faced by IND during a gap in that support. The results of UNDP capacity development efforts were non-linear. The various technical advisers (TAs) were quite active during their time in position, and the standard indicators of organizational capacity were achieved:

- The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was established.
- The Landmine Impact Survey was conducted.
- Prioritization for demining was based on socioeconomic impact.
- The Mozambique Mine Action Standards were put in place in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
- Quality assurance (QA) offices were operational.
- The National Mine Action Strategy was adopted, as were some of the indicators of national ownership.
- IND was formally established and put on the national budget.
- Mine action was included in the National Poverty Reduction Plan.
- The APMBC was signed, ratified and incorporated into the laws of the country.

Nonetheless, most parties would have agreed that this did not constitute the establishment of effective national management capacity. In particular, information management was always a weak point, despite the fact that the database unit received the greatest amount of assistance over the longest period of time; and the QA personnel did not provide credible oversight of operator demining activities.

Part of the support to the database unit has always included payment of UNDP salaries to national project staff. This did not institutionalize capacity, and in general project staff (who received the majority of all training) left when their higher salaries were in doubt. QA was generally staffed by people without demining experience. In the final years they gained increased respect from the operators when QA focused attention on the process of handing over districts and provinces, rather than on individual cleared areas.

The district-by-district approach represented a change in prioritization, in a context of a generalized low-level threat and socioeconomic impact, based on learning by IND and operational stakeholders, particularly HALO Trust. This approach gave greater importance to the quality of hand-over and to the need for local authorities and communities to be convinced that all known problems had been resolved.

Neither IND nor UNDP engaged significantly on the issue of mine victim assistance. This was consistent with the general approach of the Government of Mozambique and the international mine action community more broadly, which saw mine victim assistance as a concern for the health, social welfare and labour sectors.

Nonetheless, UNDP could have done more in this area, including by advocating for and supporting a national survey to identify mine victims, perhaps along with other persons with disabilities. Support to the survey of mine victims in two provinces by HI and Ravim in 2012 was a good contribution. A more comprehensive survey is still needed to inform national policy.

UNDP's essential contribution to community-level impact is due to its continued partnership with the Government; persuading donors to return to support the strategy to conclude eradication of the known landmine problem; and ensuring accountability for use of funds. Specific elements of UNDP technical support had only a distant relationship to community-level impact, other than to ensure the continuing partnership at the practical as well as organizational levels.

Finally, the transition of essential mine action capacities from IND to appropriate long-term organizations is now on the agenda. IND has made a good proposal, but as yet there is no indication that the entities it has proposed to take on mine responsibilities — Ministry of Interior/police for residual explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and Ministry of Land for the database of past contamination — are preparing to receive these responsibilities. Furthermore, the database

is quite incomplete; it contains only areas suspected and cleared or otherwise released since 2008. A complete database covering the two decades of mine action, needed to inform future land development decisions, is an essential part of the legacy of mine action in Mozambique. It should be a high priority for IND, UNDP and donors during the handover transition phase.

As Mozambique is about to become the first significantly mine-affected country to declare itself

mine free, all those who participated in mine action can be proud of the fact that communities live without fear and have derived socioeconomic benefits from the clearance. UNDP's contribution to that is indirect and at the national level, where it has been a long-term partner to the Government and IND and acted as a mediator, coordinator and fund manager for the sector. This ongoing partnership has been essential to the long-term success and completion of the Mozambique national mine action programme.

## Section 1

# COUNTRY BACKGROUND

### PROGRESS ON ARTICLE 5 COMPLETION

Mozambique is on the brink of becoming the first of the most heavily mine-affected countries to declare itself fully compliant with Article 5 of Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC, also known as the Ottawa Convention). The country is expected to achieve elimination of all known or suspected minefields in the third quarter of 2015. This is a historic accomplishment, for which the Government of Mozambique should be proud. So too should the donors and United Nations agencies that have supported the programme and all the operators who have implemented it.

The road to this achievement has not been easy. Mozambique's mine action programme has faced complications throughout its existence due to

lack of agreed accurate estimates on the extent of the problem. In 1992, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in Mozambique announced that there were 2 million landmines in the country. However, it has since been concluded that this figure greatly overstated the number of landmines. Later surveys and ongoing revisions improved the level of knowledge about the landmine contamination.

In 2000 the reported number of new victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) was about 90. Since 2011 it has fallen to under 1 per month, many of whom were victims of ERW other than landmines.<sup>2</sup> When the declaration of elimination of all known minefields is made, it will



*Sao Damasio on the edge of Maputo. Pylons/powerlines were mined by the Government during the war to protect them. The area has now been cleared and people are settling there and farming the land. Photo: UNDP/ Rebecca Roberts.*

<sup>2</sup> Landmine Monitor, Mozambique country profiles, 2012, 2013 and 2014, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/home.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/home.aspx), accessed 7 July 2015.

be with full awareness that more mines and ERW could be found, for which a 'residual response' capacity will be required for many years.

Mozambique's economy has grown briskly in recent years, but its majority rural population remains among the poorest in the world. Elimination of all known minefields does not eliminate poverty or guarantee social and economic development. It does, however, remove obstacles and allows people to live their lives without fear. It also supports public and private investment efforts.

## **CONFLICT AND THE LANDMINE PROBLEM**

In 1992, when the UN-brokered General Peace Agreement was signed between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), this large country had an extensive but unknown landmine problem. Over time all but 5 of the country's 128 districts were found to have landmines, the result of three distinct phases of conflict over a period of nearly 30 years:

- 1964-1975: During the fight for independence from Portugal, the Portuguese laid large barrier minefields in the northern provinces to prevent incursions by FRELIMO, particularly from United Republic of Tanzania, plus defensive minefields around key infrastructure such as the Cahora Bassa Dam.
- 1976-1979: During the Zimbabwe independence struggle, the Rhodesian military established large barrier minefields along the border and smaller minefields within Mozambican territory. The Mozambican military also mined some of the routes taken by Rhodesian forces during incursions into Mozambique.
- 1979-1992: During the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO, both sides used landmines throughout the national territory, to protect infrastructure and block access and for short-term tactical purposes.

Much of the landmine contamination was concentrated around large infrastructure projects such as dams, railroads and power lines, not necessarily near population centres. Yet landmine contamination still had socioeconomic and security impacts on communities throughout the country.

## **ORIGIN OF MINE ACTION AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT**

When the General Peace Agreement was signed in 1992, international experience with what has come to be called mine action was very limited and country specific. The first internationally sponsored mine action programme had begun in Afghanistan in 1989, coordinated by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. It was followed by a programme in Cambodia begun in 1992 under a peacekeeping mission. Both programmes were run by United Nations bodies and gave rise to competing specialized units without clear coordination. These programmes, which preceded the APMBC, focused primarily on opening access to allow refugees to return home and for international humanitarian assistance; there was no global or national long-term plan.

In Mozambique, both the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) were involved. They began to train and deploy deminers in 1993, hoping to adapt the Cambodia model. (In Cambodia, UNDP established a project to provide an organizational structure for hiring previously trained deminers.) After an arms company won a tender for road clearance, DHA and UMOMOZ found themselves in the middle of a complex dispute with donors and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The process continued unresolved for many months, and UNDP was eventually asked to finalize a transparent contracting process. The entire process took nearly two years, making the United Nations appear slow and bureaucratic, and reinforcing the preference of some key donors to support bilateral initiatives.



Map showing contamination produced by the men living in Semacusa, Sofala Province, in a focus group discussion during a community visit. Photo: UNDP/ Rebecca Roberts.

The three demining operators that were to dominate the demining in Mozambique were in place by 1994. They were:

- Norwegian Peoples' Aid (NPA) mine action programme, established in Tete, where the organization already was operating a rural development programme that was soon expanded to the other central provinces of Sofala and Manica
- HALO Trust, established in Zambezia to support the work of NGOs from the United Kingdom, which soon extended its activities to the three northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa
- The Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), established as a UNDP project to employ the deminers who had been trained during the peacekeeping phase, working in the three southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane. ADP was the largest of the three organizations for many years.

## NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME STAKEHOLDERS

There are a variety of mine action stakeholders in Mozambique:

- NPA, HALO Trust and ADP were all established during the peacekeeping period and remained the principal clearance operators over the life of the Mozambique mine action programme.
- Menschen gegen Morte (MgM; 2001-2003), Handicap International (HI; 1998-2015) and Apopo (2006-2015) each established demining operations in the country.
- HI and the International Committee of the Red Cross both established orthopaedic and rehabilitation centres in each province.
- International commercial clearance companies (i.e., Bactec, Minetech, Mechem) were active from the beginning of the programme and eventually stimulated the development of 30 local clearance companies.

- Ronco trained Army demining teams and established a civilian quick reaction demining force that conducted clearance when it was not deployed elsewhere by the United States Department of State.
- The Mozambique armed forces began conducting demining in support of infrastructure projects in the first years of the new millennium.
- The initial national mine action authority, Comissao Nacional de Desminagem (CND), was established in 1995, but remained understaffed and ineffective in the absence of donor agreement that it should play a significant role.
- The Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) succeeded CND in 1999, as stakeholders began to recognize the need for long-term government involvement and became concerned with the de facto division of the country into three autonomous areas of operation under the main NGOs. IND received more support from donors than had CND, channelled mostly through UNDP.
- UNDP was the main channel for support to ADP, as the ‘national mine action capacity’, and for donor coordination in support of the overall mine action programme.
- UNICEF and HI were actively involved in mine risk education.
- Multiple donors supported mine action, often but not always through UNDP, including Adopt-a-Minefield, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
- National ministries with projects requiring demining support were potential stakeholders, but the main entities (transport and utility authorities) made their own arrangements without IND.
- Provincial and local authorities worked closely with the operators in their area and over time became more involved with IND in the development of strategy, priorities and annual plans.

## Section 2

# PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MINE ACTION MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

National mine action management capacity has developed in five main phases, as summarized below; more detail is available in Annex 4.

### **THE ORIGINS OF MINE ACTION IN MOZAMBIQUE: 1992–1994**

Following the General Peace Agreement, UNOMOZ was established to oversee the initial transition. Among its responsibilities was ensuring mine clearance for safe access of peacekeepers, returning refugees and humanitarian assistance. The mission began to train Mozambican deminers and contract for road clearance/verification and for an emergency survey of the mine problem. The road clearance contract took nearly two years to get in place, leaving the impression that the United Nations was slow and bureaucratic. NPA and HALO Trust established mine action programmes in the central and northern parts of the country, with direct support from their donors.

In order to give the trained deminers an organizational structure, UNDP established the ADP as a project, much as it had recently done in Cambodia, and ADP took responsibility for clearance in the south. Each of the three organizations had its own operational management structure (for the Mozambican deminers in the south this was provided initially by UNOMOZ) and conducted its work in isolation; there was no effort to create an overall national programme. UNDP did not provide any advisers or capacity development support during this period. At the end of the period, there were three autonomous mine action programmes, each operating in one third of the country. There was no national authority or perspective on how to manage a national programme.

### **FIRST EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL PROGRAMME: 1995–1999**

In mid-1995, CND was created as a temporary body with responsibility for managing the overall mine clearance programme in the country. It was profoundly understaffed, with fewer than 10 staff members, and they were paid for the first time in 1997. None of the demining actors and few donors thought there was much need for a national authority. Starting in 1997, UNDP provided CND with up to five technical advisers while continuing to channel resources and provide technical advisers to ADP.

Most of CND's staff were military personnel from Australia and New Zealand on six-month rotations. As the period progressed, and the mine problem received more attention after Mozambique signed the APMBC, some donors became more concerned about the need for a national management authority and the weakness of CND relative to the three autonomously funded and managed mine action programmes. Given the lack of national data about the problem, there was also discussion about the need for a landmine impact survey (LIS). UNDP became accepted in the role of general donor coordinator.

### **BEGINNING OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY: 1999–2005**

In mid-1999 the Government converted CND into the IND, establishing it as a formally established autonomous body to manage the mine action programme in the country. With a new national director in charge, IND took over the staff of CND and added more. In 2000, UNDP began the first of several capacity development projects. Through this project UNDP provided

as many as five advisers simultaneously, covering operations, planning, database, finance and administration, as well as a chief technical adviser (CTA) from 2001 to 2005. The staff complement was then gradually reduced, until only the CTA remained as of 2008.

The Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey report, delivered in 2001, was subject to considerable criticism from those who had gained experience with other such surveys. Yet its results became the basis for preparation of national mine action standards (in English) and the first National Mine Action Plan, covering 2002 to 2006, under the leadership of the UNDP advisers. The plan targeted demining of all high- and medium-impact communities by 2006. In 2002 national mine action standards were adopted (in English). Quality assurance (QA) processes were established and teams deployed to the three regional offices of IND; unfortunately the QA team members had little experience as deminers. The three main operators continued to guard their autonomy.

Based in part on the announced target of having only low-impact contamination left after 2006, many donors announced that they would phase out of mine action in Mozambique. Both NPA and HALO Trust announced that they were nearing conclusion and would leave around the end of 2006. HALO Trust conducted a detailed survey to ensure that it had resolved all known or suspected mine fields in the four provinces where it worked (2004-2007). NPA conducted an assessment of all the tasks it had concluded and identified those that remained in its area. The IND database continued to be a weak point throughout this period, even though its staff received signif-

icant support and training in producing it. The reduction in suspected hazardous areas over the 2002-2006 period is shown in Table 1.

Donors were not convinced that IND was playing its expected role, nor that the Government thought that mine action was important, as evidenced by the lack of reference to it in the first Poverty Reduction Plan (PARPA I, 2001-2005).

Beginning in late 2003, the demining programme was hit by a corruption scandal involving IND, NPA and UNDP staff. ADP collapsed in early 2005. With the credibility of key actors damaged, funding dried up. In order to keep national staff who otherwise would have received low government salaries, UNDP had recruited key individuals as national project staff (working on the database and QA, in particular), and soon found itself topping up the salary of most IND staff. When the main UNDP project supporting IND ended, many staff who had been contracted as project staff (and others) simply left, taking their expertise with them. The impact was hardest on the database unit, which had always been weak, and operations/QA.

Many of the elements expected to be strengthened through capacity development had been created, but they remained weak and had limited national ownership as the period ended in crisis.

## CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL OWNERSHIP: 2005-2008

This period began with a financial crisis for IND, the imminent departure of all major demining

**Table 1. Reduction in suspected hazardous areas, 2002-2006**

Impact	Suspected hazardous areas identified in LIS	Suspected hazardous areas demined/cancelled	Suspected hazardous areas remaining, end 2006	Percent remaining
High	56	50	6	10
Medium	341	241	100	30
Low	977	780	197	20
Total	1,374	1,071	303	28

operators, the end of UNDP resident international technical assistance, and the loss of many staff, including some of the best trained. Demining resources fell by half during 2005/2006, and most of the remainder (from HALO Trust) was being terminated (Table 2). Mozambique’s initial Article 5 deadline was approaching and the country had little chance of meeting it.<sup>3</sup>

On the basis of accumulated experience, a core group within IND was able to improve cooperation with operators and develop national ownership of the process. Although initially suspicious of the HALO Trust ‘mine impact free district’ survey in the north (begun in 2004 and completed in mid-2007), IND came to recognize it as a good way forward. In mid-2006 it asked the HALO Trust to conduct a baseline assessment in the rest of the country. The results provided the best picture of the overall landmine situation and served as the basis for development of the Article 5 extension request (2008) and the second National Mine Action Plan (2008–2012, later extended to 2014).

Unfortunately, the baseline assessment results simply became the new database, and all previous data were set aside. From a development perspective, UNDP should have focused attention on the

importance of the complete dataset covering two decades of mine action. Considerable effort will be required to reconstruct it.

The new plan established the district-by-district approach as the basis for priority setting and allocation of tasks. IND developed land release standards during this period to reduce the tendency of some operators to clear areas lacking confirmed suspicion. Most of the operators did not accept this. QA capacity continued to develop with increased training and attention to handover of concluded tasks.

Mine action was explicitly recognized as one of eight crosscutting issues in the second Poverty Reduction Plan (PARPA II, 2006–2010). Norway was one of the most active donors during this period, cooperating with IND (with which it had signed a multi-year memorandum of understanding) as well as UNDP and the operators to develop an effective strategy.

This development of national ownership and management capacity occurred at the time when there was the least presence of international advisers. It was built on the foundations developed during the previous years, but without the

**Table 2. Operational resources, 2002–2006**

Humanitarian operator	Capacity				Year of withdrawal
	Deminers	Machines	Dogs	Rats	
MgM	44	2	6	0	2003
ADP	233	2	12	0	2005
Ronco	53	1	8	0	2006
NPA	220	2	12	0	2006
HALO Trust	455	9	0	0	Planned for 2007 <sup>4</sup>
HI	28	1	4	0	
Apopo	8	0	0	12	

3 Article 5 of the APMBC requires each State party to survey and clear all known mined areas within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention. If a country is unable to meet this deadline, it must request an ‘Article 5 extension’ for additional time to meet its obligations.

4 HALO Trust finished its work in northern Mozambique in 2007 and then began clearing mines in the southern and central regions. It completed its work in the country in 2015, after clearing the last known minefield. [www.halotrust.org](http://www.halotrust.org)

presence of the international advisers or many trained counterparts.

### **CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF APMBC COMPLETION: 2008–2015**

Donors began to support IND again in 2008 and to channel more of their funds through UNDP by 2011. This reflected donor confidence in the National Mine Action Strategy (2008-2012), based on the same analysis that went into the Article 5 extension request. Both of these were developed with leadership by IND and broad stakeholder consultation. The mine action programme became focused on a realistic target of concluding the elimination of all known minefields in the foreseeable future. The importance of mine action was again reflected in the third poverty reduction plan (PARP, 2011-2015) and the government Five Year Plan (2010-2014).

Following adoption of the Mine Action Strategy by the Council of Ministers in 2008, the level of government funding to IND and operations increased significantly (Table 3). Operators and donors began to cooperate in quarterly meetings to review progress and allocate additional funds according to need and resources. Even donors not channeling funds through UNDP attended, announced their funding and followed the priorities identified by IND. IND developed a residual response transition plan, which called for trained

units of the national police to deal with the remaining ERW. It also called for the database to be turned over to a national entity that would make available information on environmental and other spatial hazards to support future development. Throughout this period, IND exercised leadership of the process in conjunction with the operator and other partners. The database remained a weak point, and QA was still developing.

Landmine contamination is about to become a thing of the past in Mozambique. The baseline assessment identified approximately 15 sq km of confirmed hazardous area to be demined. The district-by-district process of ensuring that communities and local authorities are convinced that all suspected areas have been demined resulted in verification of an additional 40 sq km, without requirement for full clearance, resulting in a total of 55 sq km demined since 2008. IND records indicate that there are 16 suspended tasks and 16 confirmed hazardous areas with total estimated area of 16,700 square metres that are continually under water and provide no current hazard to human activities.<sup>5</sup> These areas were mined during the conflict, in periods of extreme drought. Plans call for them to be demined when they become accessible again, as is the case in two areas in Sofala province that were being demined in mid-2015. Mozambique plans to declare itself free of all known minefields in 2015, since these inaccessible areas present no current hazard.

<b>Table 3. Programme financing, millions of US dollars</b>								
<b>1999–2006</b>								
<b>Year</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Government	0.2	0.2	0.3	5.9	1.3	7.6	2.1	1.3
Donors	12	17	15.1	16.9	18.1	14.4	15.0	6.2
<b>2007–2014</b>								
<b>Year</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Government	1.3	1.56	1.17	1.42	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
Donors	2.5	4.3	5.9	8.1	12.4	10.1	17.1	13.2

Source: IND annual reports

<sup>5</sup> IND (2015), Resultados PNAM (2008-2014).

## Section 3

# IMPACT OF LANDMINE CONTAMINATION AT COMMUNITY LEVEL

Over 70 percent of the 25 million people in Mozambique live in rural areas.<sup>6</sup> The villages visited for this study, in May and June 2015, relied mainly on subsistence farming; most produced small amounts of excess produce for sale (see community profiles in Annex 5). Many of the villagers kept animals for their own use while a few bred and sold them for profit. Charcoal production was also an important income-generating activity, particularly for people living by the side of the road who were able to benefit from passing trade.

The villagers' homes were scattered, and there were generally a few shops, a market and sometimes a school and one or more churches located in a central area. Most villages also had a grinding mill, which in some cases had been provided by the Government in recent years. The women in particular reported that the mills saved a lot of labour, although they still had to remove the grain husks by hand. The ground in the centre of the villages was cleared to bare earth; none had been surfaced with asphalt. Beyond the village centres, the undergrowth was thick and high, which hid the private houses and disguised the extent of the villages.

Homes were typically constructed of wood, mud and thatch, although wealthier villagers used baked or unbaked bricks and had zinc roofs. Water was taken from wells, often equipped with hand pumps, or rivers. Some villages were located on main asphalt roads but access to most villages was via dirt tracks. The shops sold food, clothes and household goods. Villages along main roads sold their produce, including charcoal, to pass-

ersby. Apart from the main roads there was very little infrastructure.

Semacuesa, in Sofala province, was located on the train line next to a station, and some settlements had grown up along the route of power lines extending between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, the villages were not connected to electricity. Some villages had one or two solar panels and a couple had mobile telephone masts. These had been erected in the past few years by private companies, giving the people very good telephone reception. Wealthier residents had vehicles, motorcycles or bicycles, but most people travelled on foot. Local traders also brought and collected produce by vehicle.

Among themselves, the villagers identified different standards of living, usually dividing the population into two or three groups. The descriptions of the different groups were consistent among the villages included in this study. Over half of the population in Mozambique lives below the poverty line, according to UNDP, and the inhabitants essentially differentiated between different levels of poverty, rather than suggesting that people were well off.<sup>7</sup> Formal employment among the rural communities was rare. The wealthier groups had better homes and furniture, were better dressed and ate better than the poor groups. They were more likely to be able to buy goods that were manufactured rather than made in the village or by themselves. They had land and animals, including cows.

The poorer groups were unlikely to know each morning what they would eat that day, and they

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6 UNDP in Mozambique, [www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/countryinfo/](http://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/countryinfo/), accessed 18 June 2015.

7 UNDP in Mozambique, *ibid.*

relied on subsistence farming and charcoal production to meet all their needs. The wealthier were able to increase their agricultural production by investing in equipment and land. Their children attended school and were likely to complete their education whereas children from poorer families rarely completed their education because their labour was needed to contribute to household survival. Often poorer families could not afford to clothe their children or purchase the books needed for school. Wealth affected marriage prospects; men who were unable to offer a dowry were unable to marry.

The inhabitants of all the villages studied reported similar impacts from landmine contamination and clearance. Communities reported the main impacts of the clearance as freedom from fear, being able to move freely and to access resources freely. Often the local population knew which areas were mined, either because they had been informed by the armed forces who had laid the mines or because they were able to work it out for themselves after a number of incidents. Sometimes villagers' suspicions about contamination proved unfounded once an area had been checked. However, the belief that an area is mined has the same impact as if it actually is mined because it creates fear among the people and prevents access to that area.

With the exception of Nhamudimo in Manica province, all communities reported that the fear caused by the landmine contamination had a significant impact on their daily lives. They constantly worried that they or their family members, friends or animals would step on landmines. Some women reported that they would congratulate their children when they returned home safely. The fear was not based on large numbers of recent victims; in fact, none of the places visited had many incidents following the war. Some villages reported one or two human victims during the war and the loss of some animals. Once the contaminated areas were known, people were able to avoid them. But fear caused by uncertainty about contamination restricted people from accessing resources such as food,

water and shelter, so they worried about their immediate survival.

In Mutocoma, the inhabitants reported that during the war the armed forces laid mines each night to restrict enemy movements, and removed them in the morning so that people could resume daily activities. Living with the threat of landmines and the constant uncertainty about their locations goes some way to explaining the continuation of the fear long after the war ended, despite the fact that the locations of the remaining contaminated areas were known.

Residents of Nhamudimo stated that the presence of a contaminated area near their village was not a cause for concern. The stark contrast in their attitudes from those living elsewhere is perhaps because the contamination had not affected their daily lives, unlike all the other villages visited. Although access to some land for grazing and collecting firewood was restricted, there were alternatives. In other villages, limited access to resources had significant impacts on people's ability to engage in normal daily activities. For example, many reported that the landmine contamination prevented them from washing and cooking their food properly because they could not collect firewood or water. As a result, people became ill and some even died from diarrhoea. Sometimes it was not possible to cook enough food so people went to bed hungry. The lack of building materials meant that houses could not be constructed properly. As a result they leaked, so people were cold and wet or had to sleep outside or squashed together in a small building.

The landmine contamination restricted people's abilities to farm, often reducing them to cultivating smaller areas. This was less efficient and prevented them from growing sufficient food. Consequently people were hungry and were forced to forage for food, which led to diarrhoea and other sicknesses, and one reported death. Limited access to farmland hampered their ability to grow enough food so there was no surplus to sell. This meant that families had no money

to buy things they were unable to produce themselves such as clothes. As a result, the women in Mutocoma reported that they worked in the fields naked. Children also missed out on their education due to lack of money.

The neighbouring villages of Maconha and Josina Machel reported additional problems with monkeys and baboons, which steal food from cultivated land. The inhabitants were forced to farm smaller patches of safe land in areas that were contaminated. The monkeys and baboons deduced that the humans would only chase them for a short distance when they stole food, so they would loiter nearby observing the farming and make brief forays into the cultivated land, stealing food in full view of the farmers. The villagers reported that to protect their produce they had to be on their land and prepared to chase away the monkeys and baboons at all times. This work was tiring and time consuming.

In general, the inability to access resources and to walk around freely was time consuming for everyone. Children who attended school had to walk around the contaminated area, which took them longer. Tasks that children might carry out had to be done by adults to prevent children

from entering unsafe areas. Women in particular reported that the restricted movement added to their burden, as it took longer to collect water and firewood.

Populations reported feeling isolated, as restrictions on their travel prevented them from trading their goods and purchasing supplies. Similarly they found that traders were less likely to come to them, as vehicles loaded with goods could not enter the village and people were unwilling to visit on foot. In Mabenga in Maputo province and Semacuesa in Sofala province, the areas next to the roads were mined. As a result communities were living in areas set back from the road, preventing them from selling produce to passersby. In Maconha, which was more remote than the other places visited and accessible only by a single dirt track, the people complained that the contamination reduced their income-generating opportunities because they were unable to travel on foot to seek daily wage labour.

Overall, the lack of freedom of movement increased the uncertainty of daily life by restricting access to resources. In turn, this exacerbated the fear created by the contamination because people did not know how they were going to survive.



## Section 4

# KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND RESULTS

### QUESTION 1. RELEVANCE OF UNDP SUPPORT IN MINE ACTION

To what extent was UNDP support to mine action relevant to the needs of countries supported? Did support vary among countries and over time to reflect different national contexts? Have programmes been implemented on a scale that allowed for the expected impact? Is the scope and extent of UNDP global engagement in mine action consistent with its mandate and linked to other support efforts?

- Was UNDP support in mine action relevant to country needs and consistent with UNDP’s poverty reduction mandate? Did UNDP respond to changing needs for support as national contexts changed?

UNDP support to mine action in Mozambique has generally responded to the country’s changing needs, although often in a reactive and personalized manner and without a long-term strategy. UNDP support has taken three major forms: (a) provision of technical advisers and resource mobilization for ADP; (b) provision of technical advisers and resource mobilization for IND; and (c) donor coordination, resource mobilization and assistance in raising the international profile of the country in the context of APMBC fulfilment.

**Support to ADP:** UNDP established the ADP project in 1994, following the model established a year earlier in Cambodia, but without any long-term strategy. ADP was seen as a successful experience for most of its existence, but the difficulty in converting it to a sustainable, independent legal entity was of growing concern. ADP competed to some extent with CND and then IND to be the ‘national mine action entity,’ which complicated the establishment of a credible national authority and national programme. With the establishment of IND, UNDP continued to provide advisers to ADP, while mobilizing resources for both of them. UNDP’s initial support was responsive to international and national needs. However, it did not respond effectively to the changing circumstances by developing a national programme and was unprepared for the precipitous collapse of ADP in 2005.

**Support to IND:** UNDP provided five long-term advisers during the period 2001-2005, covering the key aspects of mine action (Table 4). The operations adviser was removed in 2007, leaving only the CTA position. The advisers supported key IND departments and assisted with preparation of the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS; in English) and the National Mine Action Strategy, based on the LIS. The advisers also aided develop-

**Table 4. National directors and UNDP technical advisers, 1995–2015**

IND national directors		UNDP chief technical advisers	
1995-1999 (CND)	Osorio Severiano	1995-1999 (CND)	(unknown)
1999-2003	Artur Verissimo	2000-2001	Pieter de Villiers
2003-2006	Gamiliel Munguambe	2001-2004	Olaf Juergensen
2006-2012	Julio Braga	2005-2008	Lutful Kabir
2012-2015	Alfredo Augusto	2008-2010	Hanoch Barlevi
		2011-2015	Hans Risser

ment of the operations, information and administration sections. This responded to the perceived requirements of IND at that time and supported important steps in development of IND operational and strategic planning capacities. Information management remained weak. The financial and administrative procedures supported were those of the United Nations rather than of the national Government. Over the following years, strategic planning/coordination and operations/QA were often the focus of targeted or general support by UNDP and other partners, such as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Survey Action Centre (SAC) and NPA. This contributed to continuing improvement as observed by IND staff and other stakeholders.<sup>8</sup>

Since 2008, UNDP has provided two long-term CTAs (with gaps) who have generally sought to support IND and the national director. They have often served as facilitators/mediators to ensure effective communication and participation by IND and international stakeholders, particularly operators. The effectiveness of these two and previous CTAs has reportedly varied considerably, apparently due in large part to differences in personal (rather than technical) skills and the relationship between the CTA and the national director.<sup>9</sup>

**Support to donor coordination and raising the international profile of Mozambique mine action:** Since the mid-1990s, UNDP has supported Mozambique in its mine action efforts on both national and international levels. It has been seen by donors and stakeholders as the lead international partner of the national Government. Support to ADP in the 1990s led some to view UNDP as preferring that operator, but since

the three operators competed more in rhetoric than in territory, this did not cause any significant problems. UNDP supported the new IND in organizing the first meeting of States Parties (1999) and the third APMBC review conference (2014). Over the past five years, it has managed donor contributions to all operators, allocated based on IND-led stakeholder planning. This accountability mechanism is preferred by the current IND director over direct management of the funds, which brings the risk of corruption. UNDP continues to support the current transition process to ensure maintenance of the legacy and relevant institutional capacities to deal with future residual contamination.

- **To what extent did UNDP partner with other actors to provide this support? Did UNDP link mine action support to other country support mechanisms (e.g., anti-poverty, post-crisis recovery, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, cash for work, community development, etc.)**

UNDP has had sustained partnerships with several organizations in support of mine action and has facilitated the cooperation of these partners with the Mozambique national authority. During the first decade of support to ADP and IND, UNOPS served as executing partner. The longest term partner has been GICHD. It has provided support in development of information management (particularly of the Information Management System for Mine Action [IMSMA] since 2001), national standards and other operational areas, and most recently planning for residual response. SAC provided support for development of the land release policy and information management. The Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) provided support for integrat-

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8 These same areas received attention throughout the international mine action community during this period. Attention was focused on development of national strategic plans, standards, standard operating procedures, etc. at the UNDP/Cranfield Senior Managers Training Course. Attention was also given to issuance in 2001 of the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards, and spreading use since 1999 of the GICHD-supported Information Management System for Mine Action.

9 The term Chief Technical Advisor may be somewhat misleading, since after the CTA from 2000-2001, none of the four successor CTAs brought significant mine action technical knowledge.

ing gender into mine action. NPA is currently providing support in information management.

UNDP does not appear to have linked mine action to other UNDP programming to date. The current UNDP country director indicated that completion of the landmine effort, which coincides with development of the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework, is a good opportunity for multi-agency programming of decentralized activities within the national territory. These could be developed through joint programming, for example by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, together with UNDP.

■ **Did UNDP promote gender equity and South-South cooperation in its mine action support?**

Mozambique has its own laws and long-standing government policies promoting gender equity. UNDP has not provided regular attention to this issue in mine action, although it requested and facilitated the GMAP assessment in 2011 and follow-up missions in 2014. All major operators in Mozambique have female deminers, which is relatively unusual compared to other countries. Gender-disaggregated data are collected in surveys and reported when available in victim statistics.<sup>10</sup>

UNDP supports South-South cooperation and has sponsored exchange visits with other programmes since the Mine Action Exchange in the first years of the new millennium. IND has established ongoing relationships with other national programmes (with Cambodia in particular), facilitated in part with support from UNDP.

■ **What steps have been taken by country offices to ensure that mine action programming results can be reported through**

**the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017? What changes in mine action programming approach and content are required by UNDP to ensure that mine action programming is inextricably linked to the organization's mission/vision?**

Support to mine action is an important part of the UNDP-Government of Mozambique programme. The country office was concerned that the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 did not include the mine action outcomes that were in previous multi-year funding frameworks. Because mine action is referenced in government planning and poverty reduction documents, the country office has mapped its mine action support programme to the poverty reduction outcomes of the Strategic Plan. It also considered mapping them to the outcomes related to disaster risk reduction, resilience and human security. Mine action is an important concern of the Government, and the UNDP country office believes it is important to provide support to it; as such, it always would find an appropriate outcome for reporting on mine action.

Nonetheless, the country office is concerned by the suggestion that UNDP might no longer have corporate involvement in this area. Mine action is important in many countries and is supported by several United Nations agencies and donors. The current UNDP country director insists that it is important for UNDP to remain engaged at the global level.

**QUESTION 2. EFFECTIVENESS OF UNDP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS**

**Has UNDP been able to address the national and local capacity development agenda in designing and implementing mine action programmes? Were the targeted government capac-**

<sup>10</sup> Gender in mine action has been a long-standing concern of the international mine action community. The importance of interviewing both women and men during community surveys has been recognized since the 1990s, and it is incorporated in the IMAS and NMAS standards on survey. The UN Guidelines on Gender and Mine Action (2005) were widely disseminated and discussed globally.

**ities, policies, services and laws developed? To what extent did UNDP assistance contribute?**

The core technical capacities for management of the national mine action programme — including strategic planning, database and information management, QA, prioritization and management of relationships with operational stakeholders — have been developed over the 20-plus years of UNDP support. More precisely, they were the focus of considerable support over more than a decade beginning in 1995 (with IND since 1999). The national capacity did not develop in a simple linear fashion.

The first Mine Action Strategic Plan (2002-2006) was based on the first nationwide picture of the landmine situation, provided by the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (MLIS). Its deficiencies significantly discredited this first effort at strategic planning. The second Mine Action Strategic Plan (2008-2014) was based on the more widely accepted data of the baseline assessment of 2007/2008. It provided the basis for the district-by-district approach and a more effective government strategy, and it called for the elimination of all known or suspected minefields by 2014.

Socioeconomic prioritization was adopted in the first National Mine Action Strategy, and was to some extent discredited along with that strategy. Beginning in 2005, it was complemented by prioritization of low-impact communities with development projects, and then in 2008 by the district-by-district approach.

Database and information management had a dedicated technical adviser for nearly 10 years, with additional support provided by GICHD (IMSMA), SAC and NPA. The database unit never achieved high-quality operations or reli-

able information, and it broke down more than once when project funding for contracting local staff as consultants ended. The database unit still requires support.<sup>11</sup>

The first IND QA teams were created in 2001/2002 and decentralized to the regional delegations by 2004. They initially did not have the training, equipment, vehicles or budget necessary to exercise their function, and that support was provided under specific donor-funded project activities. As the operations department grew — mostly as QA — only a few staff members had experience as deminers. This reduced their credibility with operator staff in the field. Over time, with more training and experience, the QA team continually improved and became a more effective control over operator activities and handover of completed tasks to communities and districts.

The team never achieved a sufficient level of expertise to effectively question operator actions on clearance. But it was more effective regarding survey and especially handover, as the IND QA teams came to rely more heavily on the quality of the internal QA by the operators. The QA function would have benefited from recruitment of experienced deminers and further training. It also would have benefited from establishment of a QA process that was not based simply on a checklist of compliance with Mozambique Mine Action Standards (MMAS) or an effort to review details of operator work. UNDP has not provided an operations adviser since 2007; the principal sources of support to QA in IND since then have been specialists from GICHD and SAC, along with general support from the UNDP CTA.

Interactions between IND and the operators were distant and somewhat tense during the first 10 years of the Mozambique Mine Action Programme. For much of the time this was due

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11 No sustainable solution was found for this problem, which afflicts many mine action programmes. It might have been better to accept potentially high rates of staff turnover on the same salary scale as applied to the rest of IND, rather than to lose the best trained people each time UNDP salaries were interrupted. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to accept that skilled information management support will always be required, whether by external advisers or by contracting for support from a specialized national firm.

to the operators' desire to maintain their separate regional mine action programmes largely independent of IND management. This began to change noticeably after the collapse of ADP, when IND requested HALO Trust to conduct the baseline assessment (2006/2007). It improved significantly when IND accepted the results of the baseline assessment as the basis for further planning; included the operators in preparation of the Article 5 extension request (2008); began to allocate provinces and districts to the remaining operators; and was accepted by donors as having authority over the distribution of external funds for operations.

The collapse of ADP and the corruption scandals epitomized by (but not limited to) Adopt-a-Minefield damaged the credibility of Mozambique mine action. This particularly affected IND, but also to some extent UNDP and the operators, particularly NPA. Funding ran out for many of the positions financed through UNDP, and IND suffered a sudden loss of trained personnel in all areas, especially the database unit and QA. Donor contributions for mine action plummeted from \$15 million in 2005 to \$2.5 million in 2007. In mid-2008, almost no ambassadors attended IND's annual meeting to report to donors.

UNDP worked closely with IND to try to reestablish credibility, including by agreeing on improved means to channel funds and ensure accountability. Out of this eventually came a multi-stakeholder planning process, chaired by the IND director and the UNDP country director, in which all donors began to present their mine action contributions — whether or not they were made through UNDP. Funds were allocated transparently through UNDP to all of the operators; allocation of some funds that did not go through UNDP was announced, and some allocations were made conditional on IND endorsement. This improved donor coordination supported by UNDP, together with the increased government ownership reflected in the planning and QA processes, resulted in increased credibility and funding for the mine action programme.

It began to recover in 2008 and has maintained an annual level above \$10 million since 2011.

■ **Has the Government institutionalized the programmes, policies, services and laws developed to conduct mine action? Does this include specific attention to reduce socioeconomic inequality?**

During the inception phase of this evaluation, the following elements were identified as important to the institutionalization of mine action:

- Signature of the APMBC and approval of implementing legislation
- Institutionalization of the National Mine Action Authority and its inclusion in the national budget
- MMAS, in national language
- National Mine Action Strategy
- Prioritization policy, based on socioeconomic impact
- Mine victim assistance policy or policy on assistance to persons with disabilities.

The relationship of these indicators to institutionalization and national ownership are more nuanced than at first thought, for a number of reasons discussed below.

Mozambique was one of the first countries to sign the APMBC (in December 1997), which entered into effect in March 1999. The country is also signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The attachment of IND to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflects strong government support for the international commitment to these conventions. Mozambique has not adopted specific implementing legislation for the APMBC, since under the country's Portuguese-influenced legal system international treaties automatically become national law. While this means that implementing legislation is not necessary for application of the treaty, some argue that it would be better to have such legis-

lation rather than rely on interpretation of laws approved for other purposes.

When CND was transformed into IND by decision of the Council of Ministers in June 1999, the national authority was transformed from a temporary commission into a statutory institute with legal and financial autonomy, listed in the detail of the national budget. Expenditures were recorded in the Government's annual expenditure reports no later than 2002, and IND has been separately listed in the investment budget since 2009. According to IND annual reports, the Government's annual contribution to IND and mine action in general was equivalent to an average of \$1.4 million over the 2008-2010 period. It rose to an average of \$2.2 million equivalent a year in 2011-2014.

The first Mozambique mine action standards were developed in 2001/2002, largely by the operations adviser, in English. While they were a useful tool to develop the mine action framework, they did not represent an advance in national ownership or capacity. They did serve as a starting point for translation (2004) and revision. The MMAS were revised in 2007/2008, from Portuguese text, by which point they were more fully nationally owned. In 2012 they were updated with support from UNDP and GICHD to incorporate revisions to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) regarding land release and other topics.

Mozambique adopted its first Mine Action Strategy (2002-2006) based on the MLIS. Its development relied heavily on the international advisers (for planning and the CTA) present at the time, but it reflected an effort by IND to define a national strategy and manage the programme as a whole. Regrettably the deficiencies of the MLIS undermined the strategy, setting back national ownership. The second Mine Action Strategy (2008-2014) was based on the baseline assessment, which had greater credibility and buy-in from the operators. This second strategy and its district-by-district approach, under assignment from IND, affirmed IND's

ownership and its overall management of the national mine action programme.

Under the leadership of the Ministry of Women and Coordination of Social Action (MMCAS), the National Disability Plan 2012-2019 includes a section on assistance to mine/ERW victims. A National Action Plan for Victim Assistance was drafted in 2013-2014, informed by the UNDP-supported survey of mine victims in two provinces carried out by HI and Ravim (the national association of mine victims), but it has not yet been approved. IND and UNDP have had limited involvement in this process, since it is under the responsibility of MMCAS together with the Ministry of Health.

- **Has UNDP mine action support contributed to development of policies or programmes to support mine survivors and their families by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour or other ministry?**

Mine victim assistance is under the responsibility of the MMCAS and the Ministry of Health, which address mine victims within the broader framework of persons with physical disabilities. UNDP has not engaged consistently on the issue of mine victim assistance, nor has IND. There have been efforts to develop a mine victim assistance strategy over the years, but they have not produced concrete results. UNDP supported the victim assistance operators HI and Ravim with funding to conduct a 2012 survey of mine victims and their needs in two provinces. This was intended as a contribution to stakeholder discussions led by MMCAS to develop a national action plan for mine victims, incorporated within the general National Disability Plan. The results of the survey were taken into consideration in the drafting of the plan. It was ready for submission to the Council of Ministers in mid-2014, but approval has been delayed by the change in government. Expectations are for the action plan to be submitted to the Council of Ministers in the third quarter of 2015.

- **To what extent is socioeconomic impact accepted as a major criterion for priority**

### **setting and assessing the results of mine action? Is the landmine problem understood in terms of socioeconomic impact?**

Socioeconomic impact became an explicit criterion for priority setting following the MLIS (1999-2001). The MLIS provided the first national overview of the landmine problem, and its socioeconomic rankings provided the basis for the First National Mine Action Strategy (2002-2006), which prioritized the resolution of all communities with high and medium impact by 2006. Unfortunately, the deficiencies of the Mozambique LIS significantly discredited that strategy and with it the use of socioeconomic criteria for priority setting. Nonetheless, it seems that 90 percent of high-impact locations and 70 percent of medium-impact locations were in fact resolved by 2006. This left relatively widespread low-impact problems, which became the focus of attention over the next decade.

In 2005, UNDP supported IND in discussions with government entities responsible for investment programmes that might benefit from mine action support. They tried to identify planned sector projects to be carried out in mine-affected communities. Any blockage of a development project (whether in high-, medium- or low-impact communities) would include the community in the list of priorities derived from the high- and medium-impact communities. This effort to integrate mine action and development was then reflected in the Government's Second Poverty Reduction Plan (PARPA II, 2006-2009) which included mine action as a cross-cutting issue.

In the context of the widespread low-impact problem, priority-setting shifted to a district-by-district approach in 2008. In this approach, all known minefields should be identified and resolved in each district prior to moving to another district. This permitted more efficient operator planning of logistics with lower costs and less downtime. It also meant that when the operator concluded handover with the community and district authorities, communities would have their landmine problem fully resolved, rather

than only partly resolved, with other known contamination remaining for later action.

The district-by-district approach is appropriate for the long process of dealing with a disbursed lower level of threat and was an important innovation of the Mozambique mine action programme. This was based in part on the successful results of the HALO Trust mine-impact-free district survey of 2004-2006. While some argue that this would have been the best approach from the very beginning of the mine action programme, this evaluation concurs with the more nuanced view that the district-by-district approach developed at an appropriate time, when higher impact sites had been resolved and the major threat foci had been eliminated. In this new context, efficient use of resources becomes more important than elimination of individual low-impact situations. This development of prioritization models beyond the LIS socioeconomic impact is a positive reflection of response to national circumstances and an example of increasing national ownership.

### **QUESTION 3. IMPACT OF MINE ACTION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL**

**Have the lives and livelihoods of affected communities and citizens (women and men, girls and boys) improved as a result of demining and land release? What were the supporting or impeding factors in this regard? How did UNDP contribute?**

- **Did land release benefit the poorest mine-affected members of the community? Were there unintended impacts (positive or negative) on communities? Has post-clearance land use led to change (positive or negative) in livelihoods or living conditions of marginalized populations?**

Of the communities visited for this study, all inhabitants living in contaminated areas, male and female, reported positive safety and socioeconomic changes following clearance, with the exception of Nhamudimo village, where the con-

tamination had little if any impact on daily life. People reported that they could move around and access resources ‘at will’ and no longer needed to worry about their children stepping on a mine. From the villages visited, there was no evidence of significant difference in standards of living; the majority of the rural population is poor. People stated that all had benefited equally from the cleared land, although some explained that those who were slightly wealthier had the resources to exploit the land and opportunities for greater economic benefit.

People living in Josina Machel reported the most significant changes following clearance, as the contamination had affected every aspect of daily life. Even almost 20 years after clearance, the inhabitants remembered the impact of the contamination clearly. They said they often talked about it among themselves and would point out previously contaminated areas to children and explain how it had affected their lives. It is possible that Josina Machel had been identified as a highly impacted community, which explains why it was cleared two decades ago, unlike other villages in the area, which were cleared around five years ago.

In the communities visited, the inhabitants were confident that all areas cleared were safe, although many understood there was the possibility of unknown residual contamination. Most communities reported accessing the land as soon as they had been told it was cleared. In Mutacoma, Maconha and Mucombezi villages in Manica province, inhabitants still believed that an area of their village remained contaminated, and this was reported to IND following the field visits. However, the communities were confident that the areas they had been told were cleared were safe.

Communities insisted there had been no conflict over cleared land and that people had returned to land they had used before the war, and that those moving to a new area had shared land equally. Local officials confirmed that there were few land conflicts, and that these were not related to demined areas. This is partly because Mozam-

bique is not densely populated, so there is plenty of land available. Areas that have experienced land conflict are those with developed infrastructure and economic opportunities, such as in the border region with South Africa.

The local official of Ressano Garcia said that she regularly had to mediate land conflicts, but this was because of the location and desirability of particular pieces of land and was not a result of competing claims over newly cleared land. In Cafumpe, the administrator reported that a few people who had been using contaminated land were moved after clearance because the land was reclaimed by Citrinos, a fruit juice company. However, it appears that this issue was resolved quickly. It was accepted that the company had a legitimate claim to the land, and the affected people were given suitable farmland elsewhere.

The improvements in socioeconomic conditions occurred because people were able to resume their normal activities and make the most of the resources available to them. There was no evidence among the communities studied of organized external assistance from the Government, the United Nations or NGOs to promote development following clearance. People benefited from the clearance because, for example, they were able to farm larger plots of land, access resources more easily and so use their time more efficiently. Some were able to relocate to the newly cleared land at the side of the road and benefit from passing trade.

Many communities reported some improvement to the main access roads (all of which were still unpaved except those near a national highway). Some communities had expanded significantly as new people had been able to move into the area. The constant worry about the contamination had been removed and parents could allow their children to walk to school and to help with daily tasks. Some villages reported that the Government had provided a borehole or a grinding machine, which had helped to improve daily life, but this assistance does not seem to have been connected with the demining.

The clearance has not addressed all the problems faced by these communities; they are still poor and work hard to survive. Some reported that medical care is limited and only primary education is available locally. None of the villages had electricity, and several reported shortages of water because the borehole did not provide enough. The inhabitants of Nhamudimo reported being disappointed because they had expected government development assistance to follow the clearance, but none was forthcoming.

Newcomers to Sao Damasio (Machava Km 17) on the outskirts of Maputo reported feeling cheated by the people who had sold them the land. Long-term residents were aware that the bases of pylons carrying electricity between South Africa and Mozambique had been mined during the war, meaning that only small areas of land between the pylons could be farmed. The newcomers felt fortunate when the land was cleared shortly after they arrived and are grateful that they are able to farm the whole area. However, the area floods annually for several months each year and the newcomers claim they were not told of this. The inhabitants closest to the power lines must vacate the land during the floods or everything will be washed away. Consequently, those who are displaced struggle to survive since they cannot farm year-round and need to find money to live elsewhere while their property is flooded.

**Have the living conditions of mine survivors and their families (women and men, girls and boys) changed significantly? Does support for mine survivors and their families extend to all persons with disabilities?**

- **How and to what extent have the lives of mine survivors and their families improved as a result of mine action? Would the same results have been likely if UNDP had not been involved?**
- **In situations where UNDP has provided direct support to mine survivors and their families, are they better off than in situations where UNDP was not involved? Has**

**the direct service supported by UNDP been replicated and expanded by others?**

UNDP did not engage significantly with the issue of mine victims or provide direct services to them. The Government, as in other countries, viewed response to mine victims as an issue for the Ministry of Health and the MMCAS. IND had only the limited role of compiling data on accidents and victims, without any national reporting system. The national mine action strategies have included a section on victim assistance, but IND never had a unit dedicated to victim assistance and did not include it as part of its requirement in negotiations for UNDP support.

Mozambique signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2012, and the same year the Council of Ministers approved the National Disability Plan (2012–2019). UNDP provided funds in 2012 for a mine victim survey carried out by HI-Ravim as input to the National Action Plan for Mine Victims then being developed under the responsibility of the MMCAS. That survey, the first attempt at a comprehensive review of mine victims' needs, was carried out in the two most populous and mine-affected provinces. Among its important conclusions were: (a) the lives and situation of mine victims are in most regards the same as those of other members of the communities where they live; (b) most injuries were the result of accidents or incidents during the conflict (1994 or earlier); only about 20 percent of incidents took place after the end of the conflict; (c) roughly 40 percent of mine victims during the war were soldiers; and (d) while women represent about 20 percent of total victims (a higher proportion than in most countries), they are over one third of all civilian victims.

Communities confirmed that no support was provided for mine survivors and their families apart from immediate medical attention. No mine survivors were found in any of the villages visited so it was not possible to elicit their opinions or to make a judgement about how disability affected their socioeconomic prospects. Nonetheless, resi-

dents of Mubobo, Mutocoma and Chinete stated that the socioeconomic conditions of people who survived mine accidents were consistently worse than they had been before the accident.

#### **QUESTION 4. SUSTAINABILITY OF MINE ACTION AND ITS RESULTS**

**Were exit strategies appropriately defined and implemented? What steps have been taken to ensure sustainability of results? Are the capacities, policies, services and laws developed with UNDP support likely to continue without further UNDP involvement?**

- **To what extent have the capacities, policies, programmes, services and laws developed to manage mine action and reduce inequality been institutionalized, and are they likely to continue after UNDP support ends (e.g., community impact priority setting)?**
- **Are the results of the national mine action programme, developed with UNDP support, likely to extend to additional beneficiaries even after UNDP support has concluded?**

The evaluation mission visited Mozambique as the final few known mined areas were being cleared, and work was expected to conclude during the third quarter of 2015. Mozambique plans to formally announce that it is free of all known or suspected mined areas at the meeting of States Parties in December 2015, and it will be the first of the highly contaminated countries to do so. UNDP has been a major partner of Mozambique throughout the two-plus decades of mine action. UNDP support changed over time, but it did not end, and UNDP has worked with IND and stakeholders in the development of the current transition plan.

Sustainability in the context of mine action in Mozambique today is different from that of most other mine-affected countries. As of later this year there will be no more known or suspected mine fields in the country — the benefits of their

removal are sustainably permanent. In terms of mine action, the relevant issues are to (a) maintain the legacy of information generated over more than two decades in order to inform future development projects; (b) establish sustainable capacity to respond to the post-demining residual contamination; and (c) respond to the needs of mine victims and other people with disabilities, the other principal legacy of the period.

Past experience with efforts to hand over mine action functions does not provide much reason for optimism. HALO Trust and NPA each tried to leave capacity with local authorities as part of their exit plans in the mid-2000s, but neither received any institutional response. ADP was allowed simply to collapse and disappear. The Council of Ministers decided in 2013 that IND's functions should be transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Defence, which was selected without reviewing the options with IND.

In the view of IND, the military would be the appropriate institution to respond to future minefields or to be on call if the police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team finds something with which it requires assistance. However, the advantage of the police is that they are located throughout the territory, and police officers, once trained, tend to stay much longer in their area and assignment. Perhaps in part because of the transfer of its functions, IND does not yet have an institutional partner working to improve its capacity to receive the EOD role (which it feels should be the Ministry of the Interior/police) or to be responsible for the collected spatial hazard data (for which IND recommends the Ministry of Land).

An added complication to the database legacy is that the IND database only covers the period of known or suspected hazards existing as of the baseline assessment in 2007/2008. It lacks all records of land that was suspected or cleared during the first 15 years of mine action, a period that includes resolution of nearly all the high- and medium-impact suspected contamination.

It is essential to reconstruct this information in order to inform future development with a complete record of all areas ever suspected, and all areas where mines or other ERW were found.

Although the time is short, there is reason for some optimism, as discussed below.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed during the mission that he will reopen the question of responsibility for future mine action in the Council of Ministers, which is now comprised of new ministers from the government elected in October 2014. This is expected to be on the Council of Ministers' agenda in July 2015.

The new Minister of Land has informally confirmed interest in making the IND database a component of environmental hazards (past landmine suspicion and clearance) that should be known to public and private parties planning development projects. Technical staff of the Land Ministry will receive training on mapping and the database in IND in July.

Currently, when people encounter a suspicious object that could be an explosive, they normally contact the police. Since the police are not specialists in EOD, they may deal with the case or may refer it to the military. EOD training thus far has been conducted for two police officers from each district in 6 of the 10 provinces. Training was enthusiastically received and well absorbed, with formal reports of items destroyed or to be destroyed by police officers who received the training.

As part of a general reorganization begun in 2014, the Ministry of the Interior has created a Bomb Disposal Command, which would be the logical institutional home for the residual spot task capacity. The commander has not yet been named, and the Minister has yet to con-

firm willingness to take on the EOD residual response function. This issue should be discussed by the Ministers of IND and Interior prior to the Council of Ministers' discussion in July. It is hoped that the new Bomb Disposal Command will be staffed by September, which would provide time for transfer.

The MMCAS and stakeholders, including IND and associations of people with disabilities, have developed an action plan for support to mine victims, as part of support to persons with disabilities more generally. The MMCAS approved the draft action plan and it was ready for presentation to the Council of Ministers before the elections in 2014, but it has been stalled with the arrival of the new government. It is hoped that the approval process will be reinitiated soon. This would help establish the rights of persons with disabilities to service and support under the law, although resources for implementation are still limited.

Efforts are under way to locate copies of individually held datasets, including from past support of GICHD. IND expects to receive shipping containers full of records from each of the operators, and it apparently has several containers holding records from ADP and possibly UNOMOZ. These all need to be carefully reviewed so that any cases missing from the database can be incorporated. It would be a rather substantial project to properly archive the records of the national mine action programme. UNDP or other donors would likely provide financing for it as part of the historic successful completion of mine action in Mozambique. The complete database of areas where landmines were ever suspected and demining occurred may be the most important IND resource to be handed over, in terms of the safety of people and the cost of future national development.



## Section 5

# REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF CHANGE

As part of the country and community level investigations for the global evaluation of UNDP's contribution to mine action, each country case team was asked to reflect on the general 'theory of change' articulated in the global evaluation, to consider its fit and relevance within each country context. The findings from Mozambique set out in

Table 5 are based on stakeholder interviews and a review of documents at the national level, together with visits to 11 communities and meetings with local officials in the provinces of Maputo, Sofala and Manica. The theory of change developed during the inception phase of the global evaluation is reproduced at the end of this section.

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Outcomes</b>	Improved livelihoods (towards poverty eradication) and reduced marginalization (towards reduction of inequalities and exclusion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The livelihoods of rural communities improved as a result of landmine clearance/land release because they were able to access resources freely and in safety.</li> <li>• Livelihood improvements were important to people but relatively small, and were a result of their own hard work.</li> <li>• Cleared land was shared equally and/or people returned to the land they had before it was contaminated. Those with slightly more resources were able to exploit their land to greater advantage (e.g. use farming equipment, fertilizer etc.).</li> <li>• There was no evidence of significant eradication of poverty or reduction in inequalities or exclusion as a result of mine action. Over 50% of the country's population lives below the poverty line and over 70% lives in rural areas.</li> <li>• Freedom of movement was restored and the ability to travel locally to markets, schools etc. improved. It could be argued that this reduced exclusion.</li> <li>• Although the improvements in livelihoods following mine action are small in terms of production and financial gain, being able to access resources freely and in safety was important to communities.</li> <li>• The most important impact has been improved human security, which may contribute to improved livelihoods.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'Marginalization' should be defined. It is perhaps an inappropriate term as the majority of people in Mozambique, and those included in the study, are poor, and the majority live in rural areas.</li> <li>• Removal of the continual threat caused by landmines may reduce marginalization as community faces poverty without the fear and uncertainty caused by mines.</li> <li>• Applying the UNDP definition of impact to the communities visited might suggest that people did not benefit from mine action. Using communities' own measures of impact showed that very often mine action had improved their quality of life even if there were no significant changes in their financial security or levels of production.</li> <li>• Apart from emergency medical care there has been no systematic victim assistance in Mozambique.</li> <li>• The ToC should incorporate 'increased human security' in impact.</li> </ul>

(Continued)

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Outcomes</b>	Safety and reduced threat from land-mines and ERW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communities expressed feelings of safety and security following clearance of land.</li> <li>• Appropriate handover procedures satisfied communities that the hazard is gone.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ToC should show this outcome on the principal pathway to achieving improved lives and livelihoods in Mozambique.</li> </ul>
	Productive use of previously contaminated land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cleared land is being used and was put into use as soon as it was cleared.</li> <li>• Communities have resumed their normal livelihood activities on previously contaminated land.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This has taken place, but in general there were alternative lands available before.</li> </ul>
	National landmine ban law and legal protection for mine victims in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The APMBC has entered into national legislation in accordance with Mozambique law.</li> <li>• Draft legislation for the protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities is awaiting approval from the new Parliament (as of July 2015).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ToC should separate these two factors, and outcome should be removed.</li> <li>• APMBC legislation is a component of national ownership and does not contribute independently to impact.</li> <li>• Legal protection for mine victims belongs in 'policies' of 'immediate results'.</li> </ul>
	Rehabilitation and improved living conditions of mine victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apart from emergency medical care, there has been no systematic victim assistance in Mozambique.</li> <li>• There has been no significant engagement of IND or UNDP in victim assistance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no accurate database of mine victims; from information available, the number of mine incidents has fallen significantly since the end of the war. However, such a decline is also the result of improved awareness of dangerous areas.</li> <li>• This outcome should include support to families of victims/survivors.</li> </ul>
	Demined land released	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a process for releasing land. Since 2008 the handover process has been a central focus of QA.</li> <li>• The land release process includes effort to identify and release all suspected areas district by district in order to satisfy communities that all known threats have been removed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ToC should show this outcome on the principal pathway to achieving impact in Mozambique.</li> </ul>

(Continued)

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Outcomes</b>	National ownership of mine action, mainstreamed into relevant national body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A national body for mine action has existed for over 20 years in Mozambique but effective ownership of mine action has taken many years to develop.</li> <li>• There is a national mine action authority that coordinates mine action and reports to the meeting of States Parties.</li> <li>• With Mozambique soon to be declared mine free it is unclear how the ongoing functions of the mine action authority will be integrated into the government structure long term; specifically, how necessary residual clearance capacity and the IMSMA database will be managed and maintained.</li> <li>• Technical capacity of the national mine action authority is still weak, particularly on quality management of clearance and database management.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple indicators of national capacity were confirmed in the early years, in the absence of effective national capacity. Refine indicators.</li> <li>• National ownership in mine action is difficult to achieve because it is a finite problem for which it is easier to access international funding than for other humanitarian/development interventions.</li> <li>• ToC should show this outcome as exercising influence horizontally only (see ToC graphic).</li> <li>• ToC should show this outcome on principal pathway to impact in Mozambique, through influence on 'demined land released'.</li> </ul>
	Mine victims identified and recognized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There has been no systematic collection of data on landmine victims.</li> <li>• There is no specific support for victims.</li> <li>• Victims have been given emergency lifesaving treatment in local hospitals.</li> <li>• This outcome did not receive engagement of IND or UNDP.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ToC should remove this outcome and incorporate it into mine victim immediate result.</li> </ul>
	Mine victims able to access basic and specialized services and vocational schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no specific support for victims.</li> <li>• This outcome did not receive engagement of IND or UNDP.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This outcome should include support to families of victims/survivors.</li> </ul>
<b>Immediate results</b>	Contaminated land identified and demined in line with IMAS standards, and communities aware of risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mine action has been ongoing in Mozambique for over 20 years so contaminated land has been identified and cleared and communities are aware of the risks. However, early efforts to identify contaminated areas were disputed and data on cleared areas was lost; some areas were cleared unnecessarily and some areas were reportedly cleared more than once.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approaches to identifying areas for clearance and determining how much land should be cleared have evolved, and mine action in general has become more efficient. This is important to note but does not need to be reflected in the ToC.</li> <li>• Consider qualifying this immediate result: 'Contaminated land identified and demined in line with prioritization criteria and IMAS standards...'</li> <li>• ToC should reflect this element as on the principal pathway to achieve impact in Mozambique.</li> </ul>

(Continued)

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Immediate results</b>	Institutional structures developed and/or enhanced (e.g. mine action centres/authorities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mozambique was one of the first countries to establish a humanitarian mine action programme, so the understanding of how to do it was still evolving. Mozambique did not create a national mine action authority until three years after mine action had begun. The initial authority was weak and was replaced by a second one in 1999.</li> <li>• It is only in the last decade that the national authority has become respected by the international operators and been able to exercise some authority over mine action. Its capacity for technical QA and database management remains weak.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There have been numerous capacity-building efforts supported by UNDP and other international actors but retention of capable qualified staff has proven difficult due to low government salaries.</li> <li>• ToC should reflect this element as on the principal pathway to achieve impact in Mozambique, through influence on national ownership (see Annex 3).</li> </ul>
	Policies, structures and services for mine victims developed, strengthened and/or provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no specific support for victims and medical facilities are limited.</li> <li>• Draft legislation for the protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities is awaiting approval from the new Parliament (as of July 2015).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This has not received engagement of IND or UNDP.</li> </ul>
<b>UNDP role</b>	Demining, technical and operational support, awareness and training, quality management, provision of demining equipment, methods, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP has provided technical and operational support and implemented clearance activities through ADP. It is rare for UNDP to conduct clearance activities.</li> <li>• Often the CTA does not have technical mine action skills, so UNDP is not providing ongoing technical support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is unclear what is meant by 'awareness' and 'methods'.</li> <li>• The emphasis of UNDP's role in providing technical support is perhaps misleading.</li> <li>• Lacks reference to role of UNDP in promoting livelihoods, security.</li> </ul>
	Institutional support and development: governance, policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, coordination, resource mobilization, fund management, relationship building, national survey, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP has provided institutional support and development but critical elements have never been sustainable — e.g., database and information management.</li> <li>• The legal framework for the APMBC was taken directly from the treaty.</li> <li>• In Mozambique UNDP has been instrumental in resource mobilization, fund management and relationship building.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This has been the most significant of UNDP's roles in mine action in Mozambique.</li> <li>• Advocacy or lobbying to keep mine action on the agenda should also be included in the UNDP role.</li> </ul>

(Continued)

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>UNDP role</b>	Victim assistance (including rehabilitation, advocacy and reintegration support): physical rehabilitation, medical exams, psychosocial care, vocational training and relevant policies, laws and institutional structures, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apart from funding an HI-Ravim survey in 2012, UNDP has not made a significant contribution to victim assistance.</li> <li>• Neither UNDP nor IND has fulfilled this role.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Although there has been no specific victim assistance in Mozambique and victim assistance tends not to be prioritized by mine action programmes, this is not a reason to remove it from the ToC.</li> </ul>
	Socioeconomic: This is not mentioned as one of UNDP's roles.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no mention of UNDP's role in promoting socioeconomic development. This seems an oversight given UNDP's mandate and UNDP's intended overall impact in ToC.</li> <li>• The amount of attention given to victim assistance in ToC seems disproportionate, especially when it is seldom a mine action priority, and particularly in comparison with socioeconomic activities, which are given little attention anywhere in ToC.</li> <li>• Prioritization is an important aspect of mine action and it is not explicitly mentioned in the ToC (although included in indicators of national ownership and institutional structures).</li> <li>• Prioritization is influenced by socioeconomic need and affects national economic and community socioeconomic development.</li> </ul>
<b>Assumptions</b>	Political situation in the country is conducive to progress in landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This has been generally true since the peace agreement, and especially over the past four years.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change in past four years reflected and supported the possibility of completion by 2014/2015.</li> <li>• This is an important assumption.</li> </ul>

(Continued)

**Table 5. Reflections on the theory of change**

	<b>Theory of change (ToC)</b>	<b>Relevance to Mozambique</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Assumptions</b>	National and local government partners place high priority on landmine removal.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Until recent years, the national Government did not seem to place high priority on landmine removal, which it considered to be a UN concern.</li> <li>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed high priority on national treaty obligations.</li> <li>• Local governments often prioritized landmine removal when it was relevant to other development projects.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not clear that this is an important assumption.</li> <li>• APMBC obligates States Parties and the international community to support mine action in poorer countries, therefore national governments do not have to prioritize efforts, merely not obstruct them.</li> </ul>
	UN involvement in demining has government and popular support.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government assumed UN was largely responsible for mine action. Not clear that there was much popular support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not clear that this is an important assumption.</li> <li>• APMBC obligates States Parties and the international community to support mine action in poorer countries, therefore national governments do not have to prioritize efforts, merely not obstruct them.</li> </ul>
	Assets, including demined lands, are not misappropriated and benefits are made available to intended communities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There was not a problem of misappropriation of demined lands and benefits in Mozambique.</li> <li>• This assumption presumes that the main benefit is in use of demined lands, whereas in Mozambique the principal community benefit is ending fear of landmines.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not clear if this is an important assumption regarding effectiveness of the mine action programme.</li> <li>• Misappropriation would have been an issue for donors.</li> </ul>

## Section 6

# CONCLUSIONS

This country case study is a component of the IEO evaluation of impact of UNDP support in mine action. The evaluation seeks to assess the impact of UNDP capacity development and other support efforts on mine-affected communities and people particularly on landmine survivors and their families. The Mozambique country study illustrates the usefulness of assessing impact at the community level through a set of assessment tools derived from rapid rural appraisal and livelihoods analysis.

This study has addressed the following questions:

- Did the requisite national management capacities develop?
- Did UNDP support contribute to the development of those capacities, and if so, how?
- What impact did mine action have on mine-affected communities and populations?
- Did those capacities affect the impact of mine action at the community level, and if so, how?
- Did UNDP support affect community impact in other ways (such as stability in provision of funds)?

The Mozambique Mine Action Programme has been in operation for over 20 years. It began in 1993 as part of UNOMOZ peacekeeping operations and is expected to achieve Article 5 compliance with the resolution of all known or suspected minefields before the end of 2015. UNDP has provided support throughout the entire process.

The major actors and operators from the beginning included the United Nations (UNOMOZ), a few international NGOs and a national dem-

ining operator created by the United Nations presence (ADP). UNDP took over from UNOMOZ, but without the same resources or any smooth transition. The Mozambique mine action programme was similar to other first-generation mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic in that the largest operator was a national entity created and supported by the United Nations (ADP in Mozambique, INAROOE in Angola, CMAC in Cambodia and UXO-LAO in the Lao People's Democratic Republic). Only ADP was unable to make the transition to an independently established national entity.

During two decades, demining operations were conducted by several NGOs (NPA, HALO Trust, ADP, HI, Apopo), the armed forces and commercial firms. For the first half of the programme, mine action operations were carried out under three largely autonomous programmes, run by HALO Trust in the north of Mozambique, NPA in the centre and ADP in the south. UNDP supported ADP with advisers and resources, and ADP resisted the coordination efforts of the national authority (CND and IND) no less than did the others.

Information regarding the national problem was unreliable. Thus IND's efforts to develop a national strategy based on the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (1999-2001) to underlie the work of the three main operators were discredited. Nonetheless the key target of that strategy — clearance of all high- and medium-impact sites by 2006 — was largely accomplished. However, several unfortunate events led to a loss of donor confidence, drastic reduction in funding and abrupt loss of over 50 percent of demining capacity in 2005/2006: these included decisions

by most bilateral donors to withdraw from mine action with only low-impact sites remaining; a corruption scandal involving senior staff of IND and NPA, as well as a UNDP programme officer; and the collapse of ADP.

This crisis came as Mozambique was preparing to develop a new mine action strategy and a request for extension of the Article 5 deadline. IND asked HALO Trust to conduct a baseline assessment (2007/2008) of the tasks remaining in the six provinces of the centre and south. After some review, this data was accepted as reliable, and it replaced the previous IND database. With a more credible basis for further planning, IND worked with the operators and agreed that the national landmine problem could be resolved by 2014. It was also agreed that IND would assign operators to specific districts and that teams would complete their work in a district before moving to other districts. Reaching agreement was made easier by the fact that ADP and NPA — which had been responsible for the south and centre — were no longer operational.

The mine action programme in Mozambique formally began to be a national programme in 1995, with the end of UNOMOZ and the creation of CND. It developed as three largely autonomous regional programmes run by NGOs, with the beginning of institutionalization of a national authority in 1999. The first National Mine Action Strategic Plan (2002-2006) represented an effort to impose national direction on the regional operators. The second plan (2008-2014) presented clear development of national ownership of the landmine problem and its solution.

Based on the community visits conducted during this evaluation, the clearance of landmines from communities had a consistent and dramatic impact by eliminating people's fear, and with it one source of concern and limitation on daily activities of men, women and children. This important human security and human development impact affected all community members, and it should not be underestimated.

The sites released during the period for which data are available (2008 to the present) were primarily small in area, with the exception of some confirmed hazardous areas on the border with Zimbabwe and others surrounding the Cahora Bassa hydropower dam. The use of the actual areas released provided marginal benefits to those who cultivated or grazed their animals on them, and enabled individual families to expand their subsistence gardens. But it did not have significant implications for national agricultural production or food security. The greatest impact was in terms of human security for the communities and households that were previously mine affected, enabling higher levels of subsistence.

The tangible socioeconomic benefits at community level that have followed clearance are the result of the efforts of individuals who have been able to resume livelihood activities in safety and access local resources freely. Other than the physical clearance, there is no evidence of systematic external support from UNDP, national authorities or other actors to complement the clearance. The socioeconomic impact of UNDP's support to mine action in Mozambique is mainly indirect and comes from its long-term support to mine action and its institutional role at the national level.

UNDP supported mine action in Mozambique from the beginning to the end. During the first 10 years, UNDP provided technical advisers to ADP, CND and IND; channeled funding to each organization (most heavily to ADP); and took the leading role in coordination of donor support. In the last 10 years, following the crisis of 2004-2006, UNDP's role in strengthening the credibility of the national programme and thus increasing donor support was its central contribution. It was accompanied by the continuing presence of a CTA without other UNDP advisers. The CTA provided advice to the IND national director and staff, helped mediate the relationship with other stakeholders, and helped coordinate support from external partners, including GICHD, SAC and GMAP.

In 2008 IND demonstrated that it was largely able to manage the mine action programme on a cooperative basis with other key stakeholders. This followed more than 10 years of UNDP technical advisory support, and a crisis during a gap in that support. The results of UNDP capacity development efforts were non-linear. During their time in position, the various technical advisers were quite active, and the standard indicators of organizational capacity were achieved: the IMSMA database was established, the LIS was conducted, prioritization was based on socio-economic impact, Mozambique Mine Action Standards in line with IMAS were in place, QA offices were operational and the National Mine Action Strategy was adopted. Also achieved were some indicators of national ownership: IND was formally established and put under the national budget, mine action was included in the National Poverty Reduction Plan, and the APMBC was signed, ratified and incorporated into the laws of the country.

Nonetheless, most parties would agree that this did not constitute the establishment of effective national management capacity. While most of the benchmark targets of capacity development were achieved, it is clear that development of the two most important capacities — information management and quality management — was problematic. Information management was always a weak point, despite the fact that the database unit received the greatest amount of assistance over the longest period; and quality management never developed the capacity to effectively monitor the technical quality of operations, though it did develop capacity to ensure community confidence in the results.

Capacity development in information management proved illusory. No sustainable solution for information management was found during the 20 years of the programme. Information management was initially conceived of as database and geographic information systems management. Capacity development support was offered by UNDP and GICHD, together with LIS operators, through provision of equipment, training

and ongoing support. Technical advisers and training were provided, systems were adapted and the dataset was cleaned with each major upgrade of IMSMA — yet it was found to be of doubtful quality the next time it was examined. More resources have been expended to support development of national capacity in information management than in any other area.

However, national capacity was never established. Part of the support to the database unit was payment of salaries to national project staff. This did not institutionalize capacity, and the project staff (who received the majority of all training) left when their higher salaries were in doubt. Success has been undercut more by issues of salary and institutionalization of the role than by lack of qualified national technical personnel. The expectations for sustainable capacity may have never been realistic in Mozambique (perhaps also in some other countries). UNDP and its global partners should carefully consider whether they need to drastically lower expectations regarding sustainability of this capacity, or offer permanent support, through international advisers or specialized national firms.

The focus of quality management has shifted over time in Mozambique. UNDP played a key role in supporting the establishment and professionalization of the QA team. Its most important result was to give the IND and the Government a technical presence in the field in what were previously autonomous areas of operation by the demining operators. QA was generally staffed by people without demining experience. While they never achieved the technical superiority over operators desired of a QA team, they did improve with support of UNDP, GICHD and SAC.

Operators' respect for IND's QA has grown as it has focused on the process of handover of districts and provinces, with no suspected areas left unchecked, rather than of individual cleared areas. This is to ensure that the community and local authority have confidence and use the land. In Mozambique, this relies heavily on acceptance of the quality of clearance conducted and

of the internal quality assurance measures of the respective operators. Whether this is sufficient and fully in line with the spirit of IMAS should be considered — although whether or not it is in line with the Mozambique NMAS is formally more important.

In Mozambique, the negative socioeconomic impacts of landmine contamination — and thus the immediate socioeconomic benefits of demining — were reduced due to the relatively low population density and availability of alternatives to the blocked land and resources. While local authorities reported some conflicts over land in their areas, such conflicts were not the result of demining nor did they involve demined lands.

From the perspective of completion, the question of sustainability is somewhat simplified. Areas that have been cleared of all known minefields are safe to live in and use, and that now applies to all of Mozambique. Further community impact is now dependent on local (and regional/national) development processes, no longer related to concerns of landmines and mine action.

Prioritization determines who benefits first and who waits. Once the demining process has been concluded throughout the country, all those who were affected by landmines have benefited. Focusing on community socioeconomic impact was meant to ensure earlier benefit to more people with greater need. This approach tended to undervalue demining for non-community infrastructure projects; it also increased operational costs and downtime due to more frequent change of locations. IND recognized the need to incorporate strategic planning into development priorities and modified the planning process accordingly.

Once the high- and medium-impact priority sites had been concluded, the district-by-district approach was introduced to enable more efficient conclusion of the national demining effort. The district-by-district approach represented a change in prioritization, in a context of a generalized low level of threat and socioeconomic

impact, based on learning by IND and operational stakeholders, particularly HALO Trust. This approach emphasized the importance of the quality of the handover, and of the need for local authorities and communities to be convinced that all known problems had been resolved.

Rural communities know little of the treaty banning landmines and international efforts to clear them. However, they know that landmines have been cleared from the vicinity and are confident that the land is safe. Village inhabitants know how to report residual landmine contamination. Local officials are clear on their roles and responsibilities and how to liaise with the police for EOD assistance. Although the sustainability and organization of mine action capacity in Mozambique is uncertain, on a local level the safety of the civilian populations can be maintained. The socioeconomic impact of cleared areas is also sustainable in that communities can access resources freely.

Neither IND nor UNDP engaged significantly with the issue of mine victim assistance. This was consistent with the general approach of the international mine action community, which saw mine victim assistance as a concern for the health, social welfare and labour sectors. Nonetheless, UNDP could have done more in this area, including advocacy and support for a national survey to identify mine victims, perhaps along with other persons with disabilities. Support to the HI-Ravim survey of mine victims in two provinces was a good contribution. A more comprehensive survey is still needed to inform national policy.

UNDP's essential contribution to community-level impact is due to its continued partnership with the Government. UNDP succeeded in persuading donors to return to support the strategy to conclude eradication of known landmines, and it ensured accountability for use of funds. Specific elements of UNDP technical support had only a distant relationship to these results, other than to ensure the continuing partnership at the practical as well as organizational level.

Through ADP, UNDP engaged in clearance. Given that ADP operated for more than 10 years in the southern third of the country (including around the capital, Maputo), and that it focused on areas with high and medium levels of impact, it can be assumed that the populations near ADP clearance activities derived socioeconomic benefits.

UNDP has provided capacity building, mobilized and managed resources, and coordinated and mediated among mine action actors. The capacity building for database management and QA has been inconsistent and lacked clear goals. Issues over salaries and sustainability also undermined the successes of these interventions. However, the presence of the database and QA system supported by UNDP and others is an important element in ensuring the continuation of mine action. These systems are necessary for the institutional process and for reporting and securing donor funds. Because mine action is highly regulated and mine action operators perform their own QA, the lack of QA capacity in IND has been less serious than it might have been for other types of interventions.

Following the collapse of ADP and related scandals, UNDP has made an important contribution in enabling Mozambique to fulfil Article 5 of the APMBC. UNDP continued its efforts after many donors expressed their unwillingness to fund clearance of the low-impact areas. It also mobilized and coordinated funds at a time when donors feared misuse of funds. In the absence of comprehensive IMSMA data, it has to be assumed that most of the villages visited in Manica province and cleared in the last five years were previously considered to be low-impact areas. However, with the exception of one village, it is clear that the contamination had a socioeconomic impact and that people lived in fear. Without this final effort to ensure that Mozambique achieves mine-free status, these communities would have continued to experience the daily impact of mine contamination.

UNDP support was largely driven by country office engagement with the Government. It provided a bridge of continuity for support at times

when there were doubts or diminished credibility. Nonetheless, it suffered from lack of a clear strategy or guidance at the corporate level regarding the UNDP role in mine action generally, and the focus of capacity development in particular. This left the practical aspects of support to the best judgement of the individuals concerned. To a certain extent, UNDP acted based on the general consensus of the international mine action community in regard to capacity development while lacking its own strategy. As a result, UNDP offered (and learned) less than it might have if it had had a clearer strategy of its own. One clear example of this is the lack of deliberate synergies between national mine action and other areas of UNDP programming, particularly in terms of support to development at the community or decentralized levels. Similarly, UNDP could have encouraged the Government and other development partners to support development programmes targeting communities freed of landmines.

UNDP's actions can be considered in relation to the United Nations mine action strategy particularly as it relates to issues of concern to UNDP, such as institutional capacity development of national authorities. This is reflected particularly in Strategic Objective #3: 'The transfer of mine action functions to national actors is accelerated, with national capacity to fulfil mine action responsibilities increased.' The indicators used for capacity assessment in the United Nations strategy's monitoring and evaluation framework — which are much like those specified during the inception phase of this evaluation — can be seen to be somewhat formalistic. They miss the essence of capacity development and national ownership.

There was much discussion 10 to 15 years ago regarding the importance of having an 'exit strategy'. For the donors, this was a question of when they could responsibly shift their attention and funds to other issues. One might argue that it was appropriate to 'exit' once the problem had been reduced to low-impact areas, as many donors decided in Mozambique in the period leading up to 2005. One might also argue that it would be appropriate to 'exit' from provision of advisers

once the institutional structures had been established. This was done in Mozambique between 2004 and 2006, whether or not it really reflected the establishment of national capacities. UNDP and the Government concluded that it would be useful to continue with a single senior TA, although the role was not clearly defined. Nonetheless, this was an important ingredient in the continuation of UNDP's support for mine action to its completion in Mozambique.

Finally, the transition of essential mine action capacities from IND to appropriate long-term organizations is now on the agenda. The completion perspective can inform the discussions on residual response capacity. IND, UNDP, operators and other stakeholders would like to ensure that what has been done over the past two decades is not lost. IND has made a proposal (with UNDP support), consistent with the general approach of the international mine action community, to transition its core capacities to appropriate institutional settings. As of the time of writing, the potential recipients have not responded regarding their willingness to receive those responsibilities and capabilities. The components are:

- EOD response: The demining operators have developed an EOD response capacity that they would like to transfer to another actor. IND suggests that the army and the police would be good candidates. The advantage of the police is their presence at local level throughout the national territory, more so than the army or the demining operators. In addition, police officers are likely to remain in their area of responsibility over years, whereas army personnel are regularly rotated to new locations. The advantage of the army is that the issue concerns explosives. The Council of Ministers decided two years ago to transition EOD response to the army. The Director of IND does not agree with this decision, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has agreed to present it again to the Council of Ministers.
- Residual response: Even before demining is completed nationally, subnational territories are being completed. The four northern provinces, for example, were completed as early as 2010. At that time a residual response capacity became pertinent, and it was agreed to have the police provide that response at the provincial level. Training of a limited number of police officers — two per district in 6 of 10 provinces — has been carried out with good technical results for the police officers trained, but without much change in the overall institutional capacity as yet. This training is scheduled to reach the four remaining provinces by the beginning of 2016, and then the number of trained police officers will be increased in each district. There may be justification to continue the operations component of IND as a training and support unit within the institution recognized to have the residual response responsibility.
- Access to the database: The database covering all areas once suspected of being mine affected is a uniquely valuable resource for future development. It should be made available to interested parties to inform land development decisions. This implies the need for: (a) an institutional home for the national mine action database, such as the Ministry of Land; (b) completion of the database with data on all suspected areas prior to 2008; and (c) preservation of the database in a format that is readily usable by national staff, most likely without the need for the specialized training required for IMSMA. Protecting this essential legacy of mine action in Mozambique should be a high priority for IND, UNDP and donors during the handover and transition phase.
- Responsibility for reporting obligations: Mozambique will continue to have international reporting obligations under the APMBC, Convention on Cluster Munitions and other conventions. Currently, such reports are prepared by IND for submission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This should be continued, with support from operational sectors. This may require dedicated personnel and perhaps a small dedicated unit responsible for reporting government compliance with international treaties.

As Mozambique is about to become the first significantly mine-affected country to declare itself free of mines, all those who participated in mine action can be proud that communities live without fear and have derived socio-economic benefits from the clearance. UNDP's contribution to that is indirect and at the

national level. There it has been a long-term partner to the Government and IND, acting as a mediator, coordinator and fund manager for the sector. This ongoing partnership has been essential to the long-term success and completion of the Mozambique national mine action programme.



## Annex 1

# ACRONYMS

ADP	Accelerated Demining Programme
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
CND	Comissão Nacional de Desminagem (National Demining Commission)
CTA	Chief technical adviser
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GMAP	Gender and Mine Action Programme
HI	Handicap International
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IND	Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (National Demining Institute)
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MgM	Menschen gegen Morte
MLIS	Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey
MMAS	Mozambique Mine Action Standards
MMCAS	Ministry of Women and Coordination of Social Action
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPA	Norwegian Peoples' Aid
PARP	Programa de Redução da Pobreza – Poverty Reduction Programme
PARPA	Programa De Redução da Pobreza Absoluta – Poverty Reduction Programme
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
QA	Quality assurance
SAC	Survey Action Centre
TA	Technical adviser
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOHAC	United Nations Organization for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination in Mozambique
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation for Mozambique



## Annex 2

# PEOPLE MET

### **IND**

Alfredo Augusto, National Director  
Artur Verissimo, Deputy Director for Legal and Consular Affairs, First IND National Director  
Antonio Belchior, Chief of Operations Department  
Fernando Mulima, Chief of Finance  
Focus group of IND long-term staff

### **UNDP**

Jennifer Topping, Resident Coordinator  
Matthias Naab, Country Director  
Lucia Simao, Programme Officer  
Nadia Vaz, Head of CPRE Unit  
Hans Risser, UNDP CTA for IND  
Robert Afedra, database adviser to IND, supplied by NPA

### **PROVINCE OF MANICA**

Sr. Sarandi, Provincial Demining Coordinator  
District, local and community officials and residents related to community cases

### **PROVINCE OF MAPUTO**

District, local and community officials and residents related to community cases

### **PROVINCE OF SOFALA**

District, local and community officials and residents related to community cases

### **OPERATORS**

HALO Trust, Olly Hyde-Smith, Programme Manager  
Handicap International, Gregory Le Blanc, Programme Director  
Handicap International, Christophe Legay  
Handicap International, Aderito Ismael, Mine Action Programme Director  
Apopo, Tess Tewelde, Head of Operations

### **NATIONAL MINE VICTIM ASSOCIATION (RAVIM)**

Luis Silvestre Wamusse, Director

### **EMBASSY OF SWEDEN**

Joao Jussar, Programme Officer


### **EMBASSY OF NORWAY**

Clarisse Barbosa Fernandes, Adviser



## Annex 3

# THEORY OF CHANGE





## Annex 4

# CHRONOLOGY OF MINE ACTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

Chronology of the development of mine action in Mozambique, emphasizing the capacity of the national authority and UNDP support.

Mine action in Mozambique has developed in five phases.

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Origin and early development of mine action: UNOMOZ, 1992–1994</b>								
1992	Peace agreement is signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO; responsibility for demining is assigned to the UN peacekeeping mission (UNOMOZ)	x	x					
1992	UNOHAC estimates there are 2 million landmines in Mozambique						x	
1992	HI begins nationwide mine risk education programme			x				
1992–1994	UNOMOZ trains and manages clearance by Mozambican deminers			x				
1993	UNOHAC establishes a mine clearance training centre in Moamba for former soldiers; it eventually results in ADP			x				
1993	Mine clearance begins			x				
1993	NPA establishes demining programme in Tete province and soon expands to two other central provinces, Manica and Sofala			x				
Late 1993	UNOHAC contracts with HALO Trust for an emergency nationwide survey. Although coverage is incomplete, it finds 981 mined areas and assigns high priority to road clearance for peacekeeper access, refugee return and distribution of humanitarian assistance by road rather than air drop						x	x

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Origin and early development of mine action: UNOMOZ, 1992–1994</b> (continued)								
1994	Absence of effective donor coordination and need to start operations leads to demining assignment of HALO Trust in the north, NPA in the centre and ADP in the south	x		x				
1994	Mechem begins road clearance, financed by UNOMOZ			x				
1994	HALO Trust establishes demining programme in Zambezia province in support of United Kingdom NGOs. It soon expands to three northern provinces: Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado			x				
July 1994	UNDP initiates Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) Phase 1 MOZ/93/801 to employ demobilized soldiers trained as deminers by UNOHAC, modelled on Cambodia's Mine Action Centre. Little thought is given to the long term; initiative operates in southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane			x		x		
1994	HI and International Committee of the Red Cross establish and run modern orthopaedic centres in all provinces			x				
Oct 1994	Elections are considered the end of the peace process and of ONUMOZ	x	x					
<b>Development of three quasi-independent demining programmes and the National Demining Commission: 1995–1999</b>								
1994 onward	HALO Trust, NPA and ADP manage independent demining programmes in north, centre and south of country, respectively			x				
1995	At consultative group meeting in Paris, Government of Mozambique documents on economic and social development and key policies highlight demining as an essential priority for development	x	x					
1995	National Demining Commission created, beginning operations in 1996. Staff are first paid in 1997. CND is unable to establish oversight role and is understaffed (fewer than 10 staff); donors are dissatisfied. CND is eventually replaced by IND (1999)				CND			

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Development of three quasi-independent demining programmes and the National Demining Commission: 1995–1999</b> (continued)								
1996–1999	UNDP supports CND with 3 to 5 technical advisers and \$1 million; staff is weak, counterparts are lacking; 85% of funds go to expatriate salaries; little indigenous capacity building takes place				x	x		
1996 onward	UNDP does most of the legwork to convene donors periodically in Mine Action Support Group, to share information, mobilize resources and develop a unified message in policy dialogue with the Government		x			x		
1996	UNDP/DHA/ADP database records 1,721 mined areas divided into six categories						x	
1997–2000	Consolidation of Accelerated Demining Programme			x		x		
1997	DHA study on development of indigenous mine action capacity case study on Mozambique cites problems due to diverse mandates of multiple UN agencies: peacekeeping, relief, development etc.	x						
1997	APMBC opens for signature; Mozambique is among first countries to sign	x						
1998	Mozambique ratifies APMBC		x					
1998	HI starts small area demining in Inhambane			x				
Sep 1998	Study: 'Level One Surveys and the Socio-Economic Impact with Specific Reference to Mozambique' (part of preparation for surveys to identify mined areas)						x	
1999	Canadian International Development Agency commissions firm without mine action experience to prepare Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey; completed in 2001	x					x	
Feb 1999–July 2000	Preparation project for IND capacity building begins				x	x		
1999	APMBC enters into force with vigour, including for Mozambique	x						

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Development of three quasi-independent demining programmes and the National Demining Commission: 1995–1999</b> (continued)								
1999	Mozambique hosts first meeting of States Parties to the APMBC	x				x		
1999	Interministerial Committee for Mine Victim Support is established		x					
<b>Capacity development efforts with slow results (IND): 1999–2005</b>								
June 1999	Government replaces CND with IND under Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with more autonomy				x			
2000	Decree 39/2000 approves IND establishment with 120 employees. Most are never recruited as Government provides no funds and donors disapprove. As of 2001 staff is around 13				x			
2000–2005	UNDP mobilizes resources for IND and ADP			x	x	x		
2000	German NGO MgM starts demining in Mozambique			x				
March 2000	Preparatory assistance for project funded by Denmark, 'UNDP Capacity Building for the National Demining Institute Project' (MOZ/00/001) to run 2000 to 2003, extended to Dec 2006				x	x		
Oct 2000–Dec 2001	'UNDP Flood Related Mine Action project' MOZ/00/004 due to flooding in early 2000. By the time project starts the main flood relief effort is over; TA works on capacity development of IND				x	x		
2000–2001	LIS is conducted but not integrated with IND; provides first national report on extent of landmine problem and socioeconomic impact						x	
2000	IMSMA is installed during LIS; first capacity building CTA				x	x	x	
2000–2005	Second UNDP ADP project provides funding for ADP 2000–2002 support for capacity building to IND (nationally executed)			x	x	x		

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Capacity development efforts with slow results (IND): 1999–2005 (continued)</b>								
2001–2004	'Transformation of ADP into an NGO' project (MOZ/00/012) (\$11.3 million) with objective to support national capacity development by producing "a fully operational NGO". Minimal progress is made regarding the NGO and UNDP continues to provide demining funds. No real transition effort is in effect			x		x		
2001	IND regional delegation established in Nampula (followed by Beira)				x	x		
2001–2006	UNDP provides IND with four TAs, a CTA and advisers for finance and administration, operations and information				x	x		
2001	MLIS report is issued, identifying 791 mine-affected communities in all 10 provinces and 123 of 128 districts; 80% are low impact; 1,374 suspected mined areas total 562 sq km				x		x	
2001	HI hands over entire role in mine risk education to IND (supported by UNICEF)			x	x			
2001	First National Mine Action Strategy is approved by Council of Ministers		x		x			x
2001	First PARPA (2001-2005) does not include mine action		x					
2002	IND produces first National Mine Action Plan 2002-2006 using LIS data although operators mainly ignore it				x		x	x
2002–2003	First set of Mozambican national mine action standards is written by expatriate technical advisers in English (translated in 2004)			x	x	x		
2002	Capacity building ProDoc is revised to include creation of socioeconomic research and evaluation unit, QA unit under operations, expansion of mine risk education, capacity building of Nampula and Beira delegations, new management for Adopt-a-Minefield				x	x		

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Capacity development efforts with slow results (IND): 1999–2005 (continued)</b>								
2002	Consultancy concludes that NGO option for ADP is not viable. Donors agree at November meeting and decide to continue "more of the same", i.e. UNDP, IND and ADP will develop proposal for a nationally executed project under Ministry of Foreign Affairs			x		x		
2003	ADP continues with two TAs and \$2.1 million for operations			x		x		
2003	After using LIS as basis for its 2002-2006 plan, IND starts receiving operator reports of excessive numbers of contaminated areas and many unrecorded sites. IND has no real picture of contamination and thus how long clearance will take				x		x	
2003	Final destruction of remaining landmine stockpile on time for APMBC		x	x				
2003	Most bilateral donors announce intent to end funding for mine action	x		x	x	x		
2003	New director of IND is appointed: Gamiliel Munguambe				x			
2003	MGM closes operations and leaves Mozambique			x				
2003	Evaluation of global landmine survey process. Mozambique country study (by Scanteam) is critical of MLIS				x		x	
2004	IND QA teams are deployed to each regional office; they have insufficient equipment and resources; Austria and Switzerland each support one region				x	x		
2004	Corruption accusations are made over use of donor funds to purchase expensive car for IND national director				x	x		
July 2004	ProDoc 0039146 Transformation of the Associated Demining Programme (ADP) July 2004-June 2005 (\$3 million); establishing ADP as a non-profit-making demining operator, setting up the Governing Board, staff and strategy for ADP			x		x		

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Capacity development efforts with slow results (IND): 1999–2005 (continued)</b>								
2004	Apopo starts clearance testing with rats			x				
2004	Mozambique hosts first review conference of APMBBC	x			x	x		
2004	Review: Support to Humanitarian Mine Action in Mozambique COWI for Danida	x						
2004	HALO Trust announces it will conclude work in four northern provinces and close programme by end 2006			x			x	
2004–2007	HALO trust conducts mine-impact-free district survey in four northern provinces to document completion; process is largely ignored by IND; NPA and HI each conduct surveys of their areas of operations; all three result in update and reduction of areas estimated by LIS						x	
2004	NPA announces it will close operations in Mozambique based on Norwegian Embassy recommendation, based on 2002-2006 IND strategy with all high- and medium-impact sites cleared by 2006			x				
2004	HI announces it will close demining at end of 2006, with conclusion of all small area tasks in Inhambane			x				
2005	IND annual plan refers to “alarming differences” between 2002-2006 plan and what provincial governments were reporting; henceforth priorities to start from districts and provinces				x			
Apr 2005	ADP employees strike over unpaid wages; director resigns; Government shuts down ADP operations. UNDP (\$400,000) and Ireland (€250,000) contribute to severance package and Government contributes \$1.1 million. Whereabouts of ADP database and clearance reports is unclear		x	x		x		
2005	GICHD review of 10 years of assistance to mine action in Mozambique (based on fieldwork mid-January to mid-February 2005)			x	x	x		

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Capacity development efforts with slow results (IND): 1999–2005 (continued)</b>								
2005	UNDP capacity building programme ends; IND loses its best educated and trained local staff on UNDP project payroll; others not paid for months while awaiting admission to civil service				x	x		
<b>Crisis and development of effective national ownership of mine action programme — 2005–2008</b>								
2005–2007	Donor funding plummets amid accountability and management concerns; donor support falls from \$15 million in 2005 to \$2.5 million in 2007	x		x	x	x		
June 2005	UNDP hires local consultant to help IND outreach to government departments and represent mine action in preparation for second PARPA		x		x	x		
2006	Second PARPA (2006–2009) includes mine action as one of eight cross-cutting issues		x					
Jan 2006	Price Waterhouse produces 'Final Report — Facilitation of a Business Plan for the Associated Demining Project', funded by UNDP, but it is never heard of again			x		x		
2006	NPA closes programme and leaves country after conducting task impact assessment of all centre-south provinces (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane; plus Gaza and Maputo, where it never worked)			x			x	
2006	Apopo is accredited as demining operator			x				
2006–2007	HI conducts comprehensive village-by-village survey of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provinces						x	
Feb 2007	Mozambique is one of three African countries to participate in launch of Oslo process, which produces Convention on Cluster Munitions	x						
June 2007	HALO Trust concludes a mine-impact-free assessment of the four centre-north provinces where it had been operating and declares no known mined areas remain			x			x	

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Crisis and development of effective national ownership of mine action programme — 2005–2008</b> (continued)								
2007	Norway funds a seminar involving operators, GICHD, UNDP and IND to discuss National Mine Action Plan, challenges and strategy				x	x		
2007–2008	On behalf of IND, HALO Trust undertakes baseline assessment of remaining six provinces using records, LIS, pre- and post-LIS reports in IMSMA, and surveys by HI and NPA in their areas				x		x	
2008–2015	The only remaining long-term advisers are individual CTAs funded by UNDP				x	x		
2008	Evaluation of Canadian Landmines Fund Phase II (mainly HI)			x				
2008	For the first time the financial table in IND annual report contains government contribution (\$1.5 million)		x		x			
2008	Socioeconomic impact assessment (UNDP-funded consultancy) is undertaken to determine performance against PARPA indicators. It is superficial but finds positive linkages		x			x		
2008	Most ambassadors decline to attend annual IND director briefing		x		x	x		
<b>Effective IND management of national programme and APMB completion process: 2008–2015</b>								
2008	Article 5 extension request is prepared, involving operators and other stakeholders under leadership of IND, using baseline assessment		x	x	x			
2008–2012	National Mine Action Plan, based on baseline assessment, adopts district-by-district approach to prioritize remaining demining, approved by Council of Ministers		x		x			x
2008	Donor funding begins to recover, based on credibility of mine action strategy and Article 5 extension request, with UNDP support (full recovery by 2011)	x			x			
2008–2011	'Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming Mine Action, Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls' project					x		

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Effective IND management of national programme and APMBBC completion process: 2008–2015 (continued)</b>								
2008	IND strengthens QA operations			x	x			
2008	IND performs district-by-district verification of provinces demined by HALO Trust in four northern sites; identifies 43 suspected mined areas and 34 unexploded ordnance sites.				x		x	
2008	Government requests Ottawa Treaty extension to 2014	x		x	x			
2008	Article 5 extension request is approved by States Parties	x			x			
Dec 2008	Government signs Convention on Cluster Munitions	x			x			
2009	National Mine Action Strategy 2009-2014 is adopted, aimed at mine-free Mozambique by 2014 (amended following Article 5 extension approval)				x	x		x
2009	New IND director appointed: Julio Braga				x			
2009	IND/SAC workshop held on land release; IND develops land release standards (not accepted by operators)			x	x			
2009	Apopo begins demining work in cooperation with HI in Inhambane			x				
2010 onward	UNDP mobilizes resources for IND and operations within national programme, channelling funds to all operators according to IND priority			x	x	x		
2010	In Five Year Plan 2010-2014 mine action is one of seven cross-cutting issues with nine priority actions, reflecting baseline assessment				x	x	x	
2010	Classification of provinces as mine-free effort begins and progresses				x			
2011	District police trained and equipped to respond to EOD tasks in four northern provinces			x	x	x		
2011	PARP 2011-2014 challenges include eliminating landmines to free land		x					

(Continued)

Year	Event	External context		Operations	IND capacity	UNDP support	Other	
		Int'l.	Nat'l.				Info	Plan
<b>Effective IND management of national programme and APMBC completion process: 2008–2015 (continued)</b>								
2012	Government ratifies Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	x						
2012	National Disability Plan 2012-2019 is approved		x					
2012	NPA returns to Mozambique demining operations			x				
2012	Ravim and HI undertake survey of 300 mine/ERW survivors						x	
2013	Government makes second request for extension of Article 5 deadline, to December 2014	x			x			
2014	Mozambique hosts third review conference of APMBC	x			x	x		
June 2014	Government announces development of national victim assistance plan at third review conference		x					
2014–2015	Police in Gaza and Maputo provinces are trained and equipped in EOD			x	x	x		
2014-2015	IND plans transition of core EOD and database functions to long-term institutional basis in context of post-demining residual problems				x	x		
2015	Government Five-Year Plan 2015-2019 identifies landmines as one of several perennial issues for attention		x					
2015	Mozambique declares itself free of known mined areas (17 September)		x		x			



## Annex 5

# COMMUNITY PROFILES

From 29 May to 12 June 2015 visits were made to 11 previously mine-affected communities in Maputo, Sofala and Manica provinces to assess the impact of clearance on socioeconomic conditions. The places visited had all been mine affected and had been cleared from 3 to 20 years in the past. Information was gathered using

semi-structured interviews with local officials plus focus group discussions and rapid rural appraisal techniques with communities. Where possible, information was gathered separately from men and women. The women were anxious to return to their work and meetings with them were sometimes curtailed.

Communities visited and tools used during community visits: <sup>12</sup> 2 Visits conducted between 29 May and 12 June 2015												
Village	Locality	Admin post	District	Province	Women				Men			
					Question guide	Community mapping	Impact assessment	Socio-economic profiling	Question guide	Community mapping	Impact assessment	Socio-economic profiling
São Damasio	Mucomane	Machava	Matola	Maputo	x		x			x	x	
Mubobo	Mubobo	Ressano Garcia	Moamba	Maputo					x			
Mabenga	Namaasha	Ressano Garcia	Moamba	Maputo					x			
Semacuesa	Nhansato	Galinha	Muanza	Sofala		x				x		
Mutocoma	Mutocoma	Cafumpe	Gondola	Manica		x	x	x		x	x	x
Chicamba	Chicamba	Mesica	Manica	Manica					x			
Chinete	Chinete	Marera	Macate	Manica		x	x			x	x	x
Maconha	Maconha	Macate	Macate	Manica						x	x	
Josina Machel	Maconha	Maconha	Macate	Manica			x		x		x	
Nhamudimo	Mucombezi	Vanduze	Vanduze	Manica		x		x		x		x
Mucombezi	Mucombezi	Vanduze	Vanduzi	Manica	x		x		x			

<sup>12</sup> Tools used in each community are marked 'x'. Blank spaces indicate the tool was not used in that community.

## **SÃO DAMASIO**

Visited 29 May and 12 June 2015

### **AREA PROFILE**

São Damasio is a peri-urban area on the edge of Maputo. It is accessible by a dirt road that runs along the power line, and people have settled on land on either side of the power line. The land under the power line is cultivated or used by children for volleyball and football. The area has been inhabited for at least 40 years although there are newcomers to the area and new houses are being constructed. Not all the landowners have returned, and land owned by non-returners remains unused.

Some newcomers complained that they had been cheated by the previous landowners when they bought the land as no one had explained that it was mined and that it flooded during the rainy season. Fortunately the area was cleared soon after the new inhabitants moved in so they were able to farm the land they had bought.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

The power line was mined during the war to protect it. Engineers advised the local population of the landmines. The mined areas were marked with wooden stakes and fencing.

There had been accidents and people from the area had been killed but respondents did not know any details.

The land was cleared in about 2011.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- People no longer worry about their safety or that of their children and can move around freely.
- Larger pieces of land can be farmed because people no longer have to avoid the mined areas.
- Animals can roam freely.

- New people are moving to the area.

The annual floods are still a problem, forcing people to leave the area for three or four months each year and pay to live somewhere else. They have to take all their possessions with them or they are washed away. Relocation and replacing lost belongings is a drain on very limited financial resources.

## **MUBOBO**

Visited 29 May 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

Around 100 families live in the village. It is located in sight of the main road near the power line that runs between Maputo and South Africa. The houses are scattered and hidden by vegetation. There is a concrete primary school with two classrooms.

A health care worker provides medical advice to people in their homes. The hospital and secondary school are in the city.

The village has no electricity. Water is available from two wells.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

The bases of the pylons were mined along with some other areas of the village. People and animals have been killed but they were travelling through the area to reach the border; they were not local residents.

In one incident a local man and two local women were injured. They have not received any assistance except immediate medical attention. They collect wood to make charcoal and are able to look after themselves.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- People have stopped worrying about themselves and their animals.

- The main income-generating activity is making charcoal, as before the clearance. However, people used to leave the area when they finished collecting wood but now they are staying and farming.
- People are coming from Maputo to buy and register land with the local authorities, although most are not living in the village or using the land regularly. As yet, there have been no land conflicts.

It is unclear whether the adoption of a more sedentary lifestyle and acquisition of land by city dwellers is related to mine clearance or modernization processes occurring after the war.

## **MABENGA**

Date of visit: 2 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

Thirty-six families have been living in the area since 1992. The villagers depend on making and selling charcoal and their small farms.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

The mines had been laid along the side of the road, preventing access to the area.

One man was killed and there was no help for his widow or children.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- Now people can move freely and access the land by the side of the road. This means that people have moved their houses from the valley to the main road.
- Children can catch the bus to school more easily from the main road.
- People are able to sell their charcoal to passersby on the main road, which is more profitable.
- Villagers now have land to graze animals and set up small farms.

- Everyone has benefited equally and there have been no land conflicts. However, people have come from outside the area wanting land. There is a process for allocating land that involves the villagers and local officials. Those arriving now who want land have to look elsewhere.

A mine was found in the village recently. It was reported to the police who came to remove it.

## **SEMACUESA**

Visited 3 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

The village is on the main road and train line. It was abandoned in the mid-1980s and people began returning to the area in 2004. People who participated in the meeting said they had moved to the area because there is a train station, which is probably the reason for the village's existence. The station was destroyed during the war but has since been rebuilt.

The people were trading on the side of the road. There were several shops selling food and household goods, and charcoal was bagged and ready to sell by the side of the road.

The majority of inhabitants came to the area from Zambezia province after clearance. People from Beira own land in the area but they do not live there.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

The area was heavily mined. The new station was opened in 2012, but the ruins of the old station remain. In 1994 Ronco cleared the railroad and probably the access road; the Mozambique armed forces cleared the destroyed rail station site; and HI cleared the village around 2010 or 2011. No one expressed any doubts about the clearance and all were confident that the area was safe.

## CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE

- People are no longer scared and can move freely.
- Previously water was unavailable for the village. The people would work together to dig a well, which would take two to three days and last around four months, after which they would have to start again. The Government provided a borehole in 2011 and the railroad company (VALE) another one in 2014. Both are close together but one works better than the other.
- A mobile mast was erected so the villagers can call friends and family all over Mozambique. They sometimes arrange transport over the phone.
- A grinding machine was provided by the Government in 2014, allowing people (women and older girls) to grind grain for themselves. Previously they did it by hand, which took around three days. With the time freed up by the grinding machine they are working in their gardens and cleaning their houses.
- People have gardens so can grow food for themselves, although there is not enough to sell.
- New houses have been built on the cleared land next to the road and the railway.
- Shops have been established by the roadside to benefit from passing trade and to supply the growing local population.
- People are moving to the village from Beira and more remote areas because the area is improving.
- People are now profiting from producing charcoal because they can gather the wood from a larger area and sell the charcoal to people passing by on the road.

## MUTOCOMA

Visited 6 June 2015

### VILLAGE PROFILE

The village includes around 100 or more families, engaged mainly in agriculture. The central area has shops, a school and a market. More shops are located in another area of the village. There is a football field and a church.

While the population is poor, some people are better off than others and have more possessions and better houses and clothes. They have more and better food so they are healthier and their children can finish school.

### CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The military laid mines every night and removed them during the day so people could move around. The mines were used to control the movement of the people and no one was certain where they were.

Two people were killed and another lost his leg in mine accidents.

### CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE

- All people benefited equally from the clearance but the better-off people have been able to invest in the land and profit more. They may produce enough food to sell the surplus.
- People are no longer afraid; they move around freely and do not need to worry about their children.
- It is possible to farm now that there is safe access to the land, so they have more food.
- It is easier to collect firewood and water, which makes daily life easier.
- People can go into the bush away from the houses to go to the toilet in safety.
- People were able to return to exactly the same area they had occupied before the war.

- The market and shops were established, the road and school improved.
- The village acquired a grinding mill, which saves time over preparing grain by hand.
- A commercial company has erected a mobile phone mast.

The inhabitants suspected an area of the village was still contaminated and this was reported to IND.

## CHICAMBA

Visited 7 June 2015

### VILLAGE PROFILE

The scattered village is located in a mountainous area next to the dam and power plant, which were built in the 1980s to provide electricity. Employees at the dam and electricity plant live in prefabricated housing on the compound. The village houses are constructed from mud and wood. Some of the villagers have farms.

### CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Government forces laid mines on the hillsides around the dam to protect it. There were no warning signs but people were advised of the contamination. For almost 30 years the area was not used except by a few people collecting firewood.

No people or domestic animals were killed or injured in mine incidents; only some wild boar and monkeys.

### CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE

- The land was cleared around five years ago and people access the area for firewood.
- People feel free now that the land is cleared. The population is growing as people are coming from outside the village for land. To date there had been no land conflict.
- The village chief said that no one can be cer-

tain that the mines are gone, but there have been no new incidents since clearance.

## CHINETE

Visited 8 June 2015

### VILLAGE PROFILE

The village, which is near rivers, has houses, shops, a hospital, a school, a market, a borehole, an administrative post and several churches.

### CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Mines were laid to protect military positions and to block access. They were cleared in 2012.

### CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE

- Everybody benefitted equally from the cleared land. The population spread out and new people arrived.
- People are no longer thinking about death or feeling afraid for themselves and their children when they move around.
- People were scared when they were farming and could not produce enough food because there was not enough safe land. People were hungry and it was very expensive to buy food. The situation is better now that the land is cleared.
- Collecting water used to be very time-consuming because the women had to go a long way to collect it from a safe place. Sometimes they would spend a whole day trying to collect water. Now there is a borehole in the village.
- It is less time-consuming to collect firewood because there are many accessible areas near the village inhabitants. Now people can collect enough firewood to cook their food properly. People no longer become ill with diarrhoea from badly cooked food.
- People can go to the toilet in private and in safety away from the houses.

- It is safe to travel on the roads so it is easier to get to market and transport goods. They are often carried on the head and it is difficult when the terrain is uneven.
- A borehole was constructed in 2013 and the village has acquired a grinding machine. Respondents did not know if these changes were linked to clearance or were part of local development plans.

## **MACONHA**

Visited 9 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

The village is ruled by a hereditary king named Maconha. The village is isolated and is reached by dirt roads that start in Chimoio near Zambezi University. The nearby Mavuzi dam, which is part of an electricity generating plant, was mined during the war.

The village has an administrative building, shops, a hospital, a well with a pump, a grinding mill and several churches. It has access to the river and farm land.

The main income-generating activity is farming, although some men occasionally find work at the power plant.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

Villagers were scared about the contamination and worried for their children's safety.

Areas of land and parts of the road were mined. There was an alternative to the mined route so that was not a problem. However, the mines limited opportunities to farm, gather firewood and timber, and to fish and hunt. It also made it difficult to chase the baboons and monkeys from the farmland, because the animals soon learned that humans would only follow them so far.

One man was killed in a mine accident but he had not been from the village and the incident

did not seem to have had a significant impact on the community.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- Everyone benefited equally from the demining and there has been no conflict over the cleared land.
- The community no longer needs to worry about the landmines and everyone can move freely.
- They can access natural resources including farmland, firewood and timber and can hunt and fish. The situation is better because they are no longer hungry.

There is an area of the village that people still think is contaminated and this was reported to IND.

## **JOSINA MACHEL**

Visited 9 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

Josina Machel is located near to Maconha although it is more isolated. It is very near the Mavuzi dam.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

The contamination impeded every aspect of daily life. The people did not have enough to eat, could not build proper shelters and lived in fear of a landmine incident.

Clearance was conducted in 1996 because of the dam.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- Before clearance people were scared and there had been deaths and injuries. Now people and their children can walk around without fear.
- People can access resources easily and farm. As a result they have proper food to eat and

are no longer becoming ill from eating food they find in the wild. They have a small surplus of food they sell to pay for their children's education or to purchase clothes.

- Thatch and timber are available so people can build proper houses that are big enough for the whole family and provide shelter from the cold and rain.
- There is firewood so people can cook enough food. Before the clearance people were often going to bed hungry because they did not have enough firewood to cook enough food.
- The baboons and monkeys can no longer hide from the people in the mined land, so it is easier for the villagers to chase them away.
- There is water for cooking, cleaning and bathing, and agriculture. The situation is better than before clearance, but the village still has to go to the river for water. This is not very convenient or hygienic as they are using the same water source for everything.

## **NHAMUDIMO**

Visited 10 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

Nhamudimo is also known as Mafurungo. It is located on the main road to Tete which is the national road number 7. There is a large farm and water pump on the other side of the road from the village.

Nine families established the village after the war in 1996. According to the men, a pilot came to the area in 1997 and established a farm. There is confusion among the villagers about who has the right to the land. The pilot gave permission for the nine families to stay there, but he did not want the families to grow or new people to move to the community. However, the village population has grown and he wants the new people to leave. The villagers say they will not go and there seems to be potential for conflict over the land in the near future.

There is a primary school an hour's walk away. Some of the children are too young to walk that far so the women take turns accompanying the children to the school.

A clinic was established in about 2004 a few kilometres away in Mucumbezi locality, which they can access.

The main income-generation activities are raising cows, goats and pigs to sell and making charcoal, which is sold by the side of the road. This village seemed to be wealthier than others visited.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

There was no contamination in the village, but the farm land on the opposite side of the road was mined and then cleared in 2009. The area was used while contaminated to collect firewood and graze animals. The villagers seemed to know where the mines were and marked dangerous areas by tying grass together. Sometimes, people burned mines when they found them or reported them to the police.

The people were not aware of any mine incidents.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- The villagers reported that nothing had changed since the land was cleared, although they recognize that it is easier to collect firewood and graze animals now that they can use all the land. The women said it was nice not to have to worry about the landmines but they had never worried that much anyway.
- The women said they were disappointed because they had assumed that once the land was cleared there would be investment in the area or some development projects. They said that they have received nothing from the Government despite local officials attending village meetings. They said other villages in the area had received development assistance.

## **MUCOMBEZI**

Visited 10 June 2015

### **VILLAGE PROFILE**

The village is on the national road number 7 on the way to Tete and a few kilometres from Nhamundimo. Villagers were selling produce by the side of the road. People returned to the village soon after the war. Some people are new to the area, others are the original inhabitants. The land is used for farming and grazing animals, which they sell.

### **CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

There were Rhodesian submunitions in the area and they are still scattered around. This seems to be the main contamination. Two landmines were also found and villagers remember a farmer who found a mine that did not explode, but he never accessed that area again. The villagers remembered a man who lost his leg. He was treated in hospital and returned to the village and continued to farm as he received no special help. He has since died of old age.

The villagers did not differentiate between landmines and UXO contamination. The land was cleared in 2007.

### **CHANGES FOLLOWING CLEARANCE**

- Now that the land has been cleared, the villagers do not worry about their own safety or that of their children.
- Villagers can access farmland, water and firewood, so they have sufficient food and can cook it properly.
- Villagers have water for washing. Daily tasks are less time-consuming because all areas can be accessed and the quickest routes taken.
- It is easier for children to go to school although only primary education is available locally.

The villagers believe there is still a contaminated area nearby. It does not have any impact because they do not need to access it but this information was reported to IND.

## Annex 6

# INSTRUMENTS USED FOR COMMUNITY CASE STUDIES

### QUESTION GUIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Key questions		Prompts
1	Do you know if land in this area was mined?	
2	Was it cleared? Do you know when?	
3	How is the demined land being used?	Farm Grazing Personal plot Water Firewood Construction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– School</li> <li>– Hospital</li> <li>– Market</li> <li>– Residential housing</li> <li>– Place of worship</li> </ul> Infrastructure project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Access roads</li> <li>– Power lines</li> <li>– Bridges</li> <li>– Water well</li> </ul> Anything else
	Is the demined land being used in the same way and by the same people as before it was cleared? [probe on impact]	<i>If the answer is no:</i> What changed and why? Movement of people Land given to someone else Development project Land conflict
4	Since the land has been demined, how has life in this community changed? Or has your life changed? Do you think this is the same for the rest of the community?	Income-generating activities Movement within the community Travel outside the community School Hospital/clinic Market Access roads/tracks Collecting water and firewood Do you move around freely? Does everyone move around freely?
	Have economic conditions for you improved since clearance? In what way? Have economic conditions for the community improved since clearance? In what way?	

Key questions		Prompts
4	Has everyone benefited equally or have some people benefited more than others? Why? [can you suggest individuals we can talk to]	
	Do you think there have been other changes since the land was cleared? [aim to find out about development and development projects — in the village, locally, or regionally]	New construction New investment New people Development projects
5	Are people living in this community who were injured by landmines? Were any community members killed by landmines? Did all these incidents happen before the land was cleared? [if no: what happened] Who was affected - men, women, girls and boys, young, old, different socioeconomic groups? What assistance was/is available to survivors and their families? [physical/ psychosocial/economic] What is their situation today?	
6	Is there anything else?	

## COMMUNITY MAPPING EXERCISE

Purpose of this tool:

- To understand what resources the village has now, where the landmines were and whether contamination affected which resources were used and how
- To indicate location of resources in a community including infrastructure, houses, water sources, schools, churches, crops and other important aspects
- To show where the contaminated land was.

1. Ask each group to draw a map of their village. On this map, they should indicate:

- Village boundaries
- Natural resources — water points; forests; crop/agricultural land (other resources)
- Schools and hospitals/clinics
- Churches and mosques
- Government buildings
- Markets

- Houses
- Any other important infrastructure or facilities?

Facilitators sit with the groups to guide the map development. Facilitators take notes on the discussion. Through observation note:

- Did everybody agree on the location of resources?
- Was anything mentioned that was not shown on the map?
- Did everyone contribute equally to the process? Were some more dominant, were some ignored?

2. When the map is complete, ask the group to mark the location of the land that was contaminated

3. Begin a discussion about the contaminated land. Write down/translate the responses:

- Did you have the same resources when the land was contaminated?
- What was different?

- When did you get the resources you have now?
  - Did you use the resources in the same way? If not, what was different and why?
  - Did you use resources outside the village when the land was contaminated?
4. If using this tool on its own, ask about victims and survivors, assistance available and the location of incidents

### IMPACT ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Purpose of this tool:

- To identify and discuss the impacts of landmine contamination on the community
- To identify what changed after clearance.

Facilitators introduce the activity. Explain that the first exercise provided an overview of the community and their resources and the extent of the contamination. The second exercise looks at how the contamination affected the community.

As outsiders to the area, we need to learn from the community about the issues and challenges that they face to ensure that we understand.

1. Write down/draw the main problems that the contamination caused in your village (one problem on a separate piece of paper)
2. Arrange these in a row
3. For each problem, write down/draw how each of these problems impacted the community
4. Discuss each of these impacts
5. Arrange the issues in order of how serious a threat they pose
6. Arrange the impacts under each problem in the order of how serious a threat they pose
7. Ask which of these problems/impacts still exists now that clearance has been completed.

While the group is doing the impact assessment, take notes on the following:

- Facilitator observation: Did the group agree about the problems the contamination caused? Explain.
- Facilitator observation: Was there any disagreement about how the problems impacted on the community? Explain.
- Facilitator observation: Were there any problems discussed that are not included in the final assessment? Explain.
- Facilitator observation: Any general comments.

### SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILING EXERCISE

Purpose of this tool:

- To identify and understand the characteristics of the different socioeconomic groups in the community

Explain to the group that you would like to learn more about the people living in the village.

1. Ask the group whether everyone in the village has the same standard of living?
2. If not, ask them to explain the different standards of living in the village — for example, they might say, poor, middle and good.
3. Show the different groups on different pieces of paper either with words or simple pictures or symbols for money
4. Ask them how someone from the outside would know which group each person in the village comes from. Write or draw the answers on different pieces of paper.

Consider: income-generating activities; family size; health of family members; number of income generators; size of house and land; location of house and land; belongings; level of education.

When the group is happy with the profiles, ask the following questions:

- If people used the land when it was mined, are the same people still using the land now? If not, why not; what happened?
- Has each group benefited equally from the cleared land? If so, why? How?
- To which group do mine survivors and their families belong?

Facilitators should make notes of all the information the group provides.

If possible ask to visit households from the different groups to ask them questions.

## Annex 7

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