



# **Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership**

## **Mozambique**

**Geneva, March 2012**



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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

<b>ADP</b>	Accelerated Demining Programme
<b>BA</b>	Baseline Assessment
<b>BAC</b>	Battlefield Area Clearance
<b>CND</b>	National Demining Commission
<b>CTA</b>	Chief Technical Advisor
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>GICHD</b>	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action
<b>IND</b>	National Demining Institute
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-governmental Organisation
<b>LIS</b>	Landmine Impact Survey
<b>MA</b>	Mine Action
<b>MAC</b>	Mine Action Centre
<b>MIFD</b>	Mine Impact Free District
<b>MRE</b>	Mine Risk Education
<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	UN Operations in Mozambique
<b>SAC</b>	Survey Action Centre
<b>SHA</b>	Suspected Hazardous Area
<b>SOP</b>	Standing Operating Procedures
<b>TA</b>	Technical Advisor
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1964, Mozambique has lived through three distinct conflict situations—the 1964-75 fight for independence from Portugal, the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces during Mozambique’s support to Zimbabwe, and the 1980-992 conflict between the FRELIMO government and the rebel RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South Africa. As a result, Mozambique’s mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination is complex; it combines large minefields around key infrastructure, defensive minefields around military installations, and a large number of small minefields and ERW that are randomly scattered around the country.

The response to Mozambique’s contamination officially began in 1992, when the UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), primarily charged to lead the peace process, was also mandated to manage demining operations. However, due to various internal complications, ONUMOZ did not initiate demining operations until mid-1994, five months before the mission’s end. In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by international NGO operators such as Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust, as well as UN agencies such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which, together with UNDP, trained and employed 400 Mozambican deminers as part of the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). With the creation of the National Demining Commission (Comissao Nacional de Desminagem; CND), in 1995, as an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between the functions of a mine action authority and a mine action centre, Mozambique seemed to take an important step towards owning the national mine action programme. However, it remained underfunded and poorly staffed, and all of its few uncoordinated capacity development efforts yielded no concrete results.

In 1999, in response to its poor performance, the CND was replaced by the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous statutory body reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. IND was in charge of proposing policies and strategies, coordinating mine action activities, developing standards and mobilising resources. But since most of the funding came through operators, it remained virtually independent, choosing where and how to use its funds. This certainly weakened IND’s ownership and management of mine action as a whole, but did not hinder its progress in developing capacity in partnership with UNDP and others. Similar to what happened when ONUMOZ left in 1994, the end of the ADP highlighted IND’s (and the Mozambican government’s) lack of authority over mine action in the country. Conceived as a temporary project, rather than as a programme of international assistance to a national mine action authority, the ADP lacked a transition component. There were no national entities able to define relevant policies, take command and effectively manage the mine action programme. For this reason, rather than a planned transition, IND experienced an improvised, ad hoc effort to fill the gap left. And although IND’s staff is performing better and gaining more access to discretionary resources, its authority over operators remains limited.

## INTRODUCTION

Mozambique shares its borders with six countries and has a 2,500 km coastline on the Indian Ocean to the east. It has 22.4 million inhabitants and 800,000 km<sup>2</sup> of land.

The country is divided into ten provinces which are grouped into three regions:

- north (three provinces)
- centre (four provinces)
- south (three provinces)<sup>1</sup>, with the capital Maputo located at the southernmost tip

Despite impressive economic growth rates, due mainly to a handful of mega projects, Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with some 55 per cent of its population living in absolute poverty. The country is heavily dependent on donor assistance in the form of projects, and also directly, for about half the national budget. This dependence has meant that the Bretton Woods institutions and donors have considerable influence on the government's policies and programmes.

The Mozambique population have lived through three distinct conflict situations:

- the 1964-1975 fight for independence from Portugal
- the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces when Mozambique supported Zimbabwe's fight for independence
- the 1980-1992 conflict between the FRELIMO government and the rebel RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South Africa

All of these factors have affected the nature of minefield contamination and how it has been tackled. Because of these conflicts, there are:

- a combination of large minefields around key infrastructure
- defensive minefields around military installations and some settlements
- a large number of small, scattered minefields and UXO

This means that the logistics of surveys, clearance, quality assurance (QA) and explosives ordnance destruction (EOD) are complex and time-consuming.

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<sup>1</sup> Mine action is an exception – the central Zambézia province is combined with the north, making up all the country north of the Zambezi river that was HALO's operational area.

## **OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME**

### **ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME: THE START-UP PHASE 1992-1995**

Between 1992 and 1994, the UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) led a peace process. At this time the government was weak, and the UN and the donors were the key players. What happened then determined how the mine situation would be tackled thereafter and how the institutional capacity to coordinate and manage the programme would evolve.

A few months into the peace process, the UN prepared a demining plan. It focused on:

- a) demining as a military, operational issue; using commercial companies to speedily verify roads and carry out clearance
- b) building on national mine clearance capacity

In the end however, ONUMOZ demining began only in June 1994, five months before its mandate ended. This happened because:

- approving the plan was delayed
- there were conflicts between the UN and donors over whom to award the commercial contracts
- the contracting process itself was lengthy

In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by bilateral donor funding for commercial and international non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators.

In 1993, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began working in the three central provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala, with Norwegian funding. In 1994, HALO Trust began working in central Zambézia province with UK funding, and rapidly expanded to the three northern provinces. The indigenous capacity component of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plan involved the training of 400 deminers, and a UNDP project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), was launched to employ them. As HALO was in the north and NPA in the centre, ADP started operations in the three southern provinces in October 1994.

In mid-1994, with a view to establishing post-ONUMOZ capacity, the UN suggested a set-up along the lines of the Cambodian model, with:

- an inter-ministerial authority as the governing oversight entity



- a national mine action centre (MAC), with an operational wing that would intervene directly, coordinate and plan

However, concerns were raised, that it would be a top-heavy, expensive, para-statal replication of the work already being done by operators on the ground. The issue was still left unresolved when ONUMOZ came to an end in late 1994, leaving an institutional vacuum.

In the end, the transition was unprepared, ad hoc and unorganised. There were no national entities able to take command of an effective mine action programme, define overall policy, or direct, coordinate and manage the programme.

## **INITIAL CONSOLIDATION (1995-1999) AND MATURATION (1995-2004) PHASES, AND TRANSITION TO UNDP**

### **INITIAL CONSOLIDATION PHASE: 1995-1999 NATIONAL DEMINING COMMISSION (COMISSAO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM (CND) 1995-1999)**

For some six months after ONUMOZ's arrival, there was no national mine action body, but it did not seem to hamper the work of HALO, NPA or ADP. They continued to mobilise their own resources and self-regulate, with individual plans and priorities reflecting their different corporate cultures. There was little or no communication between them.

In May 1995, the government created the National Demining Commission (Comissao Nacional de Desminagem; CND) under the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, as an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between, the functions of a mine action authority and a mine action centre. The function of the former was handled by a "policy-making arm" made up of several ministries.<sup>2</sup> The mine action centre element, including data collection, clearance planning, establishing procedures, monitoring and coordinating demining activities, and licensing and tendering functions, was to be taken care of in the Executive Director's office. However, it was poorly staffed, and the few disjointed capacity-building efforts (which took two and a half years and cost some USD 3 million), had limited effects.

Operators continued to receive donor funding and consolidate their positions during 1995-1999. Meanwhile, Mozambique became one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Ottawa Convention (in 1997 and 1998 respectively). In 1998, Handicap International started humanitarian demining in Inhambane province.

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<sup>2</sup> Ministries of Economy, Finance, Home Affairs and Defence, with Health, Labour and Social Affairs as occasional members.

## MATURATION PHASE 1999-2004/5: NATIONAL DEMINING INSTITUTE (INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM – IND)

In June 1999, the CND was replaced by the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous statutory body run by a director reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meant that the tentative “policy-making arm”, the committee that might have performed something of an authority function, disappeared and was replaced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The IND was in charge of:

- proposing policies and strategies
- proposing and executing plans
- facilitating coordination, management and control of mine action activity
- developing standards
- mobilising resource
- maintaining the IMSMA database and quality assurance

It also had a corresponding departmental structure.<sup>3</sup> It later established regional offices in the north and centre of the country. It had a management committee made up of department heads and a technical council, with representatives from ministries with the greatest interest in mine action<sup>4</sup>. It was responsible for organising annual meetings with operators, donors and other stakeholders.

Within a year there were a number of significant developments:

- 2000 – launch of a UNDP capacity-building project, with a six-person technical advisory (TA) team, which helped provide the IND with a solid framework and basic working tools and procedures
- 2001 – a one-year UNDP mine action flood-related emergency project
- 2001 – publication of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) report
- 2001 – initiatives to transform ADP into a national NGO or mine action clearance agency

In addition, the German operator MgM arrived in 2000, the US Department of Defense helped build the army’s demining capacity, and the commercial operator, RONCO, received US funding to establish a “quick reaction demining force” (QRDF) of Mozambican deminers who, when not deployed overseas, worked in the centre and

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<sup>3</sup> Studies/planning /information, operations, international relations as well as the “business” departments of administration/finance and human resources

<sup>4</sup> Nothing akin to National Mine Action Authority, this is a consultative body that gives opinions on annual reports and plans or other matters, when requested to do so by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

south of the country. IND also tried to encourage the creation of Mozambican commercial operators.

Within a short time, it was recognised that, albeit with difficulty, the IND was performing somewhat better than its predecessor and its capacity was improving. Donor support for demining increased considerably, and IND presented its first multi-year plan 2002-2006, based on the LIS. The aim was to achieve “mine impact free status” by 2006, by clearing all high and medium impact sites.

Despite these advances, there were still some major problems on the horizon.

## THE OPERATORS

### HUMANITARIAN DEMINING OPERATORS

#### Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP): transition from UN to indigenous capacity

In June 1994, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) was established as a UNDP project to employ deminers trained by peacekeepers, but with little thought to its future. ADP existed as a UNDP project in two phases (1994-2000 and 2000-2005) and operated in the three southern provinces.

It received considerable donor funding, channelled through UNDP, as well as technical advisory support, mainly from military advisors from Australian and New Zealand, and it benefited from several overseas specialist training courses. ADP had a training centre in Moamba, Maputo province that eventually became the main capacity-building source for operators in Mozambique; providing basic, refresher and specialist courses. It also sent personnel for service overseas.<sup>5</sup>

In March 2001, when it still had five technical advisors, a new UNDP project attempted to address ADP’s future. The “transformation of ADP into an NGO” project document was referred to in ADP reports as the “transition document”. The objective was “support for national capacity” by producing a “fully operational national NGO”.

Although the objectives and outputs of the project document cover solely the transformation process, the text refers to a mine action budget of USD 4 million a year, so mine action activities continued (the final expenditure for the period was at least USD 6.35 million – see Annex 1). Indeed, according to ADP, the project document was a “strategic document”, with strategic objectives “based upon an external requirement” and, as such, did not allow stakeholders to assess ADP’s “institutional development”

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<sup>5</sup> According to the ADP 2004 report: Lebanon, Guinea Bissau, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Nigeria, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, Croatia, Azerbaijan and Angola.

activities. ADP, therefore, produced its own operational project document, containing mine action objectives, outputs, activities and indicators;<sup>6</sup> it also submitted two types of reports to UNDP: strategic and operational.

As progress on transforming ADP into a local NGO was minimal, this meant that what was happening on the ground did not reflect what was outlined in the official UNDP project document. Evidence suggests that UNDP went along with this, as it continued to channel demining funds to ADP.

The “transition” effort by both parties appears to have been weak. The main output was a May 2002 consultancy report which concluded that an NGO option was not viable.<sup>7</sup> When the study’s findings were presented to a donor stakeholder meeting in November 2002,<sup>8</sup> the participants reportedly concurred and decided on “more of the same”<sup>9</sup> (ie that UNDP, IND and ADP should develop a proposal for the establishment of a UNDP NEX<sup>10</sup> project under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

In 2003, ADP still had two technical advisors and USD 2.1 million for operations. However, its status was uncertain, and the perception that the mine threat was “not so serious”, made more hesitant. An added financial concern was that by changing its status from a UNDP project to an NGO, ADP would have to pay its staff some USD 1.8 million in immediate compensation.<sup>11</sup>

However, it appears that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the proposal, so a new project document<sup>12</sup> was issued for the period July 2004 to June 2005. The objective was to establish a “legal framework”<sup>13</sup> that would allow ADP to exist as a “non-profit making demining operator”. It would take the form of an association of senior ADP staff, and be known as the “Associated Demining Programme”. Work proceeded with the appointment of a governing board, preparation of the required staff establishment for national coverage and the drafting of a strategy and vision documents

The process was halted, however, by events in early 2005, when frustrated deminers went on strike for non-payment of wages. ADP’s director resigned and, by June, ADP

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<sup>6</sup> None of this was mentioned in the official ProDoc signed by the UNDP Res Rep, the IND Director and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> The former ADP director noted that this would have been evident if a minimum of effort had gone into preparing the project document. There was clearly only minimal preparation with no kind of needs assessment.

<sup>8</sup> It has not been possible to consult the minutes of the meeting.

<sup>9</sup> This was based on the report’s option 4: “Keep ADP as a project and redefine its institutional relationship with IND and other government institutions.”

<sup>10</sup> National Execution – implemented by the government on the basis of annual work plans and quarterly disbursements, as is the case with the current UNDP small arms/mine action project

<sup>11</sup> This would be severance payment from ADP as a UNDP project, in line with Mozambique’s provisions for termination of employment. It appears that UNDP never registered ADP personnel as employees; so did not make mandatory contributions into the social security system to cover termination payments.

<sup>12</sup> ProDoc not available, current information taken from 2004 ADP report.

<sup>13</sup> Not new legislation, more like legal documentation

had collapsed. Compensation, including the legally-mandated severance payments, was eventually paid to the retrenched deminers through contributions from UNDP (USD 400,000) and Ireland (Euro 250,000), with the government of Mozambique covering the balance of some USD 1.1 million.<sup>14</sup>

Although ADP was, according to IND, recognised as being very engaged and carrying out quality work,<sup>15</sup> very few of their demining activities were recorded in IMSMA. There is no conclusive evidence to say if this was due to difficulties with IND's database unit or a lack of reporting on ADP's side. The former ADP director insists that he always sent the required task and clearance information to IND, but the whereabouts of ADP's own demining database – or the original documents – is unclear.

Why did this happen? How could these deminers not have been used as a national force for the final push for compliance with Mozambique's mine clearance obligations, instead of working for a foreign operator? There are many opinions. Contributing factors appear to have been personality clashes, intra-governmental intrigue, IND concern that ADP wanted to take it over by becoming its operational wing, donor reluctance, opposition by the international operators, government disinterest, the compensation problem and all the complications of the crisis years – when ADP was both a contributor and a victim. It is, however, clear that ADP was a UNDP project, and so was partially responsible for what happened.

## HALO Trust

In mid-1993, the HALO Trust was hired by ONUMOZ to do the first rapid survey of the landmine situation throughout the country. In February 1994 the HALO trust supported three British humanitarian NGOs in demining in the central Zambézia province, and then soon expanded north to Niassa in 1995, Cabo Delgado in 1996 and Nampula in 1997<sup>16</sup>, covering 48 per cent of the country's area and more than half its population. In 1998 it felt that it could complete these provinces by 2003, and was contemplating training and leaving behind small "fire brigades" to deal with residual problems. However, after deciding to do full clearance the end date was put back to around 2007 and the fire brigade idea dropped.

HALO's priority was to roughly assess areas, based on humanitarian concerns and development and infrastructure plans (government or commercial), and the provincial government was to approve the overall demining plan. Operating in the entire country

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<sup>14</sup> However, the story did not quite end there, In January 2006 the Price Waterhouse Coopers company produced a "Final Report – Facilitation of a Business Plan for Associated Demining Project" funded by UNDP and there was news that the Associated Demining Project had been registered. However, it was never heard of again.

<sup>15</sup> The fact that the former ADP director is now a RONCO consultant organising assignments in half a dozen countries for up to 400 Mozambican deminers, most of them former ADP employees, suggests the organisation was capable.

<sup>16</sup> Financed by DFID, Ireland, Switzerland and USA/Netherlands respectively.

north of the Zambezi river, with no presence to speak of in the capital, HALO's contacts with IND were minimal, other than sending information for the IMSMA database and attending operator meetings.

Before leaving, HALO was to carry out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey of the four provinces. However, HALO did not leave as planned, but rather was asked by IND to conduct a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces. It is now working in Maputo, Manica and Tete provinces.

### Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

NPA was for many years heavily engaged in rural development projects in the three central provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. In 1994, it decided to start demining operations that would be closely linked to its rural development work.

NPA's priorities were different to HALO's, in that they were linked to its rural development background. One of NPA's principles was linking demining to humanitarian wellbeing, and clearance was often followed by a local development initiative. NPA's survey method (task impact assessment) focused on the increased production and income that was generated by clearing a certain hazard.

In 2004, NPA announced that it would stop demining operations in Mozambique. This was linked to the fact that the Norwegian embassy had made the decision to stop funding humanitarian mine action in Mozambique after noting that under the 2002-2006 IND strategy, all mined areas would be identified by 2006, and all high and medium impact areas cleared. Based on its own experience, NPA must have known that this was not going to be the case, but clearly was unable to transmit the message to the embassy, so the programme was closed and NPA left in 2006. NPA has pointed out that, before closing down its operations, it encouraged staff to create a national mine action NGO, highlighting that it would hand over its demining equipment, but that this never materialised, since there was little interest in doing so.

### Handicap International (HI)

HI (France) began working in Mozambique as an agency assisting people with disabilities, ie amputee mine victims. HI compiled a considerable database on the location of suspected minefields and was very engaged in mine risk education. In 1998, it started demining in Inhambane in the south, one of the most densely mined provinces in the country.<sup>17</sup> After NPA left, IND asked HI to expand and cover Manica and Sofala provinces.

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<sup>17</sup> Inhambane contained half the SHAs identified in the Baseline Assessment

Compared to the other INGOs, HI is relatively small and does not have a strong fundraising capacity. Until recently, its main funds came from the Canadian government and the Canadian Auto Workers union, with some support from HI's head office in Lyon. However, as IND began to gain access to more discretionary funding, it was able to increase its allocations to HI. Unlike the other international operators, all of HI's staff, including the field director, are Mozambican, making it a national operator in all but name.

Given its capacity constraints, HI concentrated on "proximity demining" of small sites under 15,000 m<sup>2</sup>. After clearing its priority sites, the organisation decided to follow a district by district approach to the remaining small sites and mark all those over 15,000m<sup>2</sup>, before closing at the end of 2006. However, IND asked it to stay and clear all sites in Inhambane, Manica and Sofala. Therefore, HI decided to conduct a "comprehensive survey" of all communities in the three provinces. It is now working only in Inhambane and Sofala provinces as, in the meantime, HALO has taken over Manica.

### APOPO

This Belgian-Tanzanian organisation began work in Mozambique in 2004, initially testing its rat-based survey and clearance approach in Manica with NPA. It then moved to Inhambane to continue testing with HI. In 2007-08, IND asked APOPO to start clearance on its own in Gaza province.

### Others

The German NGO MgM was present between 2000 and 2003, and the Mozambican army (FADM) has also worked somewhat sporadically on demining.

The US State Department funded a RONCO Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) of Mozambican deminers that, when not on assignments overseas, operated in the centre and south.

### INGOs and IND

The post-war effort made by ONUMOZ stressed clearance, not the creation and strengthening of a national mine action centre and authority. Consequently, the conflict-ridden ONUMOZ/OCHA transition effectively resulted in the country being divided into three independent operator areas. Because demining resources were tied to these areas, nationwide priorities could not be addressed.

The three regions operated separately, with different:

- resources
- work methods
- ways of relating to communities and local authorities
- criteria for defining priorities
- fundraising abilities

In the face of three strong independent operators, IND faced an uphill task to assert its coordination-direction mandate. The INGOs carried out costly surveys in their respective areas, sometimes with little reference to IND, using different data collection methods and coverage, different criteria for categorising suspected hazards and different definitions of “completion”.

Transition and ownership were therefore rather blurred. Much of what went wrong could have been avoided, had more attention been given to preparing the institutional foundations during ONUMOZ and the respective capacity-building requirements.

## COMMERCIAL OPERATORS

Initially, international companies were used to verify and clear roads, but after ONUMOZ, there was a quieter period until reconstruction, and then development projects, started to pick up.

Early in the decade, IND encouraged the creation of small Mozambican companies. This is relatively easy to do, requiring only articles of association and the company’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) (invariably a copy of the IND SOPs). These firms are usually run by former IND employees and deminers.

According to IND records, there are currently 33 licensed entities:

- three INGOs
- eight national NGOs
- 20 private mine action
- two private quality assurance companies

National NGOs and private companies have no permanent capacity, however. They recruit deminers and mobilise equipment only when they obtain a contract. IND inspection of their capacities is limited and when they work for investment companies or development projects they do not always send records of the work completed to IND (See some figures in Annex 8).



## THE CRISIS YEARS: 2004 TO 2006-07

Towards the middle of the decade, the mine action programme, as well as IND and UNDP in particular, went through a difficult time. This was due to a number of mutually reinforcing circumstances.

After the antipersonnel mine ban convention had entered into force in 1999, a programme known as “Adopt a Minefield” (AAM) was created by United Nations Association-USA, to engage American civil society in mine action. In 2003 and 2004, a corruption scandal erupted over Adopt a Minefield<sup>18</sup> funds, involving the head of the NPA demining programme, the Deputy Director of IND and a UNDP official, all of whom were dismissed. This was followed by press reports of abuse of funds by the incumbent IND director and his predecessor.

Operators announced plans for closure. MgM left in 2003, ADP collapsed in 2005 and NPA left in 2006. HI made plans to leave at the end of 2006, once all the small sites remaining in Inhambane were cleared. HALO prepared to leave in mid-2007 after completing its Mine Impact Free District programme in the centre-north provinces. They confirmed the widespread sense that the mine problem was not as bad as had been thought, or else it had already been largely resolved.

The UNDP capacity-building project in IND ended in 2005, with only a chief technical advisor post remaining. Because of this, IND lost a contingent of its best trained local staff, who had been on the UNDP project payroll; others were not paid for months while awaiting admission to the civil service.

After using the findings of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) for the basis of its 2002-2006 plan, IND started receiving operator reports of excessively contaminated areas and many unrecorded sites, to such an extent that the database unit had difficulty keeping track of the information. IND was unable to judge the real level of contamination, nor how long clearance might take, and UNDP was unable to help much, as it struggled to cope with the fall-out from the corruption scandal and the ADP debacle.<sup>19</sup>

All these factors contributed to falling donor support for mine action – from almost USD 23 million in 2002 to USD 17 million, 7.5 million and 4 million in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively.<sup>20</sup>

One of the main concerns of the 2005 *A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine*

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<sup>18</sup> After the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention entered into force in 1999, Adopt a minefield (AAM) was created by United Nations Association-USA to engage American civil society in mine action. To date, AAM has raised over USD 25 million for mine action, cleared over 1,000 minefields, and assisted thousands of survivors.  
<http://www.landmines.org/Page.aspx?pid=374>

<sup>19</sup> A senior UNDP official has described this period as “UNDP’s dark history”

<sup>20</sup> Mozambique’s Article 5 Extension Request, 30 April 2008

*Action Programme in Mozambique*<sup>21</sup> was the serious problems that arose due to ignorance of the mine action challenges Mozambique faced. Its recommendations included joint efforts by IND and operators to:

- a) achieve a common definition of “mine impact free” and “mine free”
- b) decide on approaches for a complete resurvey
- c) discuss how to ensure accurate and up to date information in IMSMA

## THE SURVEYS

Annex 1 lists the various actual and proposed surveys in Mozambique.

One of the biggest problems in the history of IND and of mine action in Mozambique has been the absence of a clear picture of the scale and nature of contamination in the country. It also is somewhat telling of IND’s fragility that only the final survey conducted in 2007 was done at the behest of IND. All the others were external initiatives with no IND involvement.

### HALO TRUST SURVEY 1993

The first four-month rough survey contracted by ONUMOZ considerably underestimated the problem but provided a useful starting point for the three larger operators.

### LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY (LIS) 1999-2001

In 1998, Canada offered to fund a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) as part of a series of such surveys being launched in mine-affected countries. When consulted in 1998, HI, NPA and ADP thought a survey was probably a good idea to help prioritisation<sup>22</sup>, but HALO felt it was not necessary.

The survey was carried out with little IND involvement, meaning there was no provision for a capacity-building input for the new institute.

The survey report was only available in 2001, shortly after the UNDP started working

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<sup>21</sup> IND, UNDP and GICHD, A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique, 2005, available through the GICHD’s Links and Information for Mine Action database: <http://www.gichd.org/links-information-database>.

<sup>22</sup> Even though the first two indicated that as a matter of urgency, and as the proposed LIS would probably take time, they were intending to do their own surveys to meet their data needs in their areas.

with IND and the results were not what stakeholders had expected. It was a sample survey and not the expected comprehensive census survey. It focused on affected communities rather than minefields, resulting in a gross overestimation of mined areas, and it seriously underestimated the number of minefields.

Despite these flaws, the LIS became the basis for IND's first multi-year plan 2002-2006, with unfortunate consequences. IND stated that it only recognised the LIS failings around 2004 when it started to put more emphasis on technical surveys<sup>23</sup> to reduce the exaggerated areas, despite the fact that the operators on the ground had been critical from the start.

### HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 2005-07

After expanding to Manica and Sofala provinces, HI decided to conduct a "comprehensive survey" of the three central provinces, which took place between 2005 and 2007. HI worked in every village and community to confirm existing mine/UXO sites and to identify new ones and their size. It identified nine million km<sup>2</sup> of 651 previously unknown SHAs, plus roads, although it was expected that the m<sup>2</sup> area would be somewhat smaller after a tighter technical survey. This was carried out when the HI survey findings were included in the baseline assessment.

#### NPA TASK IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Prior to closing down in 2005-2006, NPA conducted a task impact assessment of the minefields it had cleared in its provinces between 1993 and 2005. It measured the impact and resurveyed the 521 SHAs in the provinces recorded by the LIS, although it was not a comprehensive survey of every community. After receiving additional funding from Norway, NPA extended the assessment to cover the southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo, despite having never worked there in the past.

NPA's fieldwork targeted "affected communities" rather than suspected minefields per se.<sup>24</sup> The type of data gathered focused on beneficiary incomes and assistance after clearance. NPA gave IND detailed reports on each site, classifying them as high, medium, low and negligible impact. NPA would consider the province to be "mine impact free" if all sites in high, medium and low categories were cleared.

### HALO TRUST MINE IMPACT FREE DISTRICT SURVEY

After concluding its clearance work in the centre-north provinces, the HALO Trust

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<sup>23</sup> These were not technical surveys as defined by IMAS; rather, they were non-intrusive surveys designed to determine the polygon to be cleared.

<sup>24</sup> For example, it only considered four out of 160 power line pylons in Maputo to be hazardous because they were the only ones with communities nearby, yet virtually all were mined and are now being cleared.

carried out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey to confirm that all known mines had been removed. It took place from October 2004 to June 2007 and involved interviews with 6,395 communities. In each location, the verification process culminated in the senior local government official signing off on the appropriate paperwork. An additional 74 new SHAs were identified and cleared, with 176 mines found and destroyed. At the end of the exercise, HALO reported that it was satisfied it had made “every reasonable effort to identify all known mined areas and had cleared all known mined areas”.<sup>25</sup>

IND did not accompany HALO’s work on the ground as its QA presence in the north was minimal at the time. Despite this however, NDI came under pressure to accept the results without verification. Although these results were cited in the Article 5 extension request, IND proceeded with a verification process, with a view to districts being officially declared “mine free” in accordance with IND procedures. During this process it identified a further 43 suspected mined sites and 34 UXO/EOD spot tasks. At the time of writing, these were being demined by commercial operators with government funds. Other reports of sites requiring clearance turned out to be due to an incomplete handover process. IND has now drafted a set of official handover procedures<sup>26</sup> and these have been distributed to provincial and district authorities.

## THE HALO BASELINE ASSESSMENT

HALO Trust did not leave the country as planned after completing the MIFD survey. At IND’s request, it conducted a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces, based on existing records: LIS, pre and post LIS reports in the IMSMA database and the HI and NPA surveys.<sup>27</sup>

The baseline assessment cancelled 71 per cent of the recorded SHAs and confirmed 487. When the results were used as the basis of the National Mine Action Plan 2008-2010, IND included additional SHAs, increasing the number from 487 to 541, and the area to 12.1 million m<sup>2</sup>. The report and plan also included other sites that were known to exist but had not been surveyed or quantified:

- Cahora Bassa dam
- Chicamba dam
- the border with Zimbabwe
- one power line in Maputo and two in Sofala

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<sup>25</sup> The Mine Impact Free Survey of Northern Mozambique Final Report. The HALO Trust. November 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Now included as Chapter 5 of its revised SOPs “Procedimentos de Controle e Garantia de Qualidade para Operações de Desminagem em Moçambique”.

<sup>27</sup> NPA (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Maputo) HI (Manica, Sofala and Inhambane). So Manica/ Sofala had already been surveyed twice prior to the Baseline Assessment.

- two railways and 33 roads

The baseline assessment was based on existing records ie, it was not a new comprehensive survey of each community, as HALO felt that all SHAs were known. However, after HALO began demining in Maputo, it found 43 new sites, with an area of 500,000 m<sup>2</sup>, in addition to the 50 recorded sites. These original 50 SHAs had been recorded as having an area of 602,248 m<sup>2</sup>, but in fact 29 were larger than originally surveyed, adding 608,917 m<sup>2</sup>, meaning the total predicted area more than doubled.<sup>28</sup>

### ON THE SURVEYS – TRANSITION FROM SCATTERED EVIDENCE TO HARD DATA

Eight years passed between the rough survey carried out under ONUMOZ in 1993 and the LIS report in 2001. A further six years passed until, for the first time, the MIFD and the baseline assessment gave a much clearer picture of the landmine situation and enabled IND to produce a realistic and viable plan. Prior to the baseline assessment, there had been little IND involvement in or ownership of the various surveys. IND did not commission them nor did it have a say in the methods and criteria used. They were outside initiatives and, in the case of the post-LIS surveys, they were done to meet the purposes of those who conducted them (ie exit strategies). No IND involvement also meant no IND capacity development. These problems dated back to the LIS, as recognised in Mozambique’s 2008 Article 5 extension request:

“...the limitations or flaws associated with the LIS ...created considerable additional workload in having to revisit most sites and conduct additional stages of survey to better clarify the reality on the ground. The difficulty in determining an accurate end state may have contributed to some donor fatigue which in turn resulted in a slowdown of efforts to implement Article 5.”

The LIS took place at a time when IND was still being set up and – instead of being a capacity-building instrument – it became just the opposite.

IND’s credibility was undermined when it used the LIS data, which operators considered to be of little practical use, as the basis for its 2002-2006 plan. Instead of being a means of coordinating and controlling the operators, the plan made them even more independent. “The provincial and local authorities and the main humanitarian mine action (HMA) operators do not necessarily believe in or want to use the LIS data to prioritise their work. This has led to a situation where IND is largely left out of the discussion (on areas to be demined); the main actors in this discussion are the operator and the provincial level authority”.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The information on the additional area is inconsistent – see Annex 8

<sup>29</sup> Evaluation of Global Landmine Process. Scanteam

The LIS operation was run from separate premises. IND was not involved in the planning, implementation or analysis, so a vital capacity-building opportunity was lost. However, it was a complicated time. Initial discussions on the LIS started under the CND, fieldwork took place in 2000 when the UNDP project was starting, with also an emergency flood project ongoing. IND's ability to intervene in the LIS may have been limited, but it should have been better informed. It is difficult to understand why:

- a) the UNDP technical advisors participated in drafting the LIS-based plan
- b) they did not recommend or push for some kind of resurvey

IND has since stated that it only realised the extent of the LIS problems around 2004, which speaks volumes about IND-operator communications, and IND's awareness of the reality on the ground. There was no national uniformity (each operator with its own system and methodology) in how new areas were identified, recorded and prioritised, and with no clear picture of the situation and what was required to complete the demining programme, donor assistance was bound to falter.<sup>30</sup>

## UN GENDER GUIDELINES

The UN gender guidelines have been widely applied in Mozambique, mainly due to the government's strong position on the subject in a country where equality between men and women is laid down in the Constitution. This is important given that the gender content of many mine action activities is as much dependent on the composition and attitude of community structures and government entities as it is on the role of IND or operators. Surveys and prioritisation involve consultations with local communities where women are invariably present and free to voice their opinions. Mine risk education (MRE) takes place in schools, where at primary level, the number of boys and girls is roughly equal.

Consultation exercises such as the validation of mine free districts involve district and locality Consultative Councils that always have at least one female member to express the views and defend the interests of women. In community consultations, rural women are always ready to voice their concerns. As they tend to be heavily involved in farming, the weight of agricultural production in impact assessments necessarily reflects their interests.

In regard to demining entities, HALO has a section made up only of women, and HI has female deminers. The country manager of HALO, and the head of one of the most active

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<sup>30</sup> Due to IND's difficulty in maintaining accurate records in its IMSMA database, its adherence to LIS findings as the benchmark and its minimal involvement in operational government planning processes at the regional and provincial levels. .

commercial companies are women, as are three of IND's six executive managers – the heads of the legal, international and human resource departments. After taking a Madison University course that included gender issues, the head of the legal department is now responsible for promoting gender awareness in mine action in Mozambique.

## HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

### EVOLVING ROLES OF UN AGENCIES AND OTHERS

#### OCHA

Mozambique was one of the first post-war countries to have a demining programme, and was therefore something of a learning experience for UN agencies. During the 1992-94 peace process, the main OCHA concerns were resettlement, maintaining peace, demobilising the two armies and elections. Demining focused on road clearance in a highly politicised context, where time was of the essence, but joint decision-making by former warring parties was slow. The situation was further complicated by UN bureaucracy and UN-donor conflicts over demining contracts, and the future national mine action entity.

Mine action was equated with clearance, and clearance with operational needs and commercial solutions. HMA was never a priority in Mozambique. The development of indigenous capacity focused on training and fielding demining teams. As no agreement was reached on assistance to a mine action centre by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate, there were no preparations for what might come after, (eg institutional set-up, responsibilities, resources, etc.)

*“The inability of the donors to reach consensus meant that one of the poorest war-torn countries in the world was not given the help it needed to have a voice in the way in which the problem of mines was addressed. The absence of a central coordination mechanism meant that it was up to the mine action agencies and the donors to determine where and how resources would be allocated and used”.*<sup>31</sup>

#### UNDP

The first instance of direct UNDP project support was the ADP, which ran for 11 years in two phases:

- 1994-2000 (operational activities)
- 2000-2005 (continued operational activities, and a failed attempt to turn ADP into a national demining organisation)

The CND saw a few capacity-building initiatives, all of which failed, including a UNDP project between 1996 and 1998. In May 1999, a UNDP mission looked into transforming

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<sup>31</sup> The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities – Mozambique Study Report. Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood, Norah Niland. OCHA Publications.



CND into an institute that would receive capacity-building support. It seems that the UN-donor relationship remained fragile and donors were unwilling to provide the necessary funding.<sup>32</sup> However, when the government went ahead and created the IND in June 1999 and, in particular, when it appointed a new director, donor interest was rekindled.

The project started in March 2000 with a preparatory assistance phase funded by the government of Denmark. The project document “Capacity Building for the National Demining Institute” was signed in August 2000. Initially planned for three years, with a budget of USD 3.7 million, the project eventually ran from 2001-2005 at a cost of USD 7 million. The project also served to channel bilateral donor funds for survey and clearance. At the beginning of the project, a small parallel emergency UNDP project called “Flood Related Mine Action” also ran from October 2000 to December 2001.

Although the capacity-building project ended in 2005, there was some continuity in the form of a UNDP-funded chief technical advisor post. To date, it has been occupied by three people, usually with a gap of several months between the departure of one and the arrival of another<sup>33</sup>. Since 2008, IND capacity development has been supported under a new project, “Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming Mine Action, Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls 2008-2011”.

The bulk of the funds for the mine action component (USD 950,000) were designated for clearance, and USD 320,000 were earmarked to build capacity and high level technical support. Some small amounts were designated for resource mobilisation and mainstreaming mine action into government plans. However, while carrying out this study, the researchers found that although the project document had been signed by the government, and senior IND managers were aware of clearance assistance coming through UNDP, they knew nothing about the project and had never seen the project document.

## UNICEF

UNICEF provided the MRE technical advisor under the UNDP capacity-building project and took the lead in working with the government and NGOs. Together with the Mozambique Red Cross in particular, UNICEF was active until 2003. In 2005, a review of UNICEF’s activities indicated that there was no longer a serious need for MRE. However, it continues to be included in the IND 2008-2014 plan.

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<sup>32</sup> Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action December 2001

<sup>33</sup> The last CTA left in December 2010 and as of mid-June 2011 his replacement still had not arrived.

## DONORS

Annex 2 shows the evolution of mine action funding in Mozambique over the years. Since 2002, mine action in the country has been supported by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

Because the government can contribute only limited financial help to mine action, donor assistance has been vital. However, this often very naturally gives donors the final say in how a programme evolves.

In the start-up phase, the uncompromising approach of many donors contributed to the delay of commercial contracts and led to a mine action centre proposal being shelved, and replaced with a weaker National Demining Commission (CND) instead. A reason why ADP was never able to shift from a UNDP project to national NGO status is that it was not possible to mobilise donor support for the idea. However, simultaneous donor funding through humanitarian operators such as NPA and HALO enabled these NGOs to fill the vacuum on the ground and determine the areas that would be covered by whom.

Donor funds are provided in a number of ways:

- earmarked support for certain operators
- contributions to UNDP projects
- untied or tied funds channelled through UNDP projects
- funds via an INGO's own headquarters
- direct fundraising by the operators themselves

Most of these channels have meant that IND has had little control over where the funds went or how they were used, severely curtailing its ownership of the programme. However, after the cash-strapped crisis years, funding improved, mainly due to the commitment of Norway, and UNDP efforts to mobilise funds from a number of donors. Under the current project, both UNDP and IND jointly review the performance of clearance operations and analyse needs to agree on resource allocation.

In October 2007, Norway and Mozambique organised a round table to assist strategic planning and preparation of the Article 5 extension request. The two countries later signed a memorandum of understanding on annual assistance until Article 5 obligations had been met. It also covers cooperation on resource mobilisation, short term technical expertise and IND's coordination of national and international actors.

On the whole, and despite being under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IND has not been very proactive in mobilising funds or communicating with donors. The main point of

contact is the Mine Action Partners Meeting (heads of mission) co-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP resident Representative.<sup>34</sup>

At the time of writing, HALO is the strongest demining force in the country, and has considerable fundraising capacity. Its goals do not necessarily match IND's plans.

## GOVERNMENT

Government funding usually comprises IND running costs and customs exemptions. IND has never included in its reports the cost of military demining operations or the proportion of infrastructure rehabilitation costs reserved for mine clearance.

However, the government's contribution has risen in recent years and has included funds for clearance. In 2009, its contribution was double that of the previous year and it was the largest single contributor (USD three millions out of a total of USD nine millions).<sup>35</sup>

## CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN MINE ACTION: IND AND ADP

### IND

The final report on the emergency flood mine action<sup>36</sup> project is interesting because, by the time it started, the main flood relief effort was over and it appears to have turned to capacity development. The report describes the challenges faced by the new IND as "a serious state of affairs" and "a very unstable platform to transform into a solid foundation". There was little concept of a work plan or financial planning. It also noted that IND was under great pressure and being forced to take on too many responsibilities, for which it was unprepared, instead of concentrating on the basics.

The intended end-of-project situation of the UNDP capacity-building project was:

- competent local technical, administrative and policy formulation mechanisms and capacity
- a mine action plan
- indigenous mine action capability
- a mine action strategy with a functioning database
- a victim assistance policy and stronger support for victims
- more efficient and effective mine action operations

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<sup>34</sup> There are also quarterly stakeholder meetings with operators, UNDP and donor representatives

<sup>35</sup> IND Annual Report 2009

<sup>36</sup> Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action Annex 3 "Capacity Building and Support Programmes, Bilateral and UNDP support, overview and current status". undated

By the end of the project, many of the stated objectives had been accomplished, in particular:

- a) The putting in place of the essential elements of a mine action centre:
  - procedures
  - plans
  - reporting formats/procedures
  - safety and technical guidelines
  - accreditation criteria and procedures
  - quality assurance management system
  - national standard operating procedures
  - administration
  - finance and logistics systems and procedures
  
- b) The training of staff to assume responsibility for all of the above, and to develop staff through:
  - on the job training
  - some in-house courses and overseas management courses

The biggest challenges were shifting staff from one department to another, language barriers,<sup>37</sup> (some technical advisors didn't speak Portuguese and staff didn't speak English; essential for the international aspects of mine action), as well as the dual pressure of service performance demands and emerging responsibilities while still learning.

With mine action generally in its infancy, there was also the problem of change management in certain fields. The persistent management challenges were overly-centralised management, poor internal coordination, discipline and accountability for outputs and deadlines and performance problems, issues that were also raised in the 2005 *A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique*.

However, the biggest threat to sustainability was the build-up of IND capacity based on the (unplanned) recruitment of extra professional staff on UNDP contracts, that eventually also forced topping up for existing staff. Under the initial budget "project personnel" (predominantly technical advisors and their travel) was USD 1.9 million, about half the budget. By 2005, this had risen to USD 4.3 million and two-thirds of the budget. In 2001 there were 13 nationals on the UNDP payroll, in 2004 there were 53.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Some TA had problems with Portuguese and staff didn't speak English, which was also essential for the international aspects of MA

<sup>38</sup> UNDP Capacity Building Project Annual Reports

When the project and UNDP contracts ended in 2005, most of the best qualified staff left, including people who benefited most from the training but who found better jobs because of it. The situation was aggravated when some of those who wanted to stay could not because IND's limited personnel budget could not accommodate them all.<sup>39</sup> Even those who managed to stay had to wait six months until they were formally admitted to the civil service and could be paid.

However, it is widely recognised that IND competence has grown in recent years. This is partly because the contamination problem was reduced to six provinces. Some staff members were transferred out of IND as the workload fell, but the most able and experienced were retained, some completing university degree courses part time. Some areas have been strengthened to cope with the demands of the new situation eg, quality assurance.

Managers who remember IND's early years recall that, given the pressures of the moment, the technical advisors tended to take charge as much as they supported local personnel in doing the tasks and make the decisions, and some were not very competent. Nevertheless, they acknowledge it as learning experience.

Current IND staff feel that they gained little from the single chief technical advisor system, as none of the technical advisors had any specialist mine action knowledge. In particular, they point out that the two most important documents for the future of IND – the lengthy Article 5 submission and the 2008-2012 plan – were prepared by IND staff (with some input from Survey Action Center (SAC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)), at a time when there was no chief technical advisor present.

The job description for the new chief technical advisor post is very broad. It covers an enormous range of activities, including:

- most of the core functional capacities
- technical and operational advice
- organisational and individual capacity development
- keeping UNDP informed of the mine action situation and donor relations

With a view to the future, it also includes advising on sustainable mine action capacity and capacity development plans for IND, the military, police and operators on how to handle residual issues.

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<sup>39</sup> One senior IND staff member commented that during the crisis years the salary of the CTA was equivalent to half IND's budget. The salary issue still upsets senior managers when they compare their government salaries with those of colleagues in other countries working on UN-funded MA projects.

Current staff have said the main function of the chief technical advisor was to be the eyes and ears of UNDP and donors within IND, and so they continue to support the post to avoid losing donor funding<sup>40</sup>

One important point is that if IND does not feel it needs capacity-building assistance and is not engaged in planning, then no matter how good the chief technical advisor is, he or she will not be able to achieve much.

### ADP

Under the UNDP project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) received a great deal of capacity-building support. This came mostly through teams of military technical advisors on six-month secondments, and training in the skills required for a typical mine action programme:

- clearance
- quality assurance
- machinery maintenance
- dog handling

In the process, through its Moamba training centre, ADP became a focal point for capacity development. This was lost to Mozambique when ADP collapsed, although its expertise is still benefiting mine action programmes in other countries through recruitment for RONCO and demining firms.

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<sup>40</sup> UNDP comments that the CTA is provided at the request of IND and it approves the TOR for the post.

## **CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME – RECONFIGURATION PHASE**

The 2005 *A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique* concluded that the:

- humanitarian impact of mines had been greatly reduced
- number of victims had fallen substantially
- growing challenge was supporting development priorities

It also concluded that Mozambique would not be clear of mines in the foreseeable future, with the biggest challenge being IND's inability to provide a clear picture of contamination. The study highlighted the vague mine free/mine impact free concept, the need for a link between mine action and development, and problems with the institutional set-up.

However, much has changed since then. The initial catalyst was the 2007 Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) report that reduced the country's suspected hazardous area by half. Formal verification and handover have proceeded in these and other provinces, where the district-by-district approach has greatly simplified planning, monitoring and verification. By 2010, 50 of Mozambique's 128 districts had been declared mine free, with the prospect of a further 42 in 2011.

The MIFD and the baseline assessment provided sufficient information for Mozambique's detailed request for an Article 5 extension. In addition, after two previous plans with revisions<sup>41</sup> based on shaky data, they enabled IND to prepare a definitive evidence-based national mine action plan for 2008 to 2014, to achieve compliance, with a year-by-year clearance budget. Although a major step forward, the "evidence" was in fact far from accurate. On the one hand, there were the above-mentioned data problems in Maputo province. On the other hand a number of known major problems such as the large minefields around the Cahora Bassa dam and along the Zimbabwe border had not been quantified when the plan was drafted, although their estimated clearance cost was included in the budget and there were a number of known but unvisited sites. Consequently, while the 2008-2014 plan could only cite 541 known mined areas with 12.1 million m<sup>2</sup>, a preliminary IND report on the three years 2008-2010 shows that the figures had risen to 822 tasks and 23.4 million m<sup>2</sup>. Of these, 486 tasks/9.2 million m<sup>2</sup> were cleared during that period – equivalent to 92 per cent and 105 per cent of the respective quantified targets in the Five-Year Plan.

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<sup>41</sup> 2007-2009, 2008-2012

The geographical division of the country by operator remains, with HALO Trust in Maputo, Manica and Tete, Handicap International in Inhambane and Sofala, and APOPO in Gaza, although IND has to some extent since had a say in the distribution.

However, there has since been a recovery in donor funding, mostly due to the clearer picture, the new Article 5 compliance target, the Norwegian commitment, and mobilisation by UNDP and HALO. There was also a substantial rise in government funding; to USD 3 million in 2009, when it was the largest single contributor to the programme. Mine action has been included as a cross-cutting issue in the government's five-year plan, approved at the first sitting of the current legislature.

Planning methods have been changed to accommodate the district-by-district approach. It has been clearly established that the aim is not mine impact free but mine free<sup>42</sup>, and there is a strong emphasis on land release to increase efficiency. Official procedures for the declaration of district mine free status and the role of local authorities have been established and distributed to operators and government entities. Revised MMAS and standard operating procedures have been prepared.

In line with the government's decentralisation policy, provincial governments will play a key role in mine action:

- setting priorities
- monitoring mine action
- provision of mine risk education (MRE)
- validation of mine free status with IND

Provincial Demining Commissions have been created, with members from development and security wings of government to take on some of these responsibilities.<sup>43</sup> IND is being restructured to meet the new challenges and has reduced staff, from 68 employees in 2006 to around 40 in 2010, and aiming toward a target of 20 by 2014.

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<sup>42</sup> Defined as "All districts where there are no mined areas or known suspected areas"

<sup>43</sup> Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance, Provincial Police Command and the army with optional representation by other sectors in line with the mine-related issues in each province e.g. tourism in Inhambane and mineral resources in Tete



## TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

### DECISION-MAKING AND THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Responsibility for decision-making and the transition process are interconnected. The mine action programme in Mozambique has never been through a consistent, coherent process that culminated in a single formal transition decision point, or a single plan on how such a point would be reached. There have been several transition variants arising from a number of muddled processes. The main transition features in Mozambique are:

- Throughout the various mine action processes, ownership was always conditional on control over money and where it went. Government contribution was minimal until recently, meaning that donors and the operators who prepared project proposals for funding had the greatest decision-making power on how much was spent and where.
- Transition from large commercial operators to a “national” mine action capability in the form of ADP (a UNDP project) was the product of an improvised process during a confused ONUMOZ era that was never clearly thought through. It was an “indigenous” entity in composition but not in institutional form. Failure to resolve this conundrum is one of the tragedies of mine action in Mozambique.
- There was no transition process from ONUMOZ to CND per se, just a gap between one starting and one ending. Post-ONUMOZ donor pressure pushed the government into producing a weak CND that combined both authority and MAC functions with inappropriate leadership to address complex issues and cultivate sound donor relations. Its position under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation diluted the internal governmental attention the sector needed. A more suitable and workable plan, with the relevant capacity-building support, should have been put in place before or just after ONUMOZ closed.
- Transition to IND, UNDP and potential ownership – IND had the benefit of a new director and a UNDP capacity-building project that managed to establish more solid foundations, although many of the people it trained left. However, the biggest problem was that the independent operators had become entrenched in their three regions and IND did not have sufficient authority over them and, therefore, over the national mine action programme. Nevertheless, three years after the project ended, with the MIFD and baseline assessment data and a little outside help, IND staff were able to prepare an Article 5 extension request and the national mine action plan for 2008 to 2014.

- It is difficult to unravel the effects of the official end of the UNDP project in 2005 and other events that contributed to the crisis years. Nevertheless, the decision to hire qualified people on contract, in order to achieve “end of project” objectives was opportunistic, short-sighted and indeed dishonest, as it was obvious that the best would not stay. Also, the project technical advisors failed to steer IND in the direction of a plausible alternative to the LIS and UNDP’s collaboration in the LIS-based first IND plan. The collapse of donor support also had a UNDP footprint: its involvement in the Adopt a Minefield scandal and the disintegration of ADP undermined its hitherto significant role in mobilising funding for mine action.
- The departure of a number of international operators could have been turned to IND’s advantage, providing the ideal opportunity for a transition to an ADP-based national operational capability<sup>44</sup> and national ownership. Instead ADP was allowed to collapse. Donor reluctance was only part of the problem. The root cause was that it was conceived as a project, not a national demining organisation receiving outside support (possibly in project form). Therefore, the emphasis was on demining operations, not transition. What came afterwards was an improvised panic response. Consequently, some responsibility for the outcome of ADP’s 11 years as a UNDP project must lie with UNDP. Another major part, however, lies with the government. If it was truly interested in having a strong, national mine action capability, the government could have made it happen. It did not.
- The turning point in IND’s assertion of ownership came with the MIFD and baseline assessment. The IND personnel who prepared the Article 5 extension request were initially recruited under the UNDP capacity-building project. They received training through other means, such as practical experience, rotation through different departments, short courses and interacting with colleagues from other mine action programmes, and some also obtained university degrees. Although UNDP’s involvement in capacity development was the heaviest and most costly, a number of smaller agencies have for many years provided consistent assistance focused on specific areas as and when needed. For example, SAC and the GICHD have made a vital and possibly more lasting contribution than the isolated CTAs.

One persistently weak point with ownership implications is IND’s difficulty in addressing what comes after information is gathered. It is presented in annual reports as facts and descriptions, with little or no analysis; there are no in-depth studies of a key issue or problem. This may be due to a lack of time, although two senior staff members specifically mentioned analytical capacity/skills as being a challenge and constraint.

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<sup>44</sup> According to the former ADP director as early as 2003 there were informal approaches by departing operators who hoped that ADP would take over from them

Areas that could warrant more in-depth attention include demining costs<sup>45</sup> and operator productivity.

In the final transitional push to a mine free Mozambique, IND is undoubtedly performing better and is gaining more discretionary access to resources. However, the operator challenge persists. There is a small operator (APOPO), a somewhat larger and stronger one (HI) and a very large and powerful one (HALO Trust) with strong fundraising capacity and, therefore, the freedom to apply those funds where and how it sees fit. This places certain constraints on IND ownership as it seeks to pursue its 2014 target in the way it sees fit. It has also been pointed out however, that, if IND had a stronger set of national rules and regulations in place, which all operators would have to adhere to, its leadership role would be considerably strengthened.

## **ISSUES FACING MORE MATURE MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES**

Every country has different contamination problems, ways of addressing them and capacity to do so. In Mozambique, one of the targets of the 2008-2014 plan is to prepare for residual mine and UXO contamination. The main tasks are:

- defining and building the capacity of the entity that will deal with these
- preparation of an action plan for residual contamination, including funds for survey and clearance
- action on both mine risk education and victim assistance

The various preparatory measures mentioned in section 4 reflect some of the concerns.

An overview of the Mozambican experience raises the following issues:

- a) The importance of the database and correctly recording figures so that:
  - survey and clearance records are correct and up to date
  - the outstanding tasks for survey or full clearance are known and can be planned for
  - there is a notion of the likely kind of residual problems
- b) Mine action information should be easily available to development and investment entities that intend to work in a given area. Any data on subsequent measures should be recorded correctly, stored in a timely fashion and be available to those who need it.

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<sup>45</sup> IND reportedly asked the private operators to get together and come up with a reference price. Needless to say they came up with the highest figure discussed.

- c) The importance of identifying the likely residual problems and the capabilities needed to address them in the field, eg survey, clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), quality assurance, mine risk education, handover and information management. Although there is as yet no clear plan for Mozambique, there are some positive signs:
- provincial/district authorities will now be responsible for confirming new problems and organising appropriate solutions eg EOD, contacting a clearance entity
  - the police will be responsible for EOD, with training underway
  - the army will be responsible for clearance
- d) There are many private operators in Mozambique, and they are in many instances poorly controlled and with dubious capacity. For this reason, more rigorous licensing rules and decisions about reducing their number is required, and the demand for and control over private operators needs to be studied, including quality assurance and reporting. Under the current set-up, work for private operators is insufficient to ensure the financial viability of any company. Once Mozambique has fulfilled its clearance obligations under the Ottawa convention, there will probably be even less work, although “precautionary surveys” by investors might increase.

The current rough division of responsibility for resources has seen humanitarian operations (mainly donor-funded) working to clear not only minefields that impact on communities, but also supporting development projects such as power and railway lines. HALO’s current clearance of electricity pylons with donor funds is justified on various grounds:

- local communities and/or their resources (eg cattle) are affected
- the development brought about by more secure power supplies eventually has an impact on the well-being of communities
- HALO has assumed full responsibility for ensuring that Maputo province achieves mine free status

Major public development projects (eg roads) have invariably included a budget item for survey and clearance by commercial operators, although this practice is declining as more areas are cleared. Investors also hire commercial operators for their own survey and clearance requirements and will probably continue to do so whenever they feel there is a need, even in areas that have been declared mine free by IND.

Much has been said about the inclusion of mine action in the government’s plans, first as a “cross-cutting” issue and now the need for “mainstreaming”.

Mainstreaming implies inclusion in sector plans, with financial provision in the budget. For example, several years ago, MRE was successfully mainstreamed by the Ministry of Education through teacher training, at little or no extra cost. Surveys and clearance, however, are a different matter. In keeping with decentralisation, it seems that a special allocation in the provincial budgets has been considered, although there has also been reference to provisions in a globalising ministry<sup>46</sup> or in the individual sector ministries most likely to be affected, such as the departments of public works and agriculture. However, unless this is made mandatory, in a “mine free” Mozambique, far greater needs are bound to crowd out provision for a possible but as-of-yet unknown mine action requirement.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, if the army is to become responsible for residual issues, this would surely have to be covered by its regular budget.<sup>48</sup>

- e) The institutional set-up and a clear definition of responsibilities; central, provincial and district. This involves what legal form a future IND/MAC equivalent will take, its structure and responsibilities, where it will be placed, and the composition and role of an eventual national authority.
- f) As an organisation matures and acquires more experience and capacity short term technical advisors or consultancy support, it will be far more productive and effective than a long term UNDP technical advisor position with generic terms of reference.
- g) The end is in sight but there are still many challenges for IND before it is achieved. It is possible that, over the next two years or so before Article 5 compliance with APMBC obligations is achieved (which may or may not happen); there could still be capacity constraints. However, if these are to be identified correctly and addressed, it must be an IND initiative.

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<sup>46</sup> A ministry with responsibilities that impact on all or many sector ministries such as the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Public Administration

<sup>47</sup> Although it has been suggested that any identified need could be included in the relevant sector’s budget the following year.

<sup>48</sup> It is highly unlikely that the Vietnamese experience of sector ministry, provincial/district government, donor and investor funding of army clearance would be an option in Mozambique.

## KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT

Some findings of the 2005 *A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique* remain relevant to the issue of transition to national ownership.

- Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more difficult to put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination and ownership of the process.

A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with established programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the problem and leaves the government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it advances a better conceived coordination mechanism.

In Mozambique, a weak central body enabled operators to proceed and consolidate their positions, however their independently growing strength and knowledge made it difficult for national capacity to develop. However, it is also possible that with a different institutional set-up and more government commitment to mine action, IND could have been strengthened.

- A key element of government ownership is its ability to collect accurate data on suspected hazardous areas and their impact, and to guarantee the efficient storage of this information. This means ensuring a match between addressing the need for:
  - clear, reliable information on contamination (location)
  - an assessment of the impact of this contamination on communities and development programmes

This requires close coordination between central and local government entities and operators on the ground. The central mine action entity must have the ability to:

- develop these norms and guidelines
- establish a single set of impact criteria
- ensure that they are being applied and record the information received promptly and efficiently

If it does not develop this capacity, the operators will lead the process, and in so doing produce separate information and government control of the situation will remain weak.

In Mozambique, the LIS was conducted by an external entity, did not engage with operators and used impact indicators that were considered irrelevant by all the actors involved. The operators applied their own systems and criteria.

- An efficient and effective database system is of crucial importance:
  - for planning and treaty compliance purposes
  - as a permanent source of accurate information as clearance efforts wind down

The move to “impact free” status and “residual” contamination must remain at a high level of importance, even as other government functions decline database management capacity. This has not been the case in IND although the recent decision to shift the database from the planning to the operations department is an important step.

- When building a post-conflict mine action centre from scratch, the immediate pressure is to get the job done, particularly as lives are at stake. However, the option of cutting corners by hiring staff outside the government system and with remuneration considerably higher than public sector salary levels is self-defeating and the antithesis of institutional capacity development. It causes conflict with existing public service staff and those trained leave as soon as the funding runs out.

However, if the departure of this additional manpower coincides with a substantial reduction in the problems to be tackled (or the challenges are not as great as initially anticipated), then a short term intensive manpower approach could be justified. It could then be reduced to a downsized core team of experienced permanent staff to oversee winding down of the programme and the transition to a residual mine action capacity. To some extent this is what has happened in Mozambique but by default, not as part of a strategy. The abrupt and unplanned transition resulted in serious repercussions for both IND capacity and the mine action programme.

- An effective public mine action entity requires:
  - technical expertise
  - good management skills
  - an appropriate organisational structure and system and administrative procedures

If the institutional capacity development of technical advisors is to be effective, senior management must recognise the above needs and work to ensure internal organisational development. Without this commitment, no amount of external

assistance can build an effective organisation. Then, as the programme matures, management should improve networking/mobilisation skills within government to ensure that other public entities play their part.

The absence of a mine action authority, the unusual institutional location of IND within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fact that the IND director has always come from an international relations/diplomacy background have probably not provided the best context for the mine action programme in Mozambique. To a certain extent, this reflects

- a) the origins of IND
- b) how mine action was put lower on the government's policy and development agenda when the problem turned out to be less acute than initially predicted. Given the relatively few mine incidents over the last decade this position is understandable.

As the main effort draws to a close, much more thought is going into the post-compliance organisational set-up than occurred during the establishment of IND.

- The relationship between an "aid provider" or "fund manager" and the beneficiary is often not an easy one. Given the current stage of mine action in Mozambique, a "project/chief technical advisor" structure might be less useful than a number of short term consultancies focusing on issues of particular relevance to the current downsizing phase. However, IND regularly requests a chief technical advisor, seemingly to ensure the continued flow of funds. UNDP says it provides a chief technical advisor because IND requests one. Often, the incumbent chief technical advisor finds there is little he can advise on, or the advice is unwelcome.



## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### Surveys in Mozambique – actual and intended

Who	When	Findings
UN	1992	“Back of an envelope” estimate of two million mines in Mozambique
HALO	1993	Rough emergency survey by HALO identified 981 mined areas provided; input for the first SHAMAN database on SHA
NPA	1998-99	Intending to conduct a “Level 1 survey” documenting what was already done and identifying what remained to be done in Tete, Manica and Sofala (planned but perhaps not carried out)
HI	1998-99	A survey of the southern province where it was based - Inhambane - gathering logistical information, socio-economic data aimed at a risk-based and demining value-added prioritisation (planned but perhaps not carried out)
CIDC	2000-01	A flawed Landmine Impact Survey found 123 out of 128 districts contaminated; 1,374 SMAs affecting 1,488,998 people in 791 communities, affected area of 562km <sup>2</sup> . This was totally different to the real situation.
HALO	2004-07	A Mine Impact Free District exercise in four centre-north provinces (Zambézia, Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado) identified and cleared 74 new SHAs. It then declared that there were no known areas left to demine
NPA	2005-06	Prior to leaving Mozambique conducted a Task Impact Assessment of all centre-south provinces (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo)
HI	2006-07	Comprehensive village by village survey of the centre-south mix of provinces where it was operating - Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane
HALO	2007	Baseline assessment carried out of all known centre-south provinces (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) based on IND database/LIS, HI and NPA surveys. Visited 1,844 sites, cancelled 1,192, identified 484 mined areas (later increased to 541), 165 spot UXO sites, 33 mined roads and six battle area clearance tasks. While demining HALO found another 43 sites and additional area of 1.5 million square metres
IND	2008-	District by district verification of the HALO survey of the four centre-north provinces identified a further 43 SMAs and 34 UXO sites.

## ANNEX 2

### Funding for the mine action programme

**Table 1: Funding for the mine action programme 1999-2009 (million USD)**

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
State	0.2	0.2	0.3	5.9	1.3	7.6	2.1	1.3	1.3	1.56	3.0	24.76
Donor	12.0	17.0	15.1	16.9	18.1	14.4	15.0	6.2	2.7	4.3	5.9	127.6
Total	12.2	17.2	15.4	22.8	19.4	22.0	17.1	7.5	4.0	5.86	8.9	152.36
%												
State	2%	1%	2%	26%	7%	35%	12%	17%	33%	27%	34%	16%
Donor	98%	99%										

Source: Mozambique's Article 5 extension request; 2008 and 2009 annual reports

The mine action programme in Mozambique is financed mainly by the international community. The state usually finances the activities of IND and contributes tax exemption for the goods and equipments used in demining. The Mozambican army's contribution is never included. However, in recent years the state budget has also provided funds for demining, and over the period 2007-2009 it contributed around a third of all funds (Total USD 18.8 of which USD 5.9 government and USD 12.9 donors).

**Table 2: Costs for the extension period presented in the Article 5 extension request (USD)**

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Total
Demining	6,689,145	5,662,595	5,945,724	6,140,993	3,538,500	27,976,957
IND	2,021,800	1,853,800	1,309,500	930,200	863,200	6,978,500
TOTAL	8,710,945	7,516,395	7,255,224	7,071,193	4,401,700	34,955,457

**Table 3: Projections Mine Action Plan 2008-2014 (USD)**

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Surveys and demining	3.819.000	6.957.306	8.440.418	4.931.906	1.752.090	835.540	26,736,260
Cahora Bassa dam			913.596				913,596
Mp-Komatiport pylons			1.000.000				1,000,000
Survys /dem Zim border		125.000					125,000
SubTotal demining	3.819.000	7,082,306	10,354,014	4.931.906	1.752.090	835.540	28,774,856
Demining QA	893.680	479.344	537.456	617.839	600.834	600.834	3,729,987
Information management	371.530	199.727	223.940	257.433	250.348	250.348	1,553,326
Coordination	743.060	399.453	447.880	514.866	500.695	500.695	2,658,769
Civic education	230.000	279.617	313.516	360.406	350.487	350.487	1,884,513
Total estimated cost	6.057.270	8.440.447	11.876.806	6.682.450	3.454.454	2.537.904	39,049,331
State budget funds	1.563.270	1.800.000	2.000.000	2.500.000	2.500.000	1.700.000	12,063,270
International funds	4.494.000	6.640.447	9.876.806	4.182.450	954.454	837.904	26,986,061
Total funds	6.057.270	8.440.447	11.876.806	6.682.450	3.454.454	2.537.904	39,049,331
% state	26%	21%	17%	37%	72%	67%	31%
% GOM	74%	79%	83%	63%	28%	33%	69%

Source: National Mine Action Plan 2008-2014

Of the total USD 39 million needed to implement this plan, it is expected that USD 12 million will be provided by the government through the state budget and USD 27 million by donors.

**Table 4: Funds channelled through UNDP in 2010 in USD**

Operator	Total	Source	
<b>HALO (13%)</b>	<b>455,010</b>	50,000	DFID
		80,000	AusAid
		170,000	UNDP Trac 1
		155,010	UNDP Trac 3
<b>HI (37%)</b>	<b>1,337,558</b>	50,000	DFID
		140,000	AusAid
		140,000	UNDP Trac 1
		200,000	Japan
		807,558	UN Trust Fund
<b>APOPO (23%)</b>	<b>818,977.97</b>	161,423.94	DFID
		150,000	Italy
		201,688.02	UN Trust Fund
		305,866.01	Japan
<b>MECHEM (3%)</b>	<b>121,754.22</b>	<b>121,754.22</b>	Japan
<b>IND (24%)</b>	<b>868,997.93</b>	273,532.04	Trac 1
		79,037.60	DFID
		30,962.31	Italy
		124,002.12	Japan
		82,499.68	Australian Aid
		210,188.53	UN Trust Fund
		68,775.65	Trac 3
<b>TOTAL (100%)</b>	<b>3,602,298.12</b>	340,462	DFID (9%)
		302,500	AusAid (8%)
		807,318	UNDP Trac (22%)
		1,219,435	UN Trust Fund (34%)
		751,622	Japan (21%)
		180,962	Italy (5%)
			<b>3,602,298.12 (100%)</b>

Source: UN SALW Annual Report 2010 and additional information from UNDP

UN/UNDP contributed the largest amount; 56 per cent. The largest beneficiary was IND itself, almost one quarter of the funds.

According to the IND annual report; in 2009, mine action received almost USD 9 million (both funds received through UNDP and also other funds).

## ANNEX 3

### Capacity-building assessments

#### 1. Summary of IND capacity-building and support programmes – bilateral and UNDP supported: overview and current status (2001)

(Attachment to terminal report for MOZ/00/004 “Flood Related Mine Action”)

##### a) Background

In September 1999, the government of Mozambique established the new National Demining Institute and, under donor pressure, appointed a new director.

##### b) General Achievements

- Major change in attitude from 1999. CND was had not achieved much result when it was transformed into IND, leaving a very unstable platform to transform into a solid foundation
- IND produced a strategy for the next five years covering mine awareness, location and clearance of mined areas, training, human resources without much input from the TA, and an activity plan for 2002
- First meeting of the interministerial Technical Council in December 2000, to establish this forum, and a second meeting in March 2001 to establish priorities
- First meeting of the operators working group in August 2000, the second in November 2000. Operators thereafter decided to meet once a year
- Quarterly meetings with donors established
- CTA and IND developed a document on donor support

##### c) Current Status

##### *Information and Planning*

- *The most important* department of IND has a staff of seven (the head of department, a database supervisor responsible for outputs, a data entry supervisor and four input clerks). It records all information, distributes and determines mine action priorities. It also produced a strategy, mission plan, activity plan and the overview of mine action for 2000
- Database has been restored to working order. Hardware and networking equip was set up and software installed. Existing data was translated into EVISMA format and new report

formats distributed to operators. Basic training in IMSMA. A technical advisor from Canada helped IND by providing invaluable assistance. IND staff could not have performed this task unassisted as it involved in-depth hardware and computer science knowledge

- Database personnel worked through all the Level 2 and 3 reports and any inaccurate reports were referred to operators for rectification. This was a slow but necessary process to get the database to the required standard. Staff did 35 reports a day
- Level 1 Survey (LIS) has almost been concluded, and information transferred to the National Database. It will provide a benchmark of the mine problem and enable this department to produce a national mine action plan
- Personnel have good language capability and the necessary qualifications
- Requests for information are now dealt with within 48 hours. A database can produce mine maps that indicate suspect areas. Most information requirements are from government or NGOs involved in development or other commercial operations. Few requests are received from the three main operators.

What is needed:

- Decentralisation to regional offices
- More training and latest IMSMA
- Operator training in new reporting formats
- Forums for distribution of information
- A mine action plan after completing Level 1 activities
- Establishment of a system for tasking, tracking and completion of tasks

### ***Operations:***

- Mine action projects have been developed
- There are work plans for a flood emergency programme
- Tender procedures have been reviewed and the system is very transparent. Selection criteria had been clearly defined and tender committee established. IND is still inexperienced but is learning by training, practical experience and lessons learned
- Standard operating procedures have been developed for all categories of mine action. Accreditation Procedures have been developed but new International Standards are still to be finalised. Quality control procedures will be concluded as soon as international standards are finalised
- Training is given in priority topics where IND is having difficulty to prepare and interpret proposals:
  - Mine action information requirements

- Use of explosive detection dogs
- Use of mechanical assisted mine clearance
- Calculating productivity
- Preparation of a scope of work
- Preparation of a request for proposals

What is needed:

Operations personnel have a good demining background but some weaknesses need to be addressed through training:

- Problem solving
- Technical analyses
- Technical interpretation
- Technical evaluations
- Investigation of accidents
- Technical reports
- Quality assurance and quality control

#### ***Human Resources:***

- The HR department consists of one head and an assistant responsible for TOR, advertising, recruitment and determining training requirements
- Any new staff recruited are of a high standard
- Salaries are a problem; most of the new staff are recruited for temporary projects, so their capacity will be lost as soon as these support projects end

What is needed:

- Staff are capable of performing duties but have difficulty in determining training requirements for staff development. General management and personnel development training is required
- Salary issues need to be resolved. This involves consolidating all support programmes, including the Government of Mozambique (GOM) contribution, and creating one budget for IND, addressing all outstanding requirements. The GOM must approve the final budget.

#### ***Administration and finance:***

- Comprises the department head, two accountants, one procurement and inventory control clerk. It is responsible for all administration and finance matters in IND, as well as managing three secretaries, six drivers and three cleaners. A technical advisor arrived in March 2001

- The department was disorganised, and staff did not have clearly defined responsibilities. There were no administrative working forms or procedures, no accounting principles or standards and no accounting tools for record purposes
- Objectives were established:
  - Job descriptions and responsibilities were developed
  - information and reporting were clearly defined and given direction
  - administrative working procedures and forms were established with a set of accounting principles
- On the job training started soon after the administrative and financial systems were in place
- The technical advisor for the administration and finance has regular sessions with national counterpart, to develop leadership skills including supervising, planning, controlling and monitoring

What is needed:

- The system is not flexible for urgent requirements. Coordination needs to be further improved and instructions channelled through the head of the department
- There are training needs:
  - General management
  - Administrative and financial procedures
  - Budget controls
  - Budget revisions
  - Financial reporting procedures
  - Inventory control
  - Procurement procedures

### ***International Relations:***

- One person deals with all issues relating to projects: status of funding, visas and work permits. There is a fine line where the responsibility of the national director stops and the department's starts.

What is needed:

- Improve communications with donors
- Keep persons informed of progress
- Timely notification of events

- Interaction with the other departments

#### **d) General Achievements**

- National Director: has a clear vision of where he wants to go and is committed but needs to improve coordination and delegation and should be more patient in achieving objectives in order to maintain quality
- Deputy Director: has no clear function or responsibility and executes tasks as instructed by the National Director. Director must delegate to the Deputy a clear line function.
- Coordination needs improvement
- Basic training needs have been identified. Formal management training has been arranged for IND department heads that will take three months.
- Mandate and responsibilities: IND has an extensive mandate and has acquired more responsibility than it was originally prepared for. Objectives are reached but results are sometimes below standard. Pressure from all levels to deliver results has forced IND to perform above its capacity. This can result in hasty action without proper consideration for the longer term consequences or outcomes. IND is judged by its performance, which can impact negatively on confidence levels.
- Capacity development:
  - For capacity development to succeed in IND, commitment, dedication and enthusiasm is needed from national counterparts, especially senior management. There is room for improvement at other levels, and staff need to be motivated.
  - Training will play a major role in improving skills in IND but it is up to nationals to put effort into their work. They should emphasise training, be involved in resolving problems, and play an active training role when required. Technical advisors also need training to keep them abreast of the latest developments and improve their knowledge and ability to transfer skills.

#### **e) Conclusions**

- IND has improved significantly over the last 12 months, mainly due to the national director and his staff making an effort to achieve results and improve accessibility and communication with operators and partners. There is a need to emphasise improving coordination, tasking and sharing of information



- Departments are in an acceptable shape and the needs to improve them further have been identified. Coordination must be improved within the various departments and procedures for information flow between departments have been established
- The IND is taking on too many responsibilities, mainly because of external pressure to demonstrate it is achieving results. They should instead concentrate on getting the basics sorted take on further responsibilities only when ready
- Technical decision-making is improving and problems are being analysed before decisions are made. A lot of emphasis is placed on this area to maintain continuity in the decision-making process
- All TAs were put in place before the end of June 2001 to improve the quality of outputs. TA functions are to train IND staff to enable them to perform their tasks. Training of TAs is also recommended to improve their knowledge on current technologies and to enable them to transfer knowledge
- IND in general is showing encouraging results and continued support is recommended. Support programmes should be revised and consolidated to ensure all requirements of IND are fully covered

## 2. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique, October 2005 (1)

The 2005 *A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique* referred to a 2001 study by a consultant who made various capacity- building recommendations. It produced the following table on the status of implementation of the consultant’s recommendations at that time.

Main recommendation	Sub recommendation	Progress
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Match mandate to capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus mandate and priorities to match resources.</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop multi-year business plan and budget to correspond to activities</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build capacities related to priorities as stated in the work plan</li> </ul>	Some
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen the institute’s internal management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reorganise and strengthen the management council into a working senior management committee</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restructure the office of the deputy director to take direct responsibility for operations</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarify roles and reporting relationships</li> </ul>	No



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Address human resource management challenges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure smooth working relationships between TA and counterparts by holding workshops</li> </ul>	No
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure effective transfer of data from CIDC to IND</li> </ul>	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen IND database by conducting client satisfaction surveys</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outsource QA to contractors</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen regional offices</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decentralise authority to regional offices</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a regional office for the south in the headquarters</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a LAN for internal communications</li> </ul>	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide PCs to all managers</li> </ul>	Yes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve external relations management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use governance bodies provided to create value for mine action community</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publish regular newsletter for community needs</li> </ul>	Yes

### 3. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique, October 2005 (2)

The report (written during the crisis years) contained a number of recommendations relevant to capacity development, performance and the transition to a sustainable solution for Mozambique's contamination problem, most of which were not accepted/implemented.

#### Recommendations: number and summary

1, 2, 3	IND should meet with operators (HALO, NPA, HI, ADP) to discuss their understanding of "mine impact free" and formulate a common definition; to discuss alternative approaches to systematic resurvey leading to reduced, defined SHAs and preliminary classification; to agree upon the information management system to ensure IMSMA data are correct and up to date
9,10	Inclusion of mine action in government development plans
12,13, 14	GOM should establish an interministerial body to serve as a national authority, a mine action centre and a board of directors to oversee implementation of its mine

	action policy
15, 20	<p>On capacity development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CTA should assess existing capacities for analysing data and providing technical advisory services to GOM and the public sector and prepare the respective capacity development plan</li> <li>• To initiate the next stage of capacity development IND Director, with CTA support, should establish a performance management approach, set performance management targets, monitor performance and take appropriate capacity development action</li> </ul>
16,17,18, 19	Steps in the formulation of a national mine action strategy with donor collaboration but GOM in the driving seat, based on an accurate needs assessment