

# Landmines and Spatial Development

## Appendix I

### History of Conflict \*

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#### Abstract

This appendix provides an overview of two key periods in the recent history of Mozambique that are intimately linked to landmine contamination. The appendix is not intended to be a comprehensive reconstruction of the War of Independence or the subsequent Civil War. Its aim is to highlight, in a concise way, the events that led Mozambique to be classified as “heavily mined” at the end of hostilities in 1992. We start by going over the war of independence (1964 – 1974) and then discuss the ensuing civil war (1977 – 1992). Going over the historical narrative is useful, as it highlights the underlying causes of the widespread usage of landmines. It also puts in context the gigantic effort to clear the country from the thousands of minefields after the peace agreement. We conclude by describing socioeconomic conditions at the end of civil war in 1992.

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\*Additional material can be found at [www.land-mines.com](http://www.land-mines.com)

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<sup>1</sup>See Emerson (2014) and Funada-Classen (2012) for a discussion of the civil war and its origins.

# 1 War of Independence

## 1.1 The War

The attacks of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) rebels on September 25<sup>th</sup>, 1964 against the Portuguese base at Chai in Northern Mozambique mark the onset of the Mozambican War of Independence against colonial rule. FRELIMO was founded in 1962 in Dar es Salaam with the help of the Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere. It unified three regional anti-colonial movements from Mozambique's Northern Provinces (Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niasa) and Tete (the Central-West province neighboring Zimbabwe). FRELIMO was a set-up by expatriate "intellectuals", without strong ties to Mozambique. Although its three main leaders (Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano, and Eduardo Mondlane) were all Southerners, it drew predominantly from the Makonde, an ethnic group straddling the border of Tanzania and Mozambique (Newitt (1995)). Its founder leader was Eduardo Mondlane, a well-respected anthropologist, who before returning to Africa had worked at the United Nations and at Syracuse University in the State of New York. After Mondlane's assassination in 1969, FRELIMO was presided over by a three-member committee, consisting of Uria Simango, Samora Machel, and Marcelino Dos Santos.

The first anti-personnel anti-vehicle mines were laid by FRELIMO in 1965 in Cobue (Niassa) and Muidembe (Cabo Delgado). Watch (1997) FRELIMO mined roads alongside the Lurio river in Northern Mozambique in the late 1960s; the area was nicknamed by the Portuguese colonial forces as "Minas Gerais" mimicking the name of the Brazilian mineral-rich state. In March 1970, FRELIMO initiated "Operation Estrada" in Cabo Delgado, close to Tanzania, which involved mining roads south to Rio Messalo. In spite of some initial military success, mostly in the Northern Provinces, the Portuguese contained the insurgency with the brutal Gordian Knot Operation of 1970 – 1973. At the same time, the colonial administration completed the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, the fifth largest in the world, which aimed to show Portugal's development agenda for Mozambique and its commitment of maintaining its colony. Cahora Bassa was designed not only to secure Mozambique's energy autonomy but also to export energy to South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a highly controversial move, Portugal relocated half to one million Mozambican peasants into fortified camps (*aldeamentos*) in an effort to prevent the spread of revolutionary messages, provide basic public goods, and promote some industrialization. This proved to be counterproductive, as thousands died from disease, starvation, and brutal penalties.

FRELIMO relied mostly on small-scale attacks and insurgency tactics. The Portuguese, thus, used landmines to protect infrastructure that was targeted from the rebels. To secure the Cahora Bassa dam the Portuguese colonial authorities planted 80,000 landmines, creating the "largest" minefield in Africa. Portuguese forces also placed mines to ring-fence Mozambique's border with Tanzania and block the rearmament of FRELIMO. They also placed landmines near the "development camps". At the same time, and in response to the Portuguese counterattack, FRELIMO used anti-tank and



anti-personnel landmines to terrorize Portuguese troops. FRELIMO guerrillas planted landmines with anti-prodding devices, making them way more dangerous and easy to explode. After 1973, FRELIMO used landmines for non-military purposes in an effort to demonstrate to the locals and international observers that the Portuguese had lost control of the countryside. In Tete, FRELIMO laid anti-personnel landmines on paths and trails used by the locals for water access, farming, and accessing main roads. Watch (1997)

## 1.2 Independence

Developments in Portugal were crucial for the war ending. The Mozambican Independence War ended with the successful overthrowing of the military dictatorship in Portugal by the Carnation Revolution on April 25th in 1974. The new Portuguese officials were determined to end colonial wars; besides Mozambique, liberation movements and anti-colonial wars were flaring across all Portuguese colonies, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome. On September 1974, the Portuguese government (controlled by Movimento das Forças Armadas, but nominally represented by President Spínola) signed the Lusaka Agreement with FRELIMO, setting the stage for an independent Mozambique. Yet, many critical issues, related to the legal position of white/Portuguese settlers and their property, colonial debt, and economic relations with Portugal were left unspecified. And the country was effectively handed over to FRELIMO, which after a brief interim period, took power in 1975 without elections.

After taking office, Samora Machel, the first President of the country, and FRELIMO tried to implement ambitious social and economic reforms, such as empowering peasants, investing in education, and promoting industrialization. Yet, the situation was chaotic (Newitt (1995)). The economy was weak, infrastructure was poor, illiteracy rampant, and global economic conditions unfavorable. White settlers, Indians and educated Mozambicans were fleeing the country, depleting their bank accounts, and moving vehicles, cars, and tractors to South Africa. The government embarked on a large-scale nationalization program regarding housing, health, and education; it slowly promoted the nationalization of private enterprises. The apartheid government in South Africa, strongly skeptical of FRELIMO's policies, started laying off Mozambican workers from South African gold mines, depriving the country of valuable remittances. Things got worse in 1977 as heavy rains flooded vital agricultural lands in the Limpopo Valley, close to the country's capital, Maputo. The government took over abandoned farms and factories, installing state managers who were assisted by foreign experts from communist countries. At the core of FRELIMO's plan was a compulsory communal villagization system, similar to Tanzania's *ujamaa* system pursued by Nyerere. Peasants were forced to abandon their very dispersed settlements in the countryside and move into communal villages (*aldais comunais*). By 1981, close to 2 million people had been moved into 1,266 communal villages (Watch (1992)). This policy proved to be highly ineffective, causing resentment among peasants. Violence was high, conditions dire, and the prospects of high productivity proved to be illusionary. According to some estimates, output fell by 40% in the years surrounding independence -if not more. Thanks to foreign aid, the economy

rebounded during 1977 – 1981, but inefficiencies were massive and poverty widespread. However, the key challenge of the new government was its inability to broadcast control over its large territory. As Weinstein (2007) put it “*the socialist state suffered the same fate as the colonial government that has been unable to extend its authority to rural Mozambique*”.

## 2 Civil War<sup>2</sup>

In 1977 FRELIMO declared a one-party state rule, based on Marxist principles. FRELIMO’s rise to power affected Mozambique’s relationships with neighboring governments. The apartheid government of South Africa was very suspicious of Samora Machel and his government, due to its Marxist and anti-colonial ideology, as well as its support of the African National Congress.<sup>3</sup> Relations with Rhodesia, that had declared independence from Great Britain in 1965, were even tenser and deteriorated sharply with FRELIMO’s rise in power. Even before Mozambique’s independence, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its armed militia, ZANLA were launching attacks in Zimbabwe against the Ian Smith’s regime from Central-West Mozambique (Tete Province). After independence, FRELIMO was in a position to further assist ZANU, a party with similar nationalistic, anti-colonial, and socialist ideology. In its effort to destabilize Ian Smith’s regime, FRELIMO sealed the borders with Rhodesia, depriving its landlocked neighbor of critical coastal access via the “Beira Corridor”. Mozambique also helped with the UN-imposed sanctions against Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian armed forces and police -that were already conducting operations in Mozambique against ZANLA- backed a counterinsurgency rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, often referred as MNR, Mozambique National Resistance, though locals would refer to them as “bandidos armados”).<sup>4</sup> RENAMO was established in Salisbury, Rhodesia in 1977 by the Rhodesian Secret Service; according to some records South African Special Forces also played an instrumental role. The principal figures were Orlando Cristina, a prominent figure of the notorious Portuguese Secret Police; André Matsangaissa, a former FRELIMO official, who had been freed by Rhodesian forces during a raid in Mozambique; and Afonso Dhalakama, who led RENAMO for more than two decades. RENAMO members including former FRELIMO officials dissatisfied by the radicalization of the party, Portuguese and other European expatriates looking to recover their property and influence, and mercenaries that were mostly interested in looting. RENAMO also received support from *regulos*, traditional ethnic chiefs, who were displeased with the nation-building policies of FRELIMO that aimed to attenuate ethnic differences. Emerson (2014) In its infancy, RENAMO’s army was around

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<sup>2</sup>See Emerson (2014) and Funada-Classen (2012) for a discussion of the civil war and its origins.

<sup>3</sup>At the same time, South Africa was directly involved in the Angolan civil war that (as in Mozambique) started almost immediately after independence. South Africa was supporting the rebels of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) that were fighting the MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the key anti-colonial movement that seized power at independence and with the military and economic assistance of communist countries managed to secure power during the three-decade-long Angolan civil war.

<sup>4</sup>Vines (1991) gives an eloquent description of RENAMO’s formation and its activities in Mozambique during the civil war. Weinstein (2007) provides an in-depth analysis of the structure of RENAMO, its tactics, and recruitment methods.

300 hundreds and in 1979 did not exceed 3,000 members.

Most of the landmines in Mozambique were laid either by RENAMO or the FRELIMO-backed government troops between 1977 and 1990, though landmine usage went on till 1992 and according to some reports even beyond the war ending. Other militias, gangs, and even private agents used landmines for a plethora of reasons, to protect farmland, to terrorize the civilian population, for military purposes. And the armies of Rhodesia and then Zimbabwe, South Africa, and even Malawi and Tanzania also used landmines during their direct involvement in the war. According to Watch (1997), FRELIMO and RENAMO frequently disseminated landmines in an “*arbitrary fashion*”. The international support of both actors was reflected in the landmines used on the ground: FRELIMO planted landmines produced in the Soviet block (e.g., Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union), while RENAMO mostly employed landmines produced in South Africa and in the Western world (e.g., Italy, Belgium).

## 2.1 Phase 1 (1977 – 1980)

During the first stage of the civil war, roughly from 1977 till 1980, RENAMO’s operations were limited to the Rhodesian border and rarely affected areas close to the coast (see Panel A of Figure 2). According to the data of Domingues et al. (2011) and Robinson (2006), less than 10% of civil war’s events took place during this initial phase. Rhodesian forces were in control; as Emerson (2014) puts it “*RENAMO would be molded into a small, but well-trained commando unit groomed to play a very limited and tightly-controlled part of the Rhodesian war effort.*”

RENAMO’s attacks in Mozambique were targeting military bases. RENAMO was also trying to disrupt communications and destabilize local communities in an effort to de-legitimize the power of the new Mozambican government. It was also assisting Rhodesian forces in special operations, the most important being the sabotage of the Beira oil storage depots in March 1979. Later that year and with the huge support of the Rhodesian army, RENAMO established its first major base in the country, in Gorongosa. According to some evidence (Magaia (1988)), there were around 350 RENAMO and Rhodesian attacks between 1976 – 1979. At the same time, FRELIMO was cracking down opposition using torture and capital punishment.

During this period landmines were placed on both sides of the Rhodesia-Mozambique border to prevent ZANLA’s raids in Rhodesia and to protect RENAMO’s bases. For example, in Mucumbura 20 kilometers of border areas were mined along the river. Rhodesian forces trained RENAMO’s members to use landmines in combat. RENAMO’s main strategy concerned the mining of major roads, supply routes, rural areas, and airstrips. Watch (1997) Landmine contamination took place in Tete, Manica, and Maputo provinces. Many roads in Magoe district (Tete) were mined by the Rhodesian forces (e.g., in Massapa where bridges and roads were mined). The transportation network in Massangena district (Manica) was also mined (e.g., Chingamane and Choane) due to Rhodesian activities. Mines were laid by both Rhodesian and FRELIMO forces to secure the border.

The fall of Ian Smith’s government in Rhodesia in June 1979 coupled with the successful attack of FRELIMO on RENAMO’s headquarters in Gorongosa (in October 1979) and the death of Matsangaissa in a counterattack weakened the rebels; it looked like that the civil war would be over. As Newitt (1995) puts it “*at this stage RENAMO was simply a mercenary unit of a white colonial army.*”

## 2.2 Phase 2 (1981 – 1986)

With Zimbabwe’s independence and the rise of Robert Mugabe in power, RENAMO moved to South Africa in 1980. Its new leader, Afonso Dhlakama, secured assistance from the South African Defence Force (SADF). Having new bases in Transval, a Northern South African region close to Mozambique, RENAMO’s strategy changed. With the strong military and financial backing of South Africa, it expanded its presence in Mozambique. The conflict reached Zambezia and Nampula in the North and Inhambane and Sofala in the Center-South (see Panel B of Figure 2). RENAMO attacks coincided with massive droughts in 1981 – 1982, leading to starvation and famine. Watch (1992) reports that RENAMO was even attacking tracks carrying food supplies and medicine. RENAMO managed to recruit some sympathizers, who were opposing FRELIMO’s villagization policies and the suppression of ethnic leaders and customs. In its controlled territories, RENAMO returned local power to ethnic chiefs, who in turn were collecting supplies for the army. It also engaged on child soldiering in an effort to boost its numbers; according to some estimates, 40% of its army consisted of children recruited below the age of 18 (Weinstein (2009)). RENAMO seems to have also reached some form of agreement with the government of Malawi, and throughout the 1980s its army was getting supplies from the poor landlocked country (Robinson (2009)).

RENAMO now targeted infrastructure, dams, roads, and railroads. Roads in Morrumbala and Namroi districts in Zambezia became unusable because of mines. RENAMO placed mines on bridges in Rio Lingonia between Ribaue (Nampula) and Gile (Zambezia) in 1982; its most eminent “successes” were the destruction of oil storage tanks in Beira in December 1982 and the blowing of the Zambezi rail bridge in 1983, that effectively cut the country into two. RENAMO’s operations spread even in the North, far from its base in South Africa and in Gorongosa (in Central Mozambique) and in areas where FRELIMO’s influence was strong.

FRELIMO also deployed landmines. Several minefields were planted to defend villages in Inhambane (e.g., Funhalouro and Inharrime districts), Zambezia (Morrumbala), and Maputo (Moamba and Marracuene). RENAMO laid mines trying to isolate urban centers (packed by internally displaced people) from the countryside. In response to RENAMO’s attacks in the early 1980s, FRELIMO planted protective minefields around the Komatripoort electricity power line (that runs in parallel to the main road connecting Maputo to Johannesburg). Ring minefields were laid around each of the 202 pylons, each with 200 – 300 AP mines. Watch (1997) The border with South Africa started to be mined around the same year in an effort to cut supplies from South Africa. FRELIMO also used landmines to destroy RENAMO’s outpost in conquered villages in Zambezia (e.g., Mocuba district)

and Inhambane (e.g., Inharrime district). In their effort to secure key facilities across the country, FRELIMO patrols laid mines around their positions and camps when they stopped at night. When the troops moved on, mines were left behind and the population was not alerted, creating a lethal danger to civilians.

In response to the devastating conditions, Samora Machel made a political U-turn, signing a security agreement with South African President Pieter Willem Botha. The Nkomati Accord of March 16, 1984 mandated both countries to stop supporting each others' insurgent groups, RENAMO and the African National Congress, respectively. Machel abandoned the strong ideological ties with the Soviet bloc and also visited European capitals to persuade European leaders to commit much-needed aid and to show that he was not a hardliner. He was successful, as many European governments, including the United Kingdom, provided aid and humanitarian support. At the same time, the Mozambican government lifted price controls and changed the investment code making it easier for foreigners to invest in the country. Yet, the war continued as RENAMO was still being assisted by South African paramilitary forces, Malawi, and SADF agents.

Violence, if anything, intensified. In late 1982 Samora Marcel reorganized the military forces, decentralizing power to 10 provincial leaders, and with the assistance of Soviet countries established small counter-insurgency groups. Emerson (2014) With the help of Zimbabwe and Zambia's Presidents Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda, respectively, Machel managed to secure Malawi's neutrality in September 1986. But in his flight back to Maputo, his plane crashed. After his death, Joaquim Chissano became FRELIMO's leader and Mozambique's President and served till the end of the civil war and the transition to democracy in 1994.

### 2.3 Phase 3 (1987 – 1990)

The bloody phase of the war continues after Samora Marcel's death. RENAMO and other militias engage in widespread terror strategies and there are numerous reports in international media of atrocities. Although RENAMO had lost the official support of South Africa and most other allies, the third phase of the civil war was the most brutal (see Panel C of Figure 2). "*RENAMO augmented its financial base -hedging against a South African withdrawal- by systematically looting household property, trading in illegal goods, and extorting payments from private enterprise in exchange for protection*" (Weinstein (2007)). The United States and the United Kingdom refused to treat RENAMO as a *bona fide* anti-communist party, although they were pressed by ultra-right-wing groups to do so. "*RENAMO was also steadily weaning itself- not by choice but of necessity- from South Africa*" (Emerson (2014)). And in a private meeting in July 1988 with President Joachim Cissano, South African President P. W. Botha promised to cut off any assistance to the rebels. But these developments intensified -rather than attenuated- conflict. RENAMO's strategy during this period was to destroy people's belief in the ability of the government to protect them. Massacres were commonplace, as RENAMO embraced a strategy of terror. Abductions, kidnaps, child soldiering raids, rapes, attacks in villages

and mutilations, burning, and looting become widespread. The most infamous event took place in July 1987 in the town of Homoine, where rebels killed 386 – 424 unarmed civilians with knives and machetes, mostly children, women, elderly and patients in the local hospital. Given the coverage of international media (New York Times article of July 1986), accusations focused on South Africa, even from the United States and the United Kingdom.

A US State Department commissioned report by former US official Robert Gersony argued that such attacks were commonplace. Gersony (1988) writes “*it is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by RENAMO.*” The report stated having credible information of “*killings, shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, and random shooting of civilians in villages during attacks*” (Gersony (1988)).

RENAMO also established forced labour camps (Gandira System). RENAMO continued targeting infrastructure (especially bridges and roads in Sofala) using landmines extensively to also terrorize the local population. This was the case in Piquerra village Nampula where Renamo laid mines (even on a football pitch) to disrupt the community around 1987. Many of the landmines laid by RENAMO in southern Mozambique were intended to cause extensive social and economic disruption, with dissemination on roads and villages following a random fashion aimed at maximizing their lethal potential.

Its operations appeared successful and the government lost control of sizable parts of the country. Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops intervened to contain RENAMO and eventually launched counterattacks in the mid-late 1980s. But RENAMO responded by staging war against Zimbabwe and launching a major counterattack that led to chaos in the border regions. It seems that FRELIMO and government troops also committed serious crimes during this period. They were also using forced labour and there were constant accusations of rape, killings, and looting, as the country was effectively lawless. Violence against the civilian population intensified as warring parties appeared unwilling to fight with each other, preferring plundering, stealing, kidnapping.

## **2.4 Phase 4 (1991 – 1992)**

The war’s final phase started when the South African public opinion shifted and with Frederik de Klerk’s efforts for a smooth democratic transition in South Africa (with his secret negotiations with ANC’s imprisoned leader Nelson Mandela). The South African political establishment also decided to stop the disaster in Mozambique. RENAMO had been weakened both military and financially. “New” armed groups emerged, offering protection to peasants and refugees. FRELIMO was also weak, unable to cope with the huge logistic challenges of running a war stretching across the vast country. The conditions were devastating and foreign support was dwindling. People were also tired and support for both warring parties dwindled. Spiritual military groups, like Naprama rose, illustrating the collapse of authority in the country. However, violence against the civilians continued and in some places even

intensified.

FRELIMO introduced a new Constitution in November 1990 allowing multi-party elections, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, and civil liberties. While the United States and South African governments were pushing for an immediate cease-fire and a steady transition, RENAMO continued its operations. Other groups and scattered FRELIMO units also went on with terrorizing activities and fighting continued in 1991 and 1992 although negotiations were taking place since late 1990 (led by Archbishop Jaime Gonçalves and *Sant’Egidio*, an Italian-based Catholic lay movement). Both actors continued to use landmines during this period. A cease-fire agreement that ended the war and opened the way for elections was signed by the two parties in Rome in October 1992. With the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) deploying 6,400 soldiers and workers and foreign aid coming in from various Western powers, the transition took place and the 1994 Presidential and Parliamentary elections marked the beginning of a democratic era.

## 2.5 Descriptive Patterns

We gathered data on conflict during the civil war from Domingues et al. (2011) and Robinson (2006). As the authors themselves acknowledge, the data are noisy and incomplete; yet, they allow validating the historical narratives. The format of the data resembles that of the ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, and Hegre (2014)) and UCDP-GED dataset (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Pads kocimaite (2010), Sundberg and Melander (2013)). The authors distinguish between battles involving the fighting parties and one-sided violence against the civilian population (e.g., kidnaps, village burning, repression) perpetrated by both parties. We complemented this data with the widely-used UCDP-GED dataset (Sundberg and Melander (2013)) that however covers only the latest period, 1989 – 1992. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of State-based violence (mostly between the FRELIMO-backed Mozambican armed forces and RENAMO) and One-sided Violence in the four periods: *i*) 1975 – 1980; *ii*) 1981 – 1986; *iii*) 1987 – 1990; *iv*) 1991 – 1992. In line with the historical background, violence in the country increased over time, spiking between 1987 and 1990. In these three years, the number of violent events was higher than in the previous ten years. In the final period, just before the Rome Peace agreement, state-based violence decreased. But the level of violence against civilians remained very close to the level reported during the third period.

Figure 4 presents the evolution of violence at the province level. In absolute terms, the most affected provinces throughout the period were Maputo, Sofala, Gaza, and Zambezia. Levels of violence were fairly stable in Gaza and Sofala (given their proximity to Zimbabwe and South Africa). The northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa were the regions in which conflict was lower.







Figure 2: Civil War Spatial Distribution by Period




Figure 3: Civil War Evolution by Period

### 3 The End of Civil War

The toll of the war of independence and especially of the civil war appears, by all accounts, incalculable. RENAMO was mostly aiming to destroy state capacity, infrastructure, loot, kill and terrorize. And FRELIMO also committed serious crimes. A peculiar feature of the Mozambican civil war is the small number of battles between the fighting parties<sup>5</sup>; this was a war against the civilians. Human Rights Watch’s early report was eloquently titled *Conspicuous Destruction* (Watch (1992)). Approximately 100,000 – 150,000 Mozambicans died in rebel raids. While estimates vary, there were 7,000 to 15,000 fatalities from landmines during the war, placing the death and injuries rate to population at 1 per 1000 inhabitants (Roberts and Williams (1995)).<sup>6</sup> Moreover, one million (and according to other estimates 2 million) people died from starvation, famine, and by lack of medical support. Four to five million Mozambicans (from a total population of 12 – 15 million) had to abandon their villages. Of those approximately 1 – 2 million fled to neighboring countries (mostly in Malawi) where they lived

<sup>5</sup>The two armies were relatively small (at its peak RENAMO had 20,000 fighters and FRELIMO’s army had 70,000 soldiers) and both were ill equipped. Thus, they were trying to avoid direct confrontation and resorting to the extensive use of landmines.

<sup>6</sup>It seems that there was severe under-reporting on landmines as both parties wanted to avoid international criticism. A 1994 Survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights covering 7,000 respondents in Manica and Sofala estimate death and injury by landmine ratios per 1,000 people at 16.7 and 8.1 in Manica and Sofala, respectively.




Figure 4: Civil War Evolution by Province

at bleak conditions, with the remaining 3 – 4 million flooding Maputo and domestic refugee camps.<sup>7</sup> During the war, hundreds of thousands of displaced Mozambicans were put in special tortures camps. Thousands of children were taken hostage and recruited as child soldiers while tens of thousands of women suffered from rape and mutilations.<sup>8</sup> Watch (1992) estimates that 200,000 children were left orphaned. The war also resulted in an environmental catastrophe; the population of cattle and other domesticated animals fell by more than 80% and wildlife also declined. The situation in 1993 and 1994 was devastating; Mozambique was arguably the poorest country in the world, kept afloat only with foreign aid (Ronco (1996)).

An appalling description of the Mozambican situation at the end of the world is effectively resumed by (Watch (1992)): “*Most of the country’s economic infrastructure is destroyed or inoperable, and much of the population is dependent on a massive international aid program. Hundreds of thousands of people are refugees in neighbouring countries or displaced inside Mozambique. Many rural areas have been reduced to a stone age condition, without trade or modern manufactured goods, education or health services, and suffering from constant insecurity. Mozambique needs to be built almost from scratch.*”

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<sup>7</sup>UCDP places the number of refugees in neighboring countries to 1.5 million and the number of internally displaced people to 3 million.

<sup>8</sup>Watch (1992) writes: “*The mutilation of civilians, by cutting off ears, noses, lips and sexual organs, and by mutilating corpses, has been one of the most characteristic abuses of the war in Mozambique.*”

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